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ABSTRACT

This thesis comprises a study of those socio-economic dynamics that establish
and influence the existence, distribution, and evolution of rules for the outer space
environment. In particular, this thesis analyzes how the initial State practice of launching
objects into outer space led to the genesis of rules for the outer space environment. The
presentation of this thesis includes an introduction, a methodology section, three studies,
and a conclusion. The first study considers the formation of initial rules for the outer
space environment as a consequence of State practice using historical analysis and game
theory. The second study considers how States utilized their ability to practice foreign
relations to produce and conclude the Outer Space Treaty and how the adoption of the
Outer Space Treaty led to the subsequent adoption of specialized treaties regarding
objects launched into outer space using economic analysis of public international law.
The third study comprises a case study of the term “space object” and its adoption and
subsequent evolution into State national laws that originated from the initial State
practice of launching objects into outer space using comparative and economic analyses
of public international law. Collectively, each study seeks to demonstrate how the rules
for the outer space environment have evolved and converged in content (i.e., definition,
meaning, and scope of a rule) as a result of the consumption (i.e., acceptance of the
obligation of a supplied rule) of legal rules on which States depend to ultimately manage
the risks and costs associated with activities to and in the outer space environment.
xviii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“Facts are not autonomous. They gain meaning from the frameworks within which
human beings interpret them.”2

a. Thesis Statement

The thesis presented here comprises a study of those socio-economic dynamics
that establish and influence the existence, distribution, and evolution of rules for the outer
space environment. In particular, this thesis analyzes how the initial State practice of
launching objects into outer space led to the genesis of rules for the outer space
environment. In studying this issue, an economic analysis of international law is applied
to three sources of rules of public international law: international custom, international
agreements, and general principles of law. Rules of international custom, international
agreements, and general principles of law arise from the supranational market of
international relations. States develop rules for the outer space environment as a function
of the exchanges (occurrences and transactions) of self-regarding units, i.e., States, in the

Thomas Levenson, Science Doesn’t Work the Way You Might Think, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 10, 2015,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2015/11/science-doesnt-work-the-way-you-thinkit-does/414744/.
2

1

supranational market of international relations. In order to purchase rules on the
supranational market of international relations, States must give something of value to
other States in the form of some element of their State sovereignty.3 Because States value
their sovereignty so highly, exchanges result in the formation, proliferation, and
consumption of rules of jurisdiction, which are considered a component of State power
because it is the basis for which a State may legitimately assert its authority outside its
territory.4
When States enter the supranational market of international relations, they attempt
to maximize their valued preferences (economic and national security, foreign policy
preferences) by exchanging in the buying (i.e., accepting the obligation of a rule) and
selling (i.e., supplying (or offering) rules that States may consume) of rules of jurisdiction
supplied to the supranational market through a variety of respective State practices in
relation to some source of rules.5 The supply of rules of jurisdiction is based on the
demand of States as a product of their valued preferences in relation to the environments
beyond a State’s sovereign territory.6 The sale of rules of jurisdiction in relation to some
valued preference may occur when States supply rules to the supranational market of
international relations through negotiation and/or conclusion of an international

3

See discussion infra and Figure 1.
See JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Harvard Univ. Press
2008) [hereinafter ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]; Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of
International Law, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Dunoff & Trachtman]; and Joel P. Trachtman,
Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Prescriptive
Jurisdiction]. C.f. ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Belknap Press 2013) [hereinafter POSNER & SYKES]. See also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2012) [hereinafter BROWNLIE].
5
See Appendix for Glossary of Terms and Figure 2.
6
Every environment outside a State’s territory has its own unique benefits, costs, and risks and therefore
rules States supply and consume are taken in relation to those economic factors and priced into an
obligation.
4

2

agreement, promulgation of national laws, regulations, and policies, or State practice
itself. The buying of rules of jurisdiction in relation to some valued preference may occur
when States consume (i.e., the act of giving notice to the acceptance of the obligation of a
rule(s) of jurisdiction) a rule(s) supplied on the supranational market of international
relations.7 Consequently, States may choose from a variety of possible rules of
jurisdiction in relation to some valued preference depending on the type of market from
which rules may arise because the type of market where an exchange could take place
can also affect the types of rules that are supplied as the result of barriers to market
entry.8
The concept of rules is developed as a sufficient component of State practice
because not all rules tend to become the product of public international law. Since rules
comprise some social value to its subjects, i.e., States, the highest expression of social
value for rules is the establishment of rules of law because such rules confer on the
international community of States ordered authority outside of a State’s territorial
boundaries.9 In order to measure how rules come into existence and evolve, game theory,
economic analysis of international law, and comparative analysis are utilized. Since
States make decisions under imperfect information, convergence on at least one common
basis for the definition, meaning, and scope of a legal rule for space activities should lead
to an efficient outcome within a particular interval of time. However, when valued

7

This may take the form of accepting obligations that arise from the signature or ratification of
international agreements, expressed directly or indirectly from State practice, or through the publication
within the State in the form of national laws, regulations, and policies. See discussion infra.
8
See discussion infra.
9
See DAVID A. LAKE, HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Cornell Univ. Press 2009) [hereinafter
LAKE], and BROWNLIE supra note 4. See also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (Harvard Univ. Press 1991) [hereinafter ELLICKSON], and ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE supra note 4.

3

preferences change, rules and supranational markets related to those valued preferences
will tend to evolve as well. Changes over time to the definition, meaning, and scope of a
legal rule for the outer space environment demonstrates evolution, which may or may not
tend to efficient rule supply. Consequently, evolution may engender potential and
quantifiable ripple effects to social actors who rely on such rules in terms of social
expectations, the legality of acts or omissions, the valuation of the types of permissible
activities conducted in the outer space environment, and the management of risks and
costs in the conduct of outer space activities.

b. Outline of Thesis

The general question this thesis seeks to answer is: how did the (unilateral)
occurrences and (bilateral/multilateral) transactions of self-regarding units, i.e., States,
create supranational markets of international relations that give rise to the development of
rules of jurisdiction over activities regarding the outer space environment from the initial
State practice of launching objects into the outer space environment? In other words,
what economic processes describe how the State practice of launching objects over the
territories of sovereign States toward and into the outer space environment gave rise to
the entire corpus of space law?
Supranational markets of international relations arise whenever States seek to act
beyond their sovereign territories. States act beyond their territories to maximize the
utility of their valued preferences, which tend to manifest through their foreign policy,
national and economic security needs. When States seek to maximize the utility of their

4

valued preferences, States necessarily engage in State practice, the act of which supplies
rules of jurisdiction to the supranational market of international relations.
States supply rules to the supranational market of international relations through
their State practice. Rules manifest through State practice in the form of rules of
jurisdiction.10 Rules of jurisdiction are a function of a State’s sovereignty because it is the
basis for the allocation of a State’s authority over objects and subjects to its jurisdiction.11
Because the international system of States operates on the basis of sovereign legal
equality and consent, a State’s authority is at its zenith within the borders of the State,
while a State’s authority is at its nadir when it is acting beyond its territory.12 Thus, in
order to minimize costs and maximize benefits in the pursuit of maximizing their valued
preferences, States supply and consume rules of jurisdiction on the supranational market
of international relations.
This thesis explores how rules of jurisdiction in regard to the outer space
environment have been valued by States over time. The value of rules is defined by four
criteria: the nature of the activity, the environment in which the activity may take place,
the minimization of uncertainty of State practice in the environment, and the rule source,
i.e., international custom (State practice and opinio iuris), international agreements
(treaties), and general principles of law (common rules of national law). Moreover, the
sources of rules of public international law for which States may seek to supply,
negotiate, and/or consume, vary in value.13 This happens because when States seek to

10

See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE supra note 4, and Prescriptive Jurisdiction supra note 4.
See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE supra note 4, and Prescriptive Jurisdiction supra note 4. See also BROWNLIE
supra note 4, and George Manner, The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law, 46 AM. J.
INT’L L. 428 (1952) [hereinafter Manner].
12
See BROWNLIE supra note 4.
13
This is because the obligation purchased varies depending on the source of the rule as a product of the
prohibition on nonconsensual rule-making in the international system.
11

5

supply or consume rules for the outer space environment, it is implicit that those States
value the ability to launch objects, the outer space environment, and the need to
maximize their valued preferences through State practice in different ways. Some States
will seek to supply and consume rules from all possible sources, while other States may
not participate in rule supply or consumption at all. Furthermore, some States may only
supply or consume some rules, but not all.14
The number of States that engage in the supranational market of international
relations for activities in the outer space environment has grown significantly since
October 1957.15 Participant States that have consumed rules of jurisdiction on the
supranational market regarding activities in the outer space environment buy these rules
because they are willing to sell an element of their sovereignty to gain some authority
over activities in the outer space environment in relation to other States. The cost of a
rule of jurisdiction is in incurring obligations, the breach of which will generally impose
some sanction, in order to extend a State’s authority over persons, things, and events
outside its territory, e.g., in the outer space environment, to satisfy some valued
preference in relation to the authority of other States.
The supply of rules of jurisdiction only comes from those States that are
interested in activities in the outer space environment.16 The initial supply and

14

See discussion in Chapter V infra.
See Graph 2.
16
Compare John Cobb Cooper, The Russian Satellite – Legal and Political Problems, 24 J. AIR L. &
COMM. 379 (1957) [hereinafter Russian Satellite] with U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
[UNCOPUOS], Legal Sub-Comm., Annotated Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.295 (Jan.
13, 2015), available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_L295E.pdf. See U.N. Comm. on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [UNCOPUOS], Legal Sub-Comm., Report of the Chair of the Working
Group on the Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2015/DEF/L.1 (Apr.
17, 2015), available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2015_DEF_L01E.pdf. See also
GBENGA ODUNTAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION IN AIRSPACE AND OUTER SPACE (Routledge 2011),
15

6

consumption of rules for the outer space environment resulted from the launch of the
Sputnik and Explorer objects between October 1957 and January 1958.17 Since January
1958, the United States, the Soviet Union, and eleven other States continue to engage in
the same State practice of launching objects over the territories of sovereign States into
and through the outer space environment.18
The rules of jurisdiction that arose from the State practice of launching objects
over the territories of sovereign States and into the outer space environment grew at the
greatest rate over the first twenty years following the launch of Sputnik.19 Moreover, the
rapidity of the acceptance of the State practice to launch objects over the territories of
sovereign States indicates significant consumption of rules from all three sources of rules
of public international law, i.e., international custom, international agreements, and
general principles of law – each source of rules represents an individual supranational
market of international relations. Since October 1957, the State practice of launching
objects over the sovereign territories of other States has solidified into international
custom because there is sufficient evidence to indicate that States have purchased the
obligation to ensure they can continue the State practice.20 Moreover, some States have
accepted the obligations associated with the State practice of launching objects over the
sovereign territories of other States as a matter of national law and international

and Dean N. Reinhardt, The Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty (Jun. 2005) (unpublished Master’s thesis,
McGill University) (on file with the Institute of Air & Space Law, McGill University), available at
http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=83956&local_base=GEN01-MCG02.
17
See WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, . . . THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SPACE
AGE (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1985).
18
See Timeline of first orbital launches by country, WIKIPEDIA.ORG,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_first_orbital_launches_by_country accessed Dec. 10, 2015.
19
See Graph 10 infra.
20
See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 123137 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).
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agreement.21 To a large degree, the obligation has at least converged on the content for
the first rule of space law that may be defined as consisting of the following elements: (1)
an object, (2) intended to be launched, or (3) launched, that includes a (4) launch vehicle,
(5) payload, or (6) satellite – which also includes (a) remote sensing, (b) scientific, (c)
telecommunication satellites, as well as (7) including the component parts and parts
thereof of a launch vehicle, payload, or satellite. However, this definition is relative to
States that exist on Earth because the limiting requirement of the State practice is that the
object intended to be launched or launched is a function of the overflight of a sovereign’s
territory. States only enjoy the benefits of sovereign territory relative to the Earth and
there is a general prohibition on a State’s ability to extend unilaterally its sovereignty to
the outer space environment without the consent of other States.22
The proliferation of the State practice of launching objects into the outer space
environment demonstrates the extent to which the international community of States
values an interest in rules of jurisdiction over space activities. However, not all States
participate in the supranational market of international relations for rules regarding
activities in the outer space environment. Some States may only participate in one, some,
or all supranational markets that arise, i.e., those supranational markets in relation to rules
of each source of public international law. For example, one hundred and four (104) out

21

See Chapter V infra. See also Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature
Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts,
the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr.
22, 1968, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return Agreement]; Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187
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of one hundred and ninety three (193) United Nations Member States have ratified the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty).23
Moreover, the Outer Space Treaty was negotiated and concluded in the United Nations
(UN) Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which began with
eighteen (18) and has grown, as of October 2015, to eighty three (83) member States.24
Of all the one hundred and ninety three (193) United Nations Member States today,
approximately twenty nine (29) States have enacted rules of national (space) law the
subject of which at least concerns the launching and use of space objects.25
The rapidity of rule development across each supranational market that facilitates
exchanges in rules of public international law for the outer space environment has varied
since October 1957. Although consumption of rules of jurisdiction increased sharply
when first supplied by international agreements, space treaty rule consumption has
trended relatively flat since around 1980, except in a few supranational markets where the
trend is clearly positive.26 However, supranational market participation has continued to
increase somewhat sharply in some markets even as rule consumption remains flat.27
Moreover, the number of States that consume rules of jurisdiction is at best one hundred
and four (104) relative to treaty obligations and at least twenty-nine (29) relative to the
number of States that have directly promulgated national (space) laws regarding space
objects. Nonetheless, as changes to the supply of rules, in the number of market
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participants, and in rule consumption rates continue to arise with varied velocity, there is
much fragmentation in the types of obligations States have purchased with respect to
supranational markets of international relations for the outer space environment.
Recent trends indicate that the rate of rule consumption and evolving valued
preferences of States have shifted market participation and rule supply back to unilateral
State practice with the deepening maturity of the commercial, civil, and military space
sectors within States.28 This may be the product of inertial forces endemic to some States
in determining the scope of their valued preferences to launch objects over the territories
of other States because the rapid growth of technology makes it hard for States to
consistently value the benefits and costs associated with the particular types of activities a
space object could perform in the outer space environment. On the other hand, there is
limited consensus on the scope of the types of obligations that a State could purchase in
the form of rules of jurisdiction on the supranational market for the outer space
environment.29 Consequently, despite attempts at coordination or cooperation among
States, the supply of some types of rules has not settled in terms of the content, i.e.,
definition, meaning, and scope, because there is little incentive to supply or consume
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rules that may not help maximize some States’ valued preferences for utilizing space
objects in the outer space environment.30
There will most likely be some types of change to State practice that will force an
evolutionary response in the generation of rules of jurisdiction for the outer space
environment regarding space objects. If so, then State practice will necessitate the
reevaluation of those valued preferences associated with space activities. In so doing, a
re-supply of rules in response to changes in State practice will occur and, depending on
the value of a new State practice, States will price the new supply of rules in accordance
with the need to consume new rules of jurisdiction over persons, things, and events that
could occur in the outer space environment. Ceteris paribus, this process should repeat
every time there is a shift in a State’s valued preferences as a product of State practice;
thus, further perpetuating the evolution of rules and rules of law for the outer space
environment.

c. The Theoretical Foundations of an Economic Analysis of Rule Formation
i. Epistemological Approach

Generally, the subject of law and economics can be defined as “the application of
economic methods to legal analysis.”31 Thus, the law and economic literature can be
broken down into two basic analytical parts: 1) economic analysis of law and 2)
economic analysis in law. (Emphasis added). The former analytical part reflects the study
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See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE supra note 4, at 1.
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of two basic questions: a) what are the effects of legal rules on the behavior of relevant
actors, and b) how are the effects of rules socially desirable?32 However, these questions
can also be reformulated to inquire about how economic methods of analysis are applied
to the study of legal institutions and doctrines through comparative analysis focusing on
the consequences of legal rules through cross-jurisdictional, historical, or hypothetical
processes.33 The latter analytical part concerns the study of the underlying economics of a
legal rule, i.e., “economic analysis supplies inputs to a legal rule.”34 For example, in the
cases of antitrust or anti-dumping issues under international trade law, “whether two
products are “like,” with the result that discrimination between them is prohibited, by
reference to cross-elasticities of demand.”35 Or by way of another example, in US
national law, a Herfindahl index for a particular industry may be used to determine
whether the merger of companies would create market concentrations greater than the
level of market share permitted by law.36 Hence, this latter analytical part considers the
underlying economic forces and processes that govern how rules function in a system of
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law and the extent to which State practice may determine the existence of a legal
obligation as a product of a particular outcome in a supranational market.
Fundamentally, the approach taken in this thesis is a hybrid of both types of
economic analysis as applied to public international law. With respect to the economic
analysis of public international law, the issue of how economic methods are applied to
doctrines of international law and international institutions provide a means by which to
measure how rules of public international law arise and evolve over time. With respect to
economic analysis in public international law, the secondary objective of this thesis is to
design a means by which an observer can compare the content (i.e., definition, meaning,
and scope) of rules over time. Furthermore, several economic methods are used in an
attempt to model how rules are adopted and proliferate over time. When States seek to
negotiate for or decide to follow some rule or rule of law, it is assumed that they seek to
manage risks to State practice and maximize consistent definition and meaning for a rule
of jurisdiction to minimize the cost of the obligation over time. However, as State
preferences change, so may a rule or rule of law or a necessary element of a rule of law
over time may also change.
The application of economic methods to public international law and rule-making
is the primary concern of this thesis. The power of this approach is that the various
methodologies that comprise economic analysis can be applied to a variety of subjects
related to public international law providing a foundation for measuring the distinction of
belief from opinion in a justifiable and falsifiable manner. As Trachtman points out,
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economics itself is not so much a methodology as an epistemology.
Economics encompasses a broad range of methods. In this regard,
economics is simply another word for rational social scientific analysis –
properly applied, it rejects no method that is rational. . . . Economics is a
strong social science because it is an open system. The only conditions for
inclusion in the system are rational analysis (but not necessarily the
assumptions that people are rational) and methodological individualism.37

From this starting point, the basic assumptions that underlie the economic analyses
utilized in this thesis are “(i) methodologically, that individuals [i.e., States] seek to
maximize the achievement of their [valued] preferences; and (ii) normatively, that the
only valid source of preferences – of values – is individuals [i.e., States].”38
This thesis attempts to take a positivist view of rule formation and makes no
assumptions or claims regarding how best rules should arise, which represents a
normative view of rule formation.39 The major point of this thesis, therefore, is to analyze
what may be termed “preference revelation” and its consequences for rule formation.40 In
other words, this thesis assumes that States will seek to minimize costs and manage risks
associated with extending State authority outside their sovereign territories in the form of
a supply of rules of jurisdiction. Consumption of the same rules of jurisdiction permits
States to assert their authority extraterritorially while accepting the obligations from such
rules imposes liabilities on States. A breach of an agreed upon rule of jurisdiction may

37

See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE supra note 4, at 1.
Id.
39
See Roberto Ago, Positive Law and International Law, 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 691 (1957).
40
See Dunoff & Trachtman supra note 4, at 9.
38

14

lead to sanctions in the form of tangible and intangible costs, e.g., shaming, warfare,
monetary damages, declaration of responsibility, or collective denial of a State’s
authority in the international system.41
Preference revelation is observed when States enter the supranational market of
international relations and seek preference satisfaction through the use of stratagems in
relation to other market participants. States have wide latitudes of freedoms in
determining their economic (i.e., health of the State), foreign policies (i.e., application of
sovereign authority), and national security (i.e., internal and external security) needs in
relation to other States.42 Underlying the analysis of preference revelation, as will be
discussed below, are supranational market forces that drive States to develop rules under
imperfect information in the course of conducting their international relations to achieve
preference satisfaction. Any change in information regarding a State’s valued preferences
or any element of a rule over time tends to drive the evolution of rules. Therefore, in this
thesis, application of economic analysis does not seek to answer the question of how
States should value their preferences, but how States seek to maximize their valued
preferences and its consequences for rule formation and evolution.
Moreover, the economic theories underlying the study of rule formation can be
differentiated.43 First, the Coase theorem assumes that a market mode of allocation is
superior to bureaucratic allocation because bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome
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regardless of the initial allocation of property if transaction costs are low.44 Second, the
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics “posits that under perfection competition
the market allocates resources efficiently,” but “recogniz[ing] that in a world without
perfect competition we cannot say that a move toward the free market will enhance
efficiency.” 45
Economic analysis of public international law as applied to the international
system of States follows three basic questions. First, how many State participants are
there in a given supranational market? Second, how does market participation via State
practice lead to the supply, buying, and selling of rules in the form of rules of
jurisdiction? Third, what are the consequences to the international system when the
supply and types of rules evolve as a result of a change in the valued preferences of
States?
Chapters III-V attempt to outline an answer to these questions in relation to rules
of jurisdiction that arose from the initial rule of launching objects over the sovereign
territories of other States. In the context of the supranational market of international
relations, both market participation and rule development may or may not lead to an
efficient outcome in the supply and purchasing of rules of jurisdiction in accordance with
State(s) preferences.46 In either case, how States enter the supranational market of
international relations will depend on a variety of facts that must be observed to
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determine whether a model of rule formation reflects an efficient means by which rules
may arise based on the spectrum of market participation.
Market participation will vary in the supranational markets of international
relations because each market with respect to each source of rules will have different
barriers to entry. On the basis of sovereign legal equality, each State in the international
system will generally have an equal market share only in terms of rules supplied by State
practice. However, when States purchase the set of rules that comprise a treaty, the act of
signature or ratification will establish the level of obligation purchased. The consumption
of the set of rules that comprise a treaty gives each State Party an equal share of the
obligation that arises from the treaty’s rules. Non-States Parties do not purchase the
obligation on the supranational market because they have not paid the price of accepting
the treaty’s legal obligations. Therefore a non-State Party cannot extend its authority
relative to other States Parties to the treaty with respect to the set of rules the treaty
comprises.
Since States are assumed to be rational, individualistic actors in the course of their
international relations with other States, rules of jurisdiction may come about in a variety
of ways open to States, either through cooperative or non-cooperative means.47 Although
rule formation may not always be efficient, the fact that States seek to maximize their
utility through rule development provides direct and indirect evidence of their valued
preferences. When a State does find it in its interest to seek to develop rules for itself and
wish to see such rules proliferate, it tends to find ways to enter the supranational market
of international relations to at least attempt to achieve rules for itself and to manage risks
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and minimize costs to States individually or collectively as a function of information
about the subject activity for which rules are sought. How States go about achieving rule
supply manifests through a variety of ways including through specific markets or via
institutional means – where States have access to such venues.

ii. The International System of States Defined as a Private Legal System

Throughout human history, social order has played an important role in
minimizing relative costs to existence.48 Social order has and does come in a variety of
forms, individually or collectively, e.g., warfare, religious or moral imposition, sovereign
imposition, and familial imposition.49 Historically, the disorder among and between
States has resulted in significant costs in terms of human life, physical resources,
developing advantageous capabilities, time, and effort.50 Sometimes governments are too
weak to perform the functions of protecting the lives of its people and their property.51
When local governments fail to enforce social order, significant third-parties have been
known to intervene in disputes to minimize social and real costs through the enforcement
of general rules of conduct and self-restraint.52 For example, religious institutions have
historically enabled dialogue and negotiation between disputing parties, proceeding on
the rules of good faith and fairness, by swearing an oath to abide by the rules agreed
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upon.53 This alternative to resorting to warfare tended to significantly minimize the costs
to each disputant, even if for a short period of time.
One apropos example of a third-party imposing external rules by consent of the
disputants is found in the “Pax Dei” movement of the tenth century in Western Europe.54
The decline and fall of the Carolingian Empire caused a political vacuum in Western
Europe resulting in the consolidation of power by rival lords through warfare.55 Without a
central, independent government to assert authority over Western Europe, rival lords
resorted to the mutual destruction of their respective lands, in particular, farms and the
peasants that worked the farms.56 Without a central government to put an end to the
warfare and impose peace, an opportunity arose for a third party to take a role in easing
tensions and minimizing further destruction. Because a majority of the people of Western
Europe in the tenth century worshipped under the faith of the Church of Saint Peter in
Rome, local Christian Priests introduced the concept of “Pax Dei” – the first known
decentralized, popular peace movement, as a solution to the high and constant social
costs of existence.57
One of the primary functions of the Pax Dei movement was the design of rules for
the regulation of warfare.58 The brutality that preceded the Pax Dei movement was so
atrocious and unsustainable that all parties to such warfare desired for a way to end the
suffering.59 The rival lords adopted the Pax Dei rules by oath, which the rival lords
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voluntarily accepted.60 The network of religious members of society took oaths seriously
because they represented a covenant with the Christian God – a major aspect of social life
in Europe at the time.61 Once the rival lords adopted the Pax Dei rules, which included
rules regulating warfare, e.g., the rules of prohibition against harming non-combatants
and suspending warfare during harvest season and times of religious significance, social
order was imposed through the enforcement of the original oaths.62 If a party violated or
derogated from the sworn oath that bound a party to a particular rule, then punishments
would include social and religious ostracism – an imposition of significant real (i.e.,
tangible) and spiritual (i.e., intangible) costs to the violator.63
The rules that members of the Pax Dei movement created and imposed on its
subjects by consent provide an example of the formation of a private legal system.64 A
private legal system consists of private ordering among subjects to third-party rules,
which do not arise from a centralized government.65 Fundamentally, then, a private legal
system can arise from “a non-governmental institution intended to regulate the behavior
of its members.”66 Thus, in the absence of a supranational State to impose authority on
the disputing rival lords, the lords consumed and supplied third-party rules to increase
social order.67
While the use and enforcement of Pax Dei rules of warfare waxed and waned over
time, States – such as they were between the tenth and seventeenth centuries – were not
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immune from the degrading forces of social and real costs in their international relations.
Through the middle of the seventeenth century, European monarchs still engaged in
devastating international warfare leading to a significant shift in the international political
and legal landscapes. Nevertheless, oaths were still an important part of social life and
oath breaking tended to be severely punished.68
The modern system of international relations of States began in 1648 with the
conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War and the
Eighty Years’ War.69 From the “Peace of Westphalia” arose new rules of international
law that redefined State sovereignty, namely respect for sovereign boundaries, noninterference in domestic affairs, political independence and self-determination, and
sovereign legal equality in relation to other State sovereigns.70 Thus, two basic rules of
the international system arose: 1) a State’s application of its authority extraterritorially
must arise from the consent of States and 2) State sovereignty is confined within the
territory of a State.71
Both rules seek to enable a presumption against nonconsensual rule-making.
Nonconsensual rule-making means the involuntary application of third party rules to
State practice the breach of which imposes a sanction on a State although the State did
not purchase the obligation of the rule72 If the rules supplied to the supranational market
of international relations develop from nonconsensual rule-making, then consumption of
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such rules would violate the basic rule of the consent of States and impose obligations on
States external to the State. The existence of such a supranational market of international
relations would collapse the private legal system of States and create a supranational
government above States.73
As the new rules of international (or Westphalian) sovereignty permeated across
Europe – and eventually all States on Earth, the circumstances leading up to and beyond
the Peace of Westphalia produced a surge in scholarship directed at rival sovereigns on
the scope of a State’s powers vis-à-vis other State sovereigns and peoples collectively.74
Many of these scholars put forth theories of international relations, as well as on the
scope of a State’s sovereign and international powers.75 Consequently, States consumed
many of the rules that international legal scholars put forth, which States utilized these
new preferred powers to exercise their authority extraterritorially, giving rise to a
worldwide expansion of State activities with all the attendant risks, costs, and benefits
such activities engender upon the international system of States.76
Although rules of international law have permeated across the Earth, not all States
have adopted every rule of international law. Over time, rules change; States abandon,
repeal, or replace rules with disutility in favor of different rules with greater utility. 77 This
independence enables rule-making based on the exchanges (interactions and transactions)
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between and among States as a function of State practice. Moreover, this independence
would not have been possible but for the rules that States adopted as a result of the Peace
of Westphalia. The Peace of Westphalia and the principles that States adopted from the
treaty comprise the sovereign foundation of the State.78
The concept of the State has evolved significantly over human history.79
Nevertheless, the definition of “the State” adopted in this thesis derives from relatively
modern sources of public international law. First, the treaty definition is found in the
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), which entered
into force on December 26, 1934.80 The Montevideo Convention is the codification of
international custom of those elements that define a State. As Article I of the Montevideo
Convention affirms, a State is “a person of international law [that] should possess the
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c)
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”81 Second, a
codification of State practice for the definition of a State is found in the Restatement (3rd)
on the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Restatements).82 Section 201 of the
Restatements defines a State as being “an entity that has a defined territory and a
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or
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has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”83 Figure 1 below
provides an illustration of each element that comprises State sovereignty.
The Restatements definition is slightly augmented from the definition of the State
provided by the Montevideo Convention. For example, the Restatements qualifies
government with the aspect of “control”84 – a normative element – meant to distinguish
whether a State’s government has the ability to govern,85 as well as augments the element
of engaging in relations with other States by qualifying relations as “formal” and
generalizing the subject of international relations to entities with which a State may
“engage” in a variety of relationships.86 While these qualifications further illustrate the
common core of the rules by which States are defined, they also illustrate the departure
from the general rule that a State is defined by four basic elements. Such differences in
the rules, even if minor, signify the way State practice has evolved over time from the
supply of rules that define a State.

Figure 1: Elements of State Sovereignty
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As discussed later in this chapter, States trade in components of power on the
supranational market of international relations to satisfy some valued preference internal
to the State.87 In particular, States trade in rules of jurisdiction because such rules
represent a function of a State’s authority.88 Moreover, the act of trading in components
of power, like rules of jurisdiction, arises from State practice because it is the
manifestation of the physical will of the State in seeking to maximize its raison d’état by
extending its authority extraterritorially.89 Since a State’s authority derives from its
sovereignty, trading in rules of jurisdiction necessitates the trading in a State’s
sovereignty as a means to extend State authority outside its territory.90
The State is inherently bounded by its territory.91 Conterminous, moreover, a
State’s sovereignty is also bounded, but its authority may extend beyond its territory.92
When States assert some authority beyond their respective territory, they may act without
the protection of their sovereignty.93 Consequently, to manage the risks and minimize the
costs of a State’s international relations, States seek to trade in rules of authority that take
the form of rules of jurisdiction.94 These rules are generated by States through their State
practice and form the basis of rule-making and supply in the international system of
States.
When States engage in the maximization of their valued preferences through State
practice, their actions necessarily affect the social order established by the international
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community of States. Because no supranational State exists with the authority to impose
rules on all States, States will tend to order themselves in relation to those States that
share the same or similar interests, the results of which create social ordering.95 A
consequence of social ordering is the generation of rules of jurisdiction for which States
may bargain to maximize their valued preferences.96 In order to maximize their valued
preferences, States may independently or co-dependently develop rules as a function of
their respective State practices and cooperate to bargain for rules of jurisdiction over
some activity in some location beyond their territories.97 States tend to use any means
necessary to accomplish this task, including the use of international fora and tribunals –
both of which represent third party institutions.98
Equating the international legal system with a private legal system creates two
issues. First, must all rules of jurisdiction developed by States to govern their
extraterritorial activities have binding legal effect (i.e., bargained for obligation the basis
of which enables State authority extraterritorially)? If not, what good is the supply of
rules that do not have binding legal effect? Second, how does an observer distinguish
between rules of jurisdiction that are non-binding and binding? What is the process of
transition?
In regard to the first issue, not all rules that could be supplied for consumption by
States must have binding legal effect because not every State practice or supplied rule
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may be considered obligatory as a matter of law.99 The benefit of the supply of such rules
is dependent on a variety of factors. These include, inter alia, transaction costs,
externalities, discounted enforcement costs, and the overall benefit assumed in the supply
of such rules to enhance social order through cooperation or coordination.100
For example, when members of COPUOS negotiated the Outer Space Treaty they
relied on rules of jurisdiction expressed in the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Declaration of Legal
Principles).101 COPUOS members developed the Declaration of Legal Principles initially
as a set of non-binding rules and supplied these rules to the supranational market of
international relations.102 Consequently, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) consumed
the Declaration of Legal Principles when it voted to adopt the rules as a UNGA
resolution in 1963.103 By 1966, using the Declaration of Legal Principles as the basis for
the negotiations, COPUOS concluded the Outer Space Treaty and supplied a set of rules
of law as a multilateral international agreement.104 Once the Outer Space Treaty was
opened for signature, interested States started to consume the rules of jurisdiction of the
Outer Space Treaty by accepting the costs associated with the obligations the treaty
establishes relative to the price paid, i.e., cost of signature, ratification, accession, or
succession.105
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With respect to the second issue, the process that governs how a rule transitions to
a rule of law varies based on how the rule was initially supplied to the supranational
market of international relations. A rule will have a particular content, i.e., definition,
meaning, and scope, and that content may serve to maximize a State’s valued preference.
The transition from rule to rule of law occurs when a State gives notice that it has
purchased an obligation in relation to other States in the international system in order to
enjoy the right of extending authority extraterritorially. When a State purchases the
obligation of a rule of jurisdiction on the supranational market of international relations it
gives notice to other States in the form of some affirmative act or omission as a product
of State practice. Generally, an affirmation permits or signals that the State will or intends
to exert its authority beyond its territory bounded by the content of the rule of
jurisdiction.
Moreover, each source of rules of public international law has its own associated
costs and benefits. Because the international system of States functions as a product of
the rule of the consent of States, some rules may not be desirable to some States. With
respect to international custom, State practice itself is not clearly indicative of being
performed out of a sense of legal obligation. If a State is a consistent objector to the
obligatory nature of the rule as a function of its State practice, this is sufficient to signal
to the international market that the rule has no binding legal effect because the State has
not consumed the rule of law by accepting the cost of the legal obligation of the rule.106
Instead, the State has supplied rule(s) associated with its State practice only. However, a
State could take affirmative acts in the course of its State practice that would represent a
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market signal of buying the legal obligation of the rule in the form of its sovereign
authority.107 When this situation arises, a rule of international custom may form
evidenced by a State’s practice conducted out of a sense of legal obligation.108
With respect to international agreements, when States seek to negotiate and
conclude an international agreement, the fact that States would participate in the
development of rules of jurisdiction is indicative of the costs States are willing to accept
based on the supply of the set of rules that comprises the international agreement. Since
an international agreement manifests as a supply of choice of law rules of jurisdiction
based on the intent of the negotiating States Parties, those States that participate in the
supply of rules of jurisdiction will incur transactional costs whether or not those States
sign or ratify the international agreement.109 Conversely, some States may never take part
in the original negotiations and therefore will never expend any resources in the
development of rules of jurisdiction underlying the international agreement, but may
nevertheless later consume the rules of jurisdiction as a product of the international
agreement. Subsequent consumption via signature or ratification generally implies the
level of value the State has for the international agreement.110 Furthermore, when a State
leaves an international agreement, the State will sell back its legal obligation and abandon
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any benefits that derive from the agreement under conditions set forth by the international
agreement.111 Because States commoditize their sovereignty in the form of rules of
jurisdiction that are not fungible with other elements of their sovereignty, a State’s
sovereign authority may be revoked and the rule’s obligation discharged once a State
takes an affirmative act to do so because of the prohibition on nonconsensual rulemaking, i.e., compelled purchase of an obligation.112
With respect to general principles of law, each State has its own internal processes
by which it discharges its sovereign authority to promulgate or publish rules of
jurisdiction within its territory. This ability is a defining element of a State. However,
when rules of jurisdiction internal to the State apply extraterritorially, such rules manifest
as State practice based on how the State values certain preferences of its foreign policy,
economic and security needs. Without evidence of consistent objection, any act by which
a State discharges its authority extraterritorially can manifest as a supply of rules of
jurisdiction with respect to the State itself because the legal obligation, i.e., opinio iuris,
is based on the sovereign act of promulgating or publishing rules of jurisdiction within its
territory.113 When States collectively or independently promulgate or publish the same
rules of jurisdiction with respect to congruent activities and extraterritorial environments,
they express the same State practice.114 Since States develop their national laws
independent of other States, common rules of jurisdiction among States are considered
general principles of law and are indicative of a common basis with regard to some
application of a State’s authority extraterritorially. In other words, there is a presumption
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that the commonly used rules of jurisdiction developed by States is evidence of
purchased rules of jurisdiction because there is consensus among States about the content
of the rule.115
The international system of States operates much like a private legal system.116
The rules of jurisdiction that make up the basis of the international legal system are
created by States through their State practice.117 When States have disputes among or
between each other, they may violate the rules they accept from the sale of their
sovereignty and accept the risks of breaching their obligations to other States. However,
sometimes the costs of breach are sufficiently high that States resort to third parties to
assist in resolving a dispute.118 Such third party entities can take the form of an
international forum or tribunal, e.g., the United Nations Security Council, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), permanent and ad hoc international criminal or civil
tribunals.119 Moreover, since participation in international tribunals and fora arise from
the consent of the States Parties, generally no alternative imposition by an external
authority exists.120 However, States may collectively act together to enforce or punish
violations of international law, which develops fundamentally from State practice.121
When international tribunals intervene to resolve disputes, they act pursuant to the
vested authority granted by the consent of the States Parties to declare what the rule of
law to be applied is and determine which State(s) Party breached an obligation it owed to
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the other State(s) Party.122 The act of declaring what rules of international law are and
how they apply to the disputant States is only binding between the disputants, but the
declaration itself is a valued preference of the States Parties because they consented to the
tribunal’s authority.123 Furthermore, the publication of a tribunal’s declaration represents
another example of an exchange in the supranational market of international relations.
Moreover, as a published document, the declaration issued by the tribunal will
necessarily state the rule(s) of international law used in the decision regarding the
dispute. Consequently, relative to non-States Parties, the publication of the declaration of
the rule of law used in the decision is fundamentally a (re-)supply of rules to the
supranational market of international relations.
To summarize, first States develop their internal valued preferences generally
based on foreign policy, economic and national security needs. Next, States will
physically manifest the maximization of their valued preferences in the form of State
practice. State practice may necessitate the need to enter a supranational market of
international relations. By entering a supranational market, a State may supply rules
unilaterally or bilaterally relative to other States. Once rules of jurisdiction are supplied to
a supranational market, States may individually or collectively set an associated price on
accepting the obligation of a supplied rule. If a State accepts the obligation of a supplied
rule and gives notice of this fact in the form of published evidence, e.g., through the
promulgation or publication of a national law, regulation, or policy, or via a signature or
ratification of an international agreement, a State is said to have consumed the rule. The
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cost of consuming a rule is the acceptance of an obligation to other States to ensure the
extension of a State’s authority beyond its territory.
Public international law may be described as a set of rules and processes that
describe which and how rights, duties, and obligations apply to States via the supply and
consumption of rules that arise from the exchanges of States in the supranational market
of international relations.124 The benefit of such rules enables cooperation in the form of
bounds of consent to the extension of a State’s authority beyond its sovereign territory.125
The cost incurred results from giving notice that the State has purchased the obligation of
the rule and may be held liable for its breach.126 Nonetheless, a sovereign State has the
exclusive authority to make its own rules and rules of law, including the authority to
change rules and rules of law. In doing so, it creates a process of orderly change in how
rules and rules of law are created over time as manifested from rule- and law-making
internal to a State.127 So long as States continue to supply and consume rules of
jurisdiction and create obligations among and between States, the international legal
system will remain stable until the valued preferences of States change potentially giving
rise to a resupply of rules, via a change(s) in State practice, to the supranational market of
international relations for possible consumption. Such an event would close the loop on
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the processes of rule formation, development, and evolution.128 Figure 2 below illustrates
this process.
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Figure 2: The Processes of Rule Formation, Development, and Evolution

iii. Supranational Markets of International Relations

The general market under study here is the supranational market of international
relations. Markets are generally defined as “a place of commercial activity in which
goods or services are bought and sold.”129 In the context of the international relations of
States, the place where such actions or activities may arise is anywhere States have
interests in maximizing their valued preferences (i.e., individual utility).130 This occurs
through the application of foreign relations, whether in specific fora or as a consequence
of State actions or activities (i.e., State practice). The actions and activities in which
States engage manifest broadly through components of power, developed and used
generally to satisfy valued preferences regarding rules of jurisdiction, which are a
function of the fundamental basis of legal obligations.131 When States engage themselves
in centralized or decentralized supranational markets of international relations, the end
result may lead to the buying and selling of goods or services which includes rules of
jurisdiction. Whether rules of jurisdiction have binding effect as law depends on how
such rules are developed or purchased by States.
Through unilateral State practice or by negotiation in the supranational market of
international relations, States seek to “sell” their valued preferences as rules or rules of
law of jurisdiction by construction (e.g., international custom or national law) or in
codified form (e.g., treaty law).132 When States engage in activities in the supranational
market of international relations, the end result of the occurrences and transactions of
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States can be the development of rules or rules of law that States seek to “buy” to
maximize their individual preferences, but also to manage risk and increase certainty
related to the activities subject to such rules or rules of law.133 Below I attempt to
deconstruct what this means as a function of rule development.
In terms of market participation, the entire international system of States is
bounded only by the number of participant States, which an observer can measure
relative to the interactions of self-regarding units, i.e., States.134 Rule formation under
public international law is the product of, at least, those States that are recognized as
members of the United Nations, i.e., potential entities that can and may supply and/or
purchase rules of jurisdiction on the supranational market of international relations.
Moreover, the international system of States is treated as an open system whereby States
are generally free to maximize their preferences in relation to other States bounded only
by the hierarchies of international relationships.135 Furthermore, there is no
predetermined bound on market participation because the international system of States is
open and therefore subject to evolution.136 In other words, the supranational market of
international relations is what States make of it.137
The supranational market of international relations arises because States have
preferences which it values relative to its raison d’état. In particular, States tend to rank
economic health, authority, and security high on their list of preferences and must seek to
maximize each through a variety of means (i.e., strategies), including international
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cooperation. When international cooperation arises, States can exchange in preference
identification through negotiation to form a rule(s) or rule(s) of law to govern themselves
within a private legal system of international rules and laws. Rules and rules of law of
jurisdiction manifest as components of State power that, in theory, should minimize
transaction costs relative to other States engaged in the same types of exchanges. 138 In
other words, States engage in negotiations in the supra-national market of international
relations to trade in components of power, e.g., rules of jurisdiction, by seeking to
maximize their set of valued preferences.139 In doing so, States must relinquish some
level of autonomy in order to obtain benefits from various forms of international relations
exchanges (i.e., occurrences or transactions).140
The supranational market is postulated to arise from the activities of States that
may be defined as the exchanges among and between States engaged in international
relations. First, occurrences are defined as those positive acts that States independently
take in the course of their international relations to satisfy a valued preference. When a
State, due to changes in competence, capabilities, or resources, begins a State practice
dependent or independent of other States, the State’s valued preference(s) may begin as a
nonbinding rule relative to other States engaged in such practice. Over time, such rules
may become a binding rule of public international law when codified or when such rules
are observed as international custom if the State practice is general, consistent, and there
is evidence of a purchase of a legal obligation.141 For example, as discussed in more

138

See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE supra note 4.
Id.
140
See supra note 95. See also KRASNER supra note 71, and ECONOMIC STRUCTURE supra note 4.
141
See Office of the President, National Security Council, Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific
Satellite Program, NSC 5520 (May 20, 1955).
139

38

detail below, when the Soviet Union and US began a State practice of launching objects
into orbit around the Earth, a preference highly valued by both States (but for different
reasons), this initiated rule formation regarding the “freedom of space”142 or more
precisely the creation of an informal rule that permits a State the right to launch and orbit
an object over the sovereign territories of other States into the medium of the outer space
environment. Thus, State practice initiated by the US and the Soviet Union catalyzed
rules of jurisdiction applicable to both States necessarily created a supranational market
because each State had a valued preference in the ability to launch objects into the outer
space environment.143
Second, States individually “encounter one another and sometimes have occasion
to cooperate, to engage in what may broadly be termed “transaction[s].””144 Such
transactions can manifest in the form of bi- or multi-lateral treaties, either conditioned for
signature and ratification or open to all States. Regardless of how, if, or when States seek
to transact and conclude an international agreement, States, through their preference
valuations, must figure out for themselves the need to include some or all States in
particular supranational markets as well as the need to close off some markets to some
States. Nevertheless, the international system of States enables and permits these types of
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transactions to occur even if the various supra-national markets that develop discriminate
against or place barriers of entry on State participation.145
There are many examples of conditioned participation to international
agreements. For one, the Antarctica Treaty regulates international relations on the
continent of Antarctica and those States Parties with initial claims have rights greater
than other States that desire or have disputed claims to the continent.146 As Article IV of
the treaty states “No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim to territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.”147 On the
other hand, the Outer Space Treaty is a multilateral treaty open to all States without
precondition on capability of spaceflight or prior claims.148 Hence, States can and do
limit entrance into particular markets for the purposes of rule development and
consumption.
The buying and selling of rules and/or rules of law of jurisdiction manifest and
can be measured in a variety of ways. In the absence of a specific rule of international
law, State practice, if objectively definite and distinguishable from other observed rules,
may form nonbinding rules. A nonbinding rule, i.e., a rule that is not followed out of a
measure of legal obligation, is distinguishable from a binding rule of law, i.e., a rule that
establishes duties and obligations for which a breach could be measured and sanctions
imposed, because the degree of the cost of enforcement significantly varies between each
type of rule.
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For example, the cost to enforce a treaty obligation may be less than the cost to
enforce a national law or an international custom because being a State Party to a treaty
provides prima facie evidence that a State Party has purchased the obligations of the rules
that comprise the treaty.149 The enforcement of rules of national law or international
custom may have a higher cost to enforce relative to international agreements because of
the rule of consent to an obligation a breach of which would impose liability on the State,
i.e., the presumption against nonconsensual rule-making.150 This is a foundational rule of
a private legal system.151
In order to mitigate or resolve international conflict(s), States may choose to
resort to addressing disputes among and between States bi-or multi-laterally or through
adjudication using third party rules.152 How States go about mitigating or resolving
disputes will provide a supply of rules from State practice. Each type of rule may be
priced by States on the supranational market of international relations and the purchase of
the obligation of the rule may be evidenced by some affirmative act or omission.153 When
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States seek to have their disputes adjudicated by third party rules, i.e., rules of public
international law, States consent to the authority of the international tribunal for which
the dispute maybe resolved.154 The rules of the adjudication include the requirement that
the facts of the dispute must be agreed to by all States Parties to the dispute.155 The
publication of the documents that consist of the resolution of the tribunal to render a
verdict in the dispute apply only to the States Parties to the dispute, but the rules utilized
to render a verdict are re-supplied to the supranational market of international relations.
Rule formation and the buying of rules can be measured by looking at how valued
preferences manifest as State practice and from deviations observed between State
practice and in the types of obligations purchased by a State, respectively. First, how
rules arise in and are supplied to the supranational market of international relations from
the international relations of States may be measured as the consequence of stratagems of
State practice: whether State preference(s) or action(s) lead to (a) cooperation or (b)
defection (Strategy Testing) in the supply of rules.156 This test enables the use of game
theory to model how the stratagems, and associated payoffs, of States in exchanges over
rules that direct the scope of a State’s authority outside its sovereign territory may lead to
an optimal outcome in the supply of rules. Consequently, the supply of rules that arise
from the need to maximize valued preferences creates spontaneous order within the
international system of States.157 Once the rules are supplied, States are free to consume
as many or as few rules that maximize their valued preferences. Deviations in how many
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or which rules are consumed impose benefits and costs and risks that States will seek to
manage over time, which may or may not include rule supply or consumption.
Second, a comparative analysis of rules may be used to identify the core rules and
their content, i.e., a rule’s definition, meaning, and scope, in order to measure the extent
to which a State purchased what types of obligations (Proof of Purchase). When States
supply rules to the supranational market, States are not obliged to purchase rules.158
However, when States buy a rule of jurisdiction the content of the supplied rule(s) may
vary depending on the source. This creates different types of obligations with respect to
each source of rules. Moreover, States may purchase rules with respect to the same type
of person, thing, or event outside their territories and thus accept the obligations of all the
rules consumed. Other States may not purchase the obligation of all rules associated with
the same type of person, thing, or event outside their territories. Such differences indicate
variability in valued preferences and a stratification of obligations among States with
respect to the same types of rules. Consequently, rules of jurisdiction will vary and the
extent of a State’s authority beyond its sovereign territory will also vary.
Strategy and Proof of Purchase Testing are a measure of the observable outcomes
of States engaged in the supranational market of international relations. However, these
tests must be taken in relation to the number of States that participate in supranational
markets because market share and participation provides a separate measure of the degree
to which States value the supply and consumption of rules with respect to the same types
of persons, things, or events outside the territories of States. From these measures,
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relationships among interested States governed by the same rules may be analyzed and
compared to observed historical outcomes.
Supranational markets of international relations come in a variety forms.
However, each supranational market may be analyzed with respect to other supranational
markets because of the many ways rules are supplied by States over time. Since the
adoption of the UN Charter, States Parties have grown from the original fifty-one (51)
members to one hundred and ninety-three (193).159 The expansion in the number of States
in the international system necessarily affects how supranational markets function.
Moreover, the development of subsequent supranational markets under the UN Charter
directly and its auspices allowed for an expansion of a variety of supranational markets to
deal with a variety of international problems across a variety of Earthly and space
environments. For example, the UN Charter explicitly permits a very important
supranational market under the UN Security Council (UNSC) whereby its five permanent
members sell their valued preferences to other members to buy.160 The outcome of these
exchanges leads directly to binding and non-binding rules of international law.161 In
addition, States may cooperate and form specific supranational markets to coordinate or
protect certain State practices.162 Thus, the type of obligations a State purchases on the
supranational market will vary relative to how the market from where the rule originates
operates and potentially imposes costs, benefits, and risks.
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iv. Rules of Jurisdiction as the Allocation of Authority

While axiomatic, fundamentally, a rule can arise in three ways. First, a rule can
arise informally, i.e., through no formal means by which a State develops the rule
institutionally. When a State practice arises from an occurrence in the course of
international relations and that occurrence produces a State practice, other States may
independently adopt the same rule. For example, when the Soviet Union launched its
Sputnik objects into orbit around the Earth, only the Soviet Union had first engaged in a
State practice of launching objects into orbit and over the territories of other States.163
Within three months of the first Sputnik launch, the US launched its Explorer object into
orbit independent of, i.e., not in cooperation with, the Soviet Union.164 Although the US
followed suit, it could have also objected to such a State practice or other States could
have objected to such a State practice; although there is no evidence of objection by
States to the State practice of launching objects into orbit over the territories of other
States. Thus, State practice itself can be evidence of rule formation independent of some
formal means of exchange.
Second, a rule can arise formally, i.e., through some formal means by which a
State uses an international institution or forms a temporary institutional framework to
conclude the supply of a rule(s). In either case, formal rules are negotiated through some
agreed upon procedures, i.e., rules that govern the cooperation among negotiating States
Parties, within a particular institution or institutional framework.165 The outcome of the
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process to negotiate a formal rule(s) provides evidence of the existence of the formal
rule(s). For example, when the US sought to bring States together to negotiate a Charter
for a United Nations, delegates operated within a temporary institutional framework that
utilized rules of procedure to enable negotiations of formal rules.166 The outcome of the
negotiations resulted in the adoption of a codified set of formal rules of law, namely the
Charter of the United Nations.167 Where the institutional rules laid out the process for
ratification, upon the satisfaction of those rules, i.e., satisfaction of the requirement(s) for
which the treaty comes into force activating the treaty’s obligations to States Parties, the
Charter of the United Nations transitioned to a set of rules of law.168 Subsequently, when
States use the UN to formalize the negotiation of treaties, i.e., a set of rules of law, or the
adoption of declarations and other documents that generate rules, these rules come about
by formal means inherent to UN administration.169
Third, a rule can arise as a rule(s) of law, i.e., a codified rule or set(s) of rules
from at least one objectively cognizable source of authority that directs a subject’s act or
omission to prevent a breach of a rule of law. The negotiation of formal rules may give
rise to a rule(s) of law when codified into at least one objectively cognizable source of
authority, e.g., treaties and national law. Because codification provides evidence of the
existence of a rule(s) of law, they can be considered an objective source of authority.
However, the codification of rule(s) of law must also be cognizable, i.e., rules of law
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must be clearly identifiable relative to the subject of the rule(s) of law and within the
scope of the negotiated transaction(s), i.e., intent of the Parties, for a rule(s) of law.
While States can virtually engage in any exchange (i.e., occurrence or transaction)
related to their valued preferences in the course of their international relations, this thesis
however only considers rules as the consequence of negotiating and trading in
components of power.170 Within the system of international relations of States, the
economic character of rules can take the form of public and toll goods. First, public
goods are defined as goods that are non-excludable and non- rivalrous. A rule is nonexcludable when States cannot prevent the consumption or use of a rule just because a
State breached a rule. A rule is non-rivalrous when the consumption and/or use of the rule
by one State does not reduce the availability of the rule to another State. In other words, a
rule(s) apply to all States that have accepted or are under an obligation to accept a rule(s).
For example, in the case of international custom, States cannot exclude other
States from the rule or its obligation as a function of State practice; where consumption
of a rule by a State does not reduce availability to other States (e.g., in the acceptance of
rules that represent rights, duties, and obligations under the international custom). States
that supply and/or consume rules of jurisdiction cannot reduce the consumption of rules
by other States in the absence of such a rule that limits consumption (e.g., the obligation
that international agreements must be kept). In other words, if a State chooses or is
compelled to consume a rule (by way of some other rule), consumption does not
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necessarily affect the supply of such a rule(s) to other States.171 In the absence of an
overriding rule, a State cannot claim that a rule applicable to all is excluded to itself.172
Second, toll goods are goods that are excludable, but non-rivalrous. A rule is
excludable when a State can be prevented from accessing the rule when it does not pay
the associated price of the rule. As with public goods, a rule is non-rivalrous when the
consumption and/or use of the rule by one State does not reduce the availability or utility
of the rule to another State. In other words, a rule(s) applies to all States that have
accepted a rule(s), but only when a rule(s) is/are paid for through the acceptance of some
cost – an affirmation of a voluntary acceptance of the rule, e.g., signature or ratification
cost.173
For example, in the case of international agreements, States Parties first negotiate
language that will comprise the set of rules of the agreement.174 The negotiation and
conclusion of an international agreement each represent a type of transaction cost;
however, these transaction costs do not necessarily represent the acceptance of the
rules.175 Acceptance or intent to accept such rules of jurisdiction arises from the price
paid by a State in ratifying or signing the agreement, respectively.
The utility in the development and exchange of rules and rules of law is that both
can engender greater certainty about the costs and risks involved in engaging in
international relations.176 States must balance the need for predictability and flexibility in
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how rules and rules of law of jurisdiction are defined and scoped in a way that maximizes
valued preferences but minimizes risks of international relations. When in the course of
international relations, various unintended or unexpected costs and benefits might arise
from the adoption, proliferation, and evolution of rules and rules of law, States will
engage in exchanges (occurrences and transactions) to amend or resign from a rule(s) that
no longer meet(s) the valued preferences of some or all States.
While rule formation and consumption form the bases of the underlying analyses,
the glue that binds States to rules is the concept of jurisdiction.177 Jurisdiction plays an
important role in the international legal system because it forms the basis of State
authority over persons, things, and events outside a State’s sovereign territory and
represents what may be termed a “property right” of State sovereignty.178 The
fundamental question here is how is authority allocated within the international system of
States?179 Generally, jurisdiction allocates State authority in the international system on
the basis of sovereign legal equality (i.e., each State in the international system possesses
the same legal rights as any other sovereign State).180 Rules of jurisdiction take the form
of a pre-transactional right because, unlike in municipal law, there is no requirement that
States give consideration in the supply or purchase of rules of public international law.181
While no supranational State exists that can compel States to accept rights, duties, or
obligations under public international law, States by their sovereign nature are required
and expected to adhere to established rules of public international law.182 Accordingly, a
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State’s ability to conduct foreign relations and engage in international relations (i.e.,
politics) provides benefits and costs that are inherently scoped by jurisdiction because the
distribution of authority over persons or things or events subject to State authority must
be necessarily analyzed against the authority of other States in the international system,
including, but not limited to, authority over rule-formation.
When States engage in the supranational market of international relations, the
outcome can be the formation of a rule(s) or a rule(s) of law of jurisdiction, depending on
the circumstances of formation. A rule is defined as one or more instruction(s) of a
policy. Policy is defined as a valued preference that guides a course of action from a
subjectively legitimate source of authority that directs a subject’s act or omission to
prevent a breach of the rule(s). For example, when a group of States enter into
negotiations for the development of a rule that commits each State to take a voluntary
course of action within a certain period of time, the rule that arises is a common rule to
all participant States, i.e., States mutually agree to perform the rule that defines a course
of action.183 The fact that the rule may be nonbinding or binding as a matter of law or that
States voluntarily commit to follow the rule is sufficient evidence that a rule has formed,
but not necessarily that the rule will be followed or imputes an obligatory effect on
participant States absent certain facts.184 Although the rule in question may be voluntarily
adopted by each State, the cost of breach will tend to limit rule-breaking because the
more a State is seen to breach an agreed-upon rule, the more likely the breaching State
could be subject to reputation costs or some other sanction in the future.185 Thus the cost
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of breach may compel a State to honor its commitments, even if not followed out of a
sense of a legal obligation.186 However, when a State devalues following the rule it may
stop following the rule if the cost of breach is relatively low, the risk of breach is
potentially small, or the State can negotiate with other potential defectors to undermine
the effectiveness of the rule and minimize potential costs of breach to all defectors.187
For example, the Allies of the Second World War sought to replace the League of
Nations Charter with a United Nations Charter before the war had even ended.188 Since
doing so required the abandonment of the set of rules that had been agreed upon under
the League of Nations Charter since January 1920, the circumstances at the time, i.e., the
prospect that the Allies could win the war, gave the United States a market to develop
new post-war rules. The act of unilaterally replacing the old set of rules with ones set by
the Allies could have only occurred if the costs of doing so were less than the benefit of
establishing a new set of international rules under the vehicle of a United Nations Charter
without participation of the Axis States.189
When States engage in activities outside their sovereign territories – including
participation in international fora, the exchanges in the supranational market that arise
from State practice are inherently an exchange in the assignment of State authority.190
The only general requirement is that a State has the capacity to engage in foreign
relations. However, this ability does not necessarily lead to zero transaction costs or
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efficient rule-development outcomes, but the capacity to engage in foreign relations may
increase or reduce transaction costs and/or externalities in particular instances.191 For
example, States created after the adoption of the UN Charter had no ability to negotiate
the set of rules that comprise the Charter, but nonetheless purchased the rules of the
Charter and general public international law because the principle of sovereign legal
equality provides a necessary benefit.192 While some cost is paid by the State in the
ratification of the Charter and rules of public international law, the assumption is that
acceptance implies that the benefit is greater than the cost of not accepting how authority
is allocated in the international system by way of jurisdiction over particular persons and
things or events.193 Thus, when States engage in activities that give rise to the
development of rules, States are inherently entering a supranational market of
international relations to buy and sell their authority in the form of rules of jurisdiction.194
Rules of jurisdiction represent the allocation of State authority in the international
system and can take two basic forms: choice of law and prescriptive jurisdiction.195
Choice of law rules represent the specific power of a State to assert authority over
particular persons or things or events to which States will consensually agree. Without a
proper basis of jurisdiction in international disputes, a State’s or a private party’s case
may lead to a dismissal of claims before a tribunal.196 To deal with this potential
situation, States may negotiate amongst themselves the allocation of authority to
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determine which and in what instances a particular State will have jurisdiction over a
particular dispute.197 For example, following the political integration of European States,
members of the European Council negotiated and concluded an international agreement
with regard to jurisdiction over civil and commercial disputes that may arise within the
territories of member States.198 States may provide by international agreement such rules
of jurisdiction over persons, things, or events and define elements of the rules of
jurisdiction to manage risk, provide benefits, or reduce costs to the State and its subjects.
Prescriptive jurisdiction, on the other hand, represents the general power of a
State to assert authority over all persons, things, or events that stem from the principles of
sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence from interference in the internal
affairs of a State (i.e., Westphalian concepts of State sovereignty).199 There are five
recognized bases of prescriptive jurisdiction under public international law.200 First,
territorial jurisdiction is the most used allocation of authority in that a State has
jurisdiction over all persons and things or events within its territory.201 Second,
nationality jurisdiction represents the allocation of authority over nationals of the State
anywhere.202 Third, passive personality jurisdiction represents the allocation of authority
over events connected to a State’s national, usually where the national might be a victim
of some harm arising from conduct not within the territory of the national’s State.203
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Fourth, protective jurisdiction represents the allocation of authority over threats to the
security, integrity, or economic interests of a State outside its territory.204 Fifth, universal
jurisdiction represents the allocation of authority over specific acts deemed contrary to
the interests of the international community of States as a whole.205 As can be observed in
relation to each definition, prescriptive jurisdiction is not necessarily consensual in nature
and provides the scope (narrow or broad application) of authority within and outside of a
State’s territory.206
Why is jurisdiction important to rule-formation? Fundamental to all legal analysis
is the application of rules of jurisdiction.207 Jurisdiction helps identify the structure and
scope of the allocation of authority that States utilize to formalize their exercises in power
over subjects (e.g., natural and juridical persons) and objects (e.g., things) of the law.208
When States seek to engage in the supranational market of international relations, they
are effectively exercising their sovereignty in relation to other States because sovereignty
is the highest valued part of a State that it can offer to the market.209 When States engage
in practices related to its foreign relations, national security, or economic interests, they
are guided by valued preferences, e.g., some utility assessment developed by their
governments.210 States may or may not choose to cooperate in the international system;
however, regardless of the choice, the benefits and costs of engaging in international
relations may give rise to the need to minimize and manage risks associated with State
practice.

204

Id.
Id.
206
Id.
207
See supra note 4.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
See POSNER & SYKES supra note 4.
205

54

Although international cooperation is not a predetermined result of State practice,
when States do engage in activities outside their territories they tend to negotiate for rules
of jurisdiction in relation to certain persons, things, or events that serve the interests of
the State.211 In the case of choice of law rules, States bargain for rules and may be
required to trade in some component of power to get agreement among other potential
States Parties to conclude and eventually execute an international agreement. However,
with respect to prescriptive jurisdiction, States create supranational markets more akin to
an auction where States can bid up or down the price of the rule of jurisdiction based on
State practice and the scope of the legal obligation as a function of that State practice.212
The important distinction between the law and economics literatures on national
and international law arises from how and which types of goods are allocated within
society.213 While goods and services are bought and sold among buyers and sellers at the
national level, the things bought and sold by States are their valued preferences that are
negotiated and priced as a rule of jurisdiction that may lead to a reallocation of State
authority relative to other States. On one hand, choice of law rules enable States to
determine which rules of law might apply in disputes between them as well as the
consensual acceptance of rights, duties, and obligations regarding some type of act or
omission in the course of a State’s international relations or the execution and
administration of international agreements.214 On the other hand, prescriptive jurisdiction
provides rules scoped to limit the authority of a State in relation to the authority of other
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States. In other words, by virtue of the principles of sovereignty and sovereign equality
and a State’s ability to engage in foreign relations, States may trade in components of
power, like rules of jurisdiction, to achieve some individual utility. Whether or not the
allocation or reallocation of authority is good or bad, efficient or inefficient is a separate
issue.
To summarize, a State’s valued preferences inform how a State will seek to apply
its authority extraterritorially. In doing so, a State enters the supranational market in
relation to some valued preference. Market participation will lead to a supply of rules of
jurisdiction. Once rules of jurisdiction are supplied, States may or may not seek to price
out rules of jurisdiction in relation to facts that define a State’s valued preferences. Once
States begin to price out supplied rules of jurisdiction, States may or may not buy or sell
rules of jurisdiction that result from market participation. If a State does not buy a rule of
jurisdiction in relation to some valued preference, then it may be no better off than other
State that also does not consume the rule of jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, a State
does buy and consume a rule of jurisdiction, it has bargained for that rule by some
affirmative act.215 However, over time State practice may change because a State’s
valued preferences may change. Hence, changes in State practice may instigate market
participation again and necessitate a re-supply of rules of jurisdiction restarting the cycle
of rule development.216
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A. Sources of Rules of Public International Law

Rules supplied to the supranational market have many sources. One codified
source usually relied upon as a list of acceptable sources of public international law is
found in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Article 38
states that

The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.217

Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1) (a)-(d). Article 59 states that “The decision of the
Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” Every dispute
under public international law adjudicated by an international tribunal tends, in most cases, to use past case
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This thesis analyzes each recognized source of public international law to
demonstrate the evolution of those rules for which States have bargained in the supranational market of international relations relating to the outer space environment. The
sources listed in article 38 above are formally recognized as sources of public
international law.218 However, much of the modern literature on public international law
argues that certain rules of international custom actually form the basis of formal sources
of law.219 As Fitzmaurice argues, a treaty only contains the codification of material
sources of law like contracts.220 In other words, treaties form sources of obligations for
the States Parties. The formal source of the law of treaties comes from the rule of
international custom defined by the phrase pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be
kept”).221 Because international custom applies to all States that follow the same practice
and have given notice of the purchase of the obligation of the practice, the authority to
recognize and seek recognition of another State’s authority must necessarily derive from
the shared valued preferences of States.
This thesis treats any source of rules as potential sources of public international
law without making formal or material distinctions. However, the foregoing analysis is
limited directly to the application of international custom, treaties, and general principles
of law in relation to the outer space environment. All subsidiary sources, such as “judicial
decisions and the teachings of most highly qualified publicists,”222 provide only
additional means of evidence of the definition, meaning, and scope of rules of public
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international law. Thus, all subsidiary sources used in this thesis are not treated as formal
sources of public international law, but provide a means to determine the scope of the
definition and meaning of rules that may be supplied to the supranational market.

1. International Custom

The rule of international custom may be defined as a general and consistent State
practice performed out of a sense of legal obligation.223 Rules of international custom can
be confined to a region, among States who use international custom in the course of a
particular State practice, or broadened to all States who use the basis of State practice out
of a sense of legal obligation.224 Because State practice is a product of the valued
preferences of States, rules of international custom necessarily affect how States value
the generation of such rules.
The formation and development of rules of international custom ultimately derive
from State practice. However, the formalization of rules of international custom arise
from the consensual nature of the international system of States. Moreover, changes in a
State’s valued preferences will necessarily produce changes in State practice. Changes in
State practice will lead to changes in how State’s supply rules to the supranational market
of international relations. In doing so, these processes reflect how States value the need
for such rules as a function of their perceived payoffs in relation to the strategies of other
States engaged in the same State practice, rule supply, and/or rule consumption.
However, the temporal measure of preference revelation can have significant effects on
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the rate of rule formation and development due to inherently inertial forces within the
State itself.225
Nonetheless, sometimes changes in State practice will result in the valued
preference of objecting to rule generation because the developing practice does not
manifest as a valued preference of other States.226 Applying the framework that the
international system operates like a private legal system, the act of persistently objecting
to a rule of international custom derives from the express consent of States in the
international system.227 In order to provide sufficient notice to other States of their
objection to a rule of international custom, States must manifest their objections through
some express action.228 This express act signals an alternative value for the supplied rule
to the supranational market and represents an express denial to any attempt at
nonconsensual rule-making.229
The act of persistently objecting has evolutionary effects on rule supply because
States that consistently object to some types of rules that may be supplied or consumed
puts those States in a different relationship with States who perform the same State
practice and that have formalized the consumption of the rule in question.230 On one
hand, the presumption against nonconsensual rule making sets forth the scope of which a
State cannot be obliged to follow the rule, the breach of which may impose a liability on
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the State that may be enforced by other States without its consent. On the other hand, a
State may want to limit the content of a rule and therefore declare reservations or
objections to certain interpretations of the rule in question.231
However, because the two basic elements of international custom derive its
meaning from the expression of State practice, evidence of rule consumption could
manifest as a result of the outcome of exchanges in other supranational markets of
international relations. For example, if a State enacts a national law that provides the
basis for the State practice in question, then that act provides evidence of rule as a
product of in the legal obligation defined by the State’s legislation.232 Alternatively, the
codification and consumption of rules derived from international agreements, when
concluded and in force, may also express State practice and will reflect the degree to
which a State has purchased a particular legal obligation relative to other sources of
rules.233
However, the consumption of a rule in one supranational market does not
necessarily mean consumption of a rule in another supranational market. In other words,
the fact that the source of the rule (i.e., custom, treaty, national law) can arise in three
particular supranational markets has at least one common element, i.e., State practice.
Since State practice is the physical manifestation of the State in the international system,
the process by which a State could consume a rule relative to the source(s) of the rule
varies because States have the freedom to determine and choose how rules form and
develop that express that valued preference in the form of State practice. This can be
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modeled using game theory to determine which stratagems are the most optimal or suboptimal in attempting to maximize a valued preference. Consequently, rules of
international custom are the product of the outcomes of State’s trying to supply specific
rules to ensure the formation and continuation of the underlying State practice.

2. Treaties

Article 38(1)(a) defines treaties as “international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states.”234 Treaties
represent a codification of a set of rules supplied by States as a result of cooperative
behavior in rule development. Once concluded, the set of rules that comprises a treaty are
supplied to the supranational market of international relations and the ability to consume
a treaty’s rules may have barriers to entry depending on the valued preference of States
that negotiated the treaty to supply rules. Fundamentally, treaties codify the obligations of
States under the international customary rule of pacta sunt servanda, i.e., agreements
must be kept by States Parties.235 The obligations, duties, and rights for which States
Parties negotiate are the substance of treaties. Moreover, many of the sources of rules of
treaty law derive from international custom, and the codification (to a large extent) of
international custom regarding international agreements is found in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).236

234

Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(a).
See BROWNLIE supra note 4.
236
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
235

62

It is assumed that States act as individuals in the supranational market of
international relations, where the intention of a State may be inferred from its observed
State practice in satisfying its valued preferences in relation to other States. Since every
State under study is a member of the UN, there is no question as to whether a State under
study has the capacity to transact with other States to create and conclude a treaty.
Incidentally, this quality permits States to collude, compete, enter or leave any
supranational market of international relations or return the purchased obligation subject
to the costs and benefits of State practice.
By definition, the international system of States does not exist with a
supranational authority over it with the ability to enforce rules of international law.237 As
such, compensating a State that is the victim of a breach of an international obligation
does not function in the same way that disputes are resolved in national courts.238 This,
however, does not mean that States cannot find ways to ensure conformity to rules of
international law against other States that breach their “bargained for” or purchased legal
obligations.239 When States have disputes, they may seek resolution from a variety of
sources.240 Each possible remedy may be cooperative or non-cooperative in nature based
on how the valued preference of a State arises in the form of a State practice.241 Since
State practice is the mechanism by which States supply rules to the supranational market,
States may supply rules for dispute resolution mechanisms, e.g., international tribunals or
arbitration courts, which may only have a binding legal effect when States consent to the
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consumption of such rules that they may supply.242 Therefore, a resolution of what the
law is occurs from the consensual supply and consumption of rules by States to a third
party to adjudicate the dispute, the basis of which is an international agreement.243
Moreover, since the nature of the international system is based on consent and
that consent forms the basis for the mutual exchange of rules of jurisdiction, such rules
can only arise from cooperation among and between interested States.244 The primary
example of the manifestation of cooperation among and between States is generally
observed from the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements.
Fundamentally, an international agreement is the codification of a set of rules of
jurisdiction. States consume these rules with respect to the trading in components of
power the cost of which may vary depending on the nature of the exchange in the
supranational market. Consumption of treaty rules can arise in the form of a State’s
signature, ratification, accession, or succession to/of a treaty.245 In the case of consuming
rules through the price of signature, the associated cost is only that the State has an
intention to be bound by the obligations of the treaty’s rules, not that the State actually
paid the full price of the legal obligation.246 On the other hand, States may have a
preference to consume rules by purchasing the legal obligation in order to extend their
authority over the subject matter for which rules are supplied to the appropriate
supranational market. When States consume rules by paying the price of ratification,
accession, or succession, the associated costs is the purchase of the legal obligation that
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signals to the supranational markets a rule’s value and price to other States that could
enter the supranational market.
The value of treaty adoption is measured by the number of States that sign and/or
ratify a particular treaty. However, the value of any treaty must be taken in relation to the
number of States in the international system at a particular point or period in time. This
ratio provides an objective measure of a treaty’s relative value over time because it
considers changes to the number of States that could enter the supranational market of
international relations for rule development and consumption.

(a) Treaty Interpretation

As a codification of rules of customary international law, the VCLT provides two
important methods in which to gauge the meaning of a treaty and its obligations and
terms.247 First, the general rule of treaty interpretation under article 31 of the VCLT
provides that

A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose . . . [and] special meaning shall be given to
a term if it is established that the parties so intended.248 (emphasis added)
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Second, the VCLT allows for supplementary means of interpretation under article 32,
which includes “the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its
conclusion . . .” [so that nothing] “leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure[,] or [] leads
to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.249
Third, article 33 of the VCLT provides further rules on the authentication of two
or more copies of the same treaty when codified in different languages.250 Although the
text of each treaty in any official language that the Parties originally adopt is equally
authoritative, when due to differences in translations each authoritative text diverges from
the others, article 33 provides that “the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having
regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.”251 This rule is especially

(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.”).
249
Id., at art. 32 (“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according
to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.”).
250
Id. (”1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative
in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text
shall prevail.
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated shall be
considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a comparison of the
authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not
remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty,
shall be adopted.”)
251
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important to note given that the Outer Space Treaty and its sister treaties are multilateral
treaties adopted in five official languages, each equally authoritative.252
If or when actual substantive conflict arises between States as to any claim of a
breach of an international obligation, duty, privilege, or right, a tribunal, whether
international or national, will be required to look to the rules that comprise the corpus of
public international law and the lex specialis of space law to resolve the dispute. This
creates a problem that most treaties face over time, i.e., does modern evidence of
intention correspond with the bargained for intent of the parties when States Parties
concluded and/or ratified the treaty in question? (Emphasis added). In other words, is it
permissible to interpret treaties in a manner that does not prohibit the evolution of the
meaning of its terms?
Since this thesis depends on an understanding of how rules and rules of law
evolve over time, it is important to understand what constitutes rule evolution and how
the concept of rule evolution applies to the problems investigated. To begin, as a matter
of treaty law, evolutive interpretation can be defined as “an interpretation where a term is
given a meaning that changes over time.”253 As Helmersen notes,

[a]s with all interpretations, the evolutive interpretation of a term is
distinct from its application. This also means that a change of mind is not
an evolutive interpretation. In interpreting a term that is open to multiple
interpretations, a court may choose one interpretation in one case, and then
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change its mind and prefer another in a later case. This way, the term’s
meaning can be said to have ‘changed’ over time. However, if the change
is not prompted by an evolution intended by the parties, the interpretation
is not evolutive. The term has not evolved; only the opinion of the
court.254 (Emphasis in the original).

Moreover, a treaty term’s meaning usually evolves because of an evolution in the
linguistic meaning of the term independent of the interpretation; “[h]owever, a term does
not have to evolve linguistically to be interpreted evolutively.”255
When States go to the trouble of expending resources to negotiate and conclude
treaties, the process of rule development arises from the trading of components of power,
i.e., rules of jurisdiction. The substance of this process is grounded in the intent that the
States Parties had certain definitions and meanings for terms based on the convergence of
their valued preferences into agreed upon rules. An issue then arises as to how temporal
effects could change or expand the definition and meaning of terms within a treaty. Since
economics, politics, culture, and technology change over time, rules of law are subject to
social forces that affect the stability and flexibility of the original intent of the States
Parties. While treaty amendment is possible in many cases, amendment is nevertheless
difficult in practice and is not observed consistently within the practice of treaty law due
to the high transaction costs usually associated with amending treaties.256 To what extent
does the evolutive interpretation of treaty terms arise?
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In THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES, Bjorge seeks to answer
“[w]hat is the place of the evolutionary interpretation of treaties with the rules of treaty
interpretation codified in the VCLT.”257 Bjorge’s study reviews approximately two
hundred international and national law cases dealing with the methods by which jurists
interpret treaty terms.258 Given the various methods of treaty interpretation by courts, the
answer Bjorge arrives at is

that the evolutionary interpretation is, in common with others types of
interpretation, an outcome of the process described in the general rules of
interpretation. There is thus nothing exceptional about evolutionary
interpretation; in common with other types of interpretation it is based
upon the objective establishment of the intention of the parties.259
(Emphasis added).

By way of example, the study begins with an analysis of the phrase “evolutionary
interpretation” as proffered by the ICJ in the 2009 case Dispute regarding Navigational
and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) (Navigational Rights case).260 In the
Navigational Rights case, the question before the ICJ “was whether the phrase ‘for the

257

Supra note 219, at 1. See supra note 236.
Supra note 219, at ix-xix.
259
Id.
260
See Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) (hereinafter Navigational
Rights case) (Judgment) 2009 ICJ Rep. 213. See also BROWNLIE supra note 4; supra note 105; and Martin
Dawidowicz, The Effect of the Passage of Time on the Interpretation of Treaties: Some Reflections on
Costa Rica v Nicaragua, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 201 (2011).
258

69

purposes of commerce’ in the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican treaty of limits of 1858[261]
covered tourism, [i.e.,] the carriage of passengers for hire.”262 The ICJ held that the
phrase “for the purposes of commerce” must be interpreted to extend to all modern forms
of commerce.263 Since the Parties signed the treaty in question in 1858 and given the
period of time that has elapsed, any analysis of the meaning of the term “for the purposes
of commerce” must consider the “situation in which the parties’ intent upon conclusion
of the treaty was, or may be presumed to have been, to give the terms used – or some of
them – a meaning or content capable of evolving, not one fixed once and for all, so as to
make allowance for, among other things, developments in international law.”264 As
Bjorge explains “[w]here the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties
necessarily having been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over
time, and where the treaty has been entered into for a long period of time, . . . , the parties
must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to have evolving
meaning.”265 (Emphasis added). Thus the primary issue in treaty interpretation is an
analysis into the intent of the States Parties.
As discussed infra, the Outer Space Treaty and its subsequent sister treaties are
over forty years old. Since technological development tends to occur more rapidly than
the development of rules of law, the rules of international law as expressed in the space
treaties analyzed will most likely create definition and application problems as outer

Supra note 219, at 1, ftn. 3 (“Treaty of Limits, [signed] 15April 1858, 118 [Consolidated Treaty Series
(Oxford Univ. Press 1969)] 439 (in the Spanish original: ‘con objetos de comercio’)”). Term ‘objetos’ in
Spanish means ‘objects or things’ in English.
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space activities continue to evolve with changes in the valued preferences of States.
Criticisms today include arguments that view the rules that comprise each treaty, and in
particular the Outer Space Treaty, signifying aspirations of law rather than binding legal
obligations266 or becoming increasing irrelevant to deal with the legal issues associated
with changes in State practice.267 Such arguments generally do not have legal validity and
discount or reject evolutionary interpretative methods to treaties, which is grounded in
the intent of the Parties. If the treaty terms are overly broad but clearly express the intent
of the Parties, then courts will have recourse to extend such terms to some later in time
application to fit within the intent of the States Parties. It should be expected that courts
will continue to utilize such evolutionary interpretative methods in the future to reach
decisions in disputes regarding State practice in the outer space environment.

3. General Principles of Law

Per article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ, general principles of law are
recognized as a legitimate, applicable source of rules of public international law that can
be applied in international disputes.268 To international legal jurists, general principles of
law help fill in the gaps found between other sources of rules of public international law

266

See Jason Koebler, The US Mulls Breaking an International Treaty So Americans Can Mine Asteroids,
MOTHERBOARD.VICE.COM, May 14, 2015, available at http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-us-mullsbreaking-an-international-treaty-so-americans-can-mine-asteroids (“After a series of heated debates,
committee chairman Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX) stated bluntly that there is “nothing in this act that violates
the law. The Outer Space Treaty is a series of guiding principles subject to legal interpretation,” not a
binding law.”)
267
See John Hickman, Still crazy after four decades: The case for withdrawing from the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty, THE SPACE REVIEW.COM, Sept. 24, 2007, available at
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/960/1.
268
Statute of the International Court of Justice at art. 38(1)(c).

71

because comparative analysis of national laws provides a measure of consistency in
determining rules of decision for particular types of disputes.269 The effectiveness of the
use of general principles of law arises because those legal principles that are common to a
large number of systems of municipal law (i.e., national law) forms a common foundation
of rules of law that are “often the only source of international law in the absence of an
applicable treaty.”270 Although States generate national law particularly independent of
the supranational market of international relations, the promulgation of national law
nevertheless represents a supply of rules to the supranational market of international
relations because the act represents a signal of acceptable rules to the international
community of States, i.e., acceptable to at least the supplying State. Consequently, the
common usage (in terms of definition, meaning, and scope) of rules of jurisdiction among
States that may develop from the exchanges and consumption of rules in the
supranational market of international relations tends to intersect with rules that derive
from the promulgation of national law. Convergence to one definition and meaning, with
minimized scope, of a rule of jurisdiction creates observable consensus from among the
State practices of the international community of States that may establish a common
legal obligation.
Because general principles of law derive from national law, evolution in rules of
national law can give rise to changes in general principles of law over time.271 If
international agreements are codified into the national law of a State, then that supply of
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rules may also constitute a resupply of rules in the form of national law or State practice
because of the acts of promulgation or ratification. This creates a feedback loop of rules
of jurisdiction from State practice to purchasing the obligation arising from an
international agreement. Moreover, the content of a rule(s) of jurisdiction, i.e., the
definition, meaning, and scope of a rule, may also change due to changes in how a
State(s) define(s) a particular rule of jurisdiction as a function of changes to its/their
valued preferences. Furthermore, general principles of law are distinct from international
custom in that the State practice element is only deemed necessary because the obligation
of law is already satisfied by the national law’s internal promulgation by the sovereign.272
For example, the rule of law defined as due process is found in many legal
systems, both modern and historical.273 Although defined with greater specificity in some
legal systems, due process is a general principle of law respected by almost all States
because of the recognition that the marginal benefit of affording a person due process
(i.e., respecting the minimal rights of the accused to enforce the rules of law of the
sovereign by prescribing a specific process by which the fair administration justice must
follow)274 is greater than the marginal cost of providing no process at all (i.e., arbitrarily
ascribing justice to dispense with a perceived violation of a rule of the sovereign).275
Those sovereigns who deny due process to persons do so because the State does not price
the rights of the accused and therefore the State never had a preference to afford such a
right in the first place. Nevertheless, due process represents a general principle of law as
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much as it represents an international custom even if a difference in legal obligation
exists.276 What matters is how congruent State practice is with respect to a rule(s) in
question. Hence, the economic analysis of and in general principles of law seek to
demonstrate the distinctions and connectedness of rules and rules of law arising from rule
formation and evolution.
General principles of law derive from two major sources of jurisprudence, i.e., the
common law and civil law.277 Stated simplistically, rules of law derived from the
common law are said to arise because of the adversarial nature of rule-making, while
rules of law derived from the civil law are said to arise from the inquisitorial nature of
rule application.278 Where the life of the common law derives consistency and evolution
in rule-making from precedent, the life of the civil law builds upon the codification of
rules derived from the legislature and applied to each dispute without the need for
precedent.279
To illustrate this point, consider how both the common law and the civil law
traditions treat the law of contracts. In American common law, the Holmes’s option
theory of contracts280 posits a general rule of law for contracts in that “there is no
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obligation to honor a contractual undertaking – just an obligation to pay the other party’s
damages if you decide not to perform,” leaving open almost all possibilities of breach to
provide for rule formation and evolution in rules of contract law.281 In the civil law
tradition, the rule of law for contracts follows the rule of pacta sunt servanda
(“agreements must be kept”), giving direction to the obedience of the obligation where
the written source, i.e., the agreement, forms the basis of the obligation.282
Where differences exist in contract law between the common and civil law
traditions, so does State practice. However, the essence of general principles of law is
that such rules of law have a common basis, both for procedural and substantive rules of
law, across States. Where a State permits the formation of contracts, State practice in
regard to contract formation exists and the national law creates an obligation of law
internal to the sovereign. Consequently, when a sample of States that permit the activity
of contracting, these States may also supply rules to limit how contracts may be formed,
given that the appropriate measure of a general principle of law of contract formation
exists.283 However, deviations in State practice with regard to limitations on contract
formation can create international custom with respect to contract formation with
attendant limitations because the obligation generally arises from the need to apply a
State’s authority extraterritorially. Although common rules of contract between States
exist, observable deviations in national law rules for contract formation from independent
sources of the content, i.e., the definition, meaning, and scope, of the State practice in
question and the obligation of law may no longer be assumed relative to other States.

281

Id., at 989.
Id.
283
This measure may consist of application of comparative legal analysis to determine the common core of
a rule’s content, i.e., definition, meaning, and scope.
282

75

Thus, such changes can give rise to changes in what may constitute a general principle of
law and its ability to fill in gaps under public international law because of the common
source and content of rules supplied from the promulgation of national laws indicate
independent rule-development and supply.284
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CHAPTER II
ANALYTICAL CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGIES
a. Overview of Methodological Approaches

The sum of this thesis represents the use of several methodological approaches
from several fields of study interwoven with contextual historical analysis. This is done
for two reasons. First, the quantification of rules requires, at a minimum, both a legal and
historical foundation because it provides context to the underlying mathematics. Second,
to measure how rules come into existence, proliferate, and evolve, the use of subjective
and objective measures of analysis produces a means by which to identify relative
patterns in preference revelation and rule development. Although economic
methodologies have limitations, grounding how rules become law and how rules and law
evolve over time to study patterns in rule development necessitates an evaluation of how
an observer views particular problems identified in various literatures against what has
historically occurred. Thus, the goal here is to identify those metrics which may be useful
for future analyses.
In chapter III, preference revelation and rule development in the formation of the
first rule of space law is explored. First, an application of historical analysis of the events
leading up to the launch of Sputnik I is utilized to single out the necessary variables that
enabled the generation of rules of jurisdiction that produced the supranational market
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exchange from the strategic choices of the United States and the Soviet Union. Three
variables are defined: (1) the technology to launch objects into the outer space
environment, (2) the supply of, but failed consumption of, rules of jurisdiction for
verification overflights of the US and the Soviet Union by each State’s representatives,
and (3) the purchase of rules of jurisdiction relating to the International Geophysical Year
of 1957-58. Second, basic game theory is applied to the three variables to test the
stratagems used by the US and the Soviet Union leading up to the Sputnik and Explorer
launches. Since State practice is the product of preference revelation, the stratagems
employed by each State manifest from their respective State practices. Hence, a rule may
be measured as a consequence of State practice by the stratagems each State employs.
In Chapter IV, historical, economic, and comparative analyses are applied to rule
and supranational market development. First, economic analysis is applied to quantify
market participation and rule consumption and generate possible trend lines to predict
how future supranational markets and rules might evolve. Second, historical and
comparative analyses are utilized to study how preference revelation and rule supply
evolved from the State practice of launching objects into the outer space environment.
In Chapter V, economic analysis is applied to quantify rule supply and evolution
as well as the growth of market participation. First, the data sets relating to national
(space) law promulgation are analyzed as the product of rulemaking. Second, the national
law data sets are compared to the treaty data sets to analyze the evolution and rates of
rule consumption. Third, both the national law and treaty data sets are analyzed to
measure the rate of market participation across the supranational markets for rules and
rules of law relating to the activities of States in the outer space environment.
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b. Game Theory

Game theory represents the analysis of strategic behavior in competitive situations
among a set of players. Each player’s payoff relative to the possible strategies chosen by
each player in a game is evaluated.285 A game is a mathematical construct that analyzes
the interactions of rational, mutually cognizant set of players where each decision made
by one player affects the payoffs of other players.286 The number of players, their
representative strategies, and the resulting payoffs in a measured outcome comprises the
essential elements of a game.287 A set of players may play a game once, over some period
of time, for an undetermined period of time, or infinitely.288 But the characteristic
element of a game is that each choice made by one player has consequences on the payoff
to the other player.289
This thesis uses a very simple model of a game. For the purposes of Chapter III
analysis, the game of initial rule formation is played by two players: the United States
(US) (player 1) and the Soviet Union (SU) (player 2). Each player has two strategies:
cooperate (C) or defect (D). Based on these two strategies, payoffs range between plus
one (+1) and minus one (-1), where the value +1 represents the maximum benefit for a
particular strategic choice, the value zero (0) represents neither a detriment nor a benefit
to the player, i.e., no payoff (status quo), and the value minus one (-1) represents the
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maximum detriment for a particular strategic choice.290 The payoff continuum ([α, β] =
[1, -1]) represents the commoditized valued preferences of the players as defined by the
historical record.291 The payoff scheme applies to each game played.

Table 1: Strategy Payoffs Arising from Initial Rule Formation

Payoffs
O
NO
I
NI

US
1
0
1
-1

SU
-1
0
1
-1

As Table 1 above shows, the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (SU) have
payoffs for each strategic choice for each game. With respect to the first game, if the US
chooses to cooperate with the SU on the Open Skies Treaty (O), the US will earn a payoff
of +1 because it has sought to maximize its valued preference of negotiating for
overflight rules.292 If the US chooses to defect and not pursue the Open Skies Treaty
(NO), then the US will earn a payoff of zero (0) because no change in circumstances
occurred as a result of the strategic choice. Conversely, if the SU chooses to cooperate
with the US on the Open Skies Treaty (O), then the SU will earn a payoff of -1 because
the strategic choice would expose the military gaps between the two players and would
create significant unacceptable strategic risks and costs.293 If the SU chooses to defect
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and not pursue an Open Skies Treaty (NO), then the SU will earn a payoff of 0 because
no change in circumstances occurred as a result of the strategic choice.294
With respect to the second game, if the US chooses to cooperate as a participant
of the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (I), the US will earn a payoff of +1
because it has sought to maximize its valued preference of launching an object over the
territories of other States for surveillance purposes.295 If the US chooses to defect and not
pursue participation in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (NI), then the US
will earn a payoff of -1 because it would create a detriment in the form of political and
technological outcomes that do not satisfy its valued preference to launch an object over
the territories of other States.296 Conversely, if the SU chooses to cooperate as a
participant of the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (I), then the SU will earn a
payoff of +1 because it has sought to maximize its valued preference of launching an
object over the territories of other States for technological and political propaganda in the
Cold War.297 If the SU chooses to defect and not pursue participation in the International
Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (NI), then the SU will earn a payoff of -1 because it would
create a detriment in the form of political and technological outcomes that does not
satisfy its valued preference to launch an object over the territories of other States.298
The game type used for this game takes the extensive form. In this game, the
historical record sets the values for the strategic outcomes, i.e., payoffs. As Figure 3
below illustrates, the US and SU played a sequential game, the payoffs of which have
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Figure 3: Extensive Form of the Game for Initial Rule Formation

sixteen (16) possible outcomes. Of these sixteen (16) possible outcomes, two payoff
strategies dominate for the game with three subgame equilibria that represent the optimal
strategic set of choices for the players.
Table 2 below illustrates the total number of possible payoff outcomes. The two
dominant strategies arising from this game are highlighted in rows (e) and (m). Both are a
combination of three equilibria that represent the optimal payoffs for each player. Table 3
below divides the entire game into subgames. Given the possible choices, the US had two
optimal strategies represented by (O, I) and (NO, I). The first strategy consists of the US
agreeing to negotiate rules for the Open Skies Treaty and participating in the
International Geophysical Year of 1957-58. The second strategy consists of the US
foregoing cooperating with the Soviet Union on the Open Skies Treaty, but agreeing to
participate in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58. On the other hand, the
Soviet Union had only one optimal strategy. This strategy consists of not cooperating in
the negotiation for the Open Skies Treaty, while accepting to participate in the
International Geophysical Year of 1957-58.
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Table 2: Final Payoffs for Each Strategy Employed in the Game of Initial Rule Formation

(US, SU, US, SU)
a

(1, -1, 1, 1)

b

(1, -1, 1, -1)

c

(1, -1, -1, 1)

d

(1, -1, -1, -1)

e

(1, 0, 1, 1)

f

(1, 0, 1, -1)

g

(1, 0, -1, 1)

h

(1, 0, -1, -1)

i

(0, -1, 1, 1)

j

(0, -1, 1, -1)

k

(0, -1, 1, 1)

l

(0, -1, -1, -1)

m

(0, 0, 1, 1)

n

(0, 0, 1, -1)

o

(0, 0, -1, 1)

p

(0, 0, -1, -1)
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Table 3: Subgame Strategy Payoffs

(O, I)

(O, NI)

(NO, I)

(NO, NI)

US

(1, 1)

(1, -1)

(0, 1)

(0, -1)

SU

(-1, 1)

(-1, -1)

(0, 1)

(0, -1)

Each subgame assumes that the technological capability to launch an object into
outer space is foreseeable because it is the basis for the payoff schema for each State.
Since these payoff strategies are a function of the valued preferences of States, the
optimal strategies are therefore a product of initial rule formation. No matter the reasons
for which States seek to launch objects into the outer space environment, the fact that any
reason underlies a valued preference manifested through State practice necessarily gives
way to the need to design rules to ensure the continuation of the State practice.

c. Quantification of Rule Supply, Consumption, and Evolution Rates and Market
Participation
i. The Sources and Methods Used to Compile Data Sets
A. States Parties to the United Nations

The UN Membership data set comes from the UN’s webpage titled “Growth in
United Nations membership, 1945-present.”299 The data set begins in October 1945 with
the thirty-two (32) original Members of the UN. For reasons of temporal congruency
between data sets, the UN Membership data set is extrapolated out to October 2015, but

299

United Nations, Growth in the United Nations membership, 1945-present, WWW.UN.ORG,
http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml accessed Dec. 10, 2015.
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technically South Sudan became the last State Party to the UN in 2011. Moreover, to
account for changes to the political and governmental identities of States since 1945, a
pivot table was created to adjust the data set to a continuous set of data points.
The set of the number of States that represent the total number of States Parties to
the UN was constructed using a cumulative counting process. The count follows the
historical sequence of State membership in the UN. The UN Charter entered into force in
October 1945. Between October and December 1945, Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Bolivia,300 Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,301 Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,302 Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt,303 El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Iran,304 Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine Republic,305 Poland, Saudi

Id. (“On 7 April 2009, Bolivia changed its name to Bolivia (Plurinational State of).”)
Id. (“On 19 September 1991, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic informed the United Nations
that it had changed its name to Belarus.”)
302
Id. (“Czechoslovakia was an original Member of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. In a letter
dated 10 December 1992, its Permanent Representative informed the Secretary-General that the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic would cease to exist on 31 December 1992 and that the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic, as successor States, would apply for membership in the United Nations. Following the
receipt of their application, the Security Council, on 8 January 1993, recommended to the General
Assembly that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic be both admitted to United Nations
membership. Both the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic were thus admitted on 19 January of that
year as Member States.”)
303
Id. (“Egypt and Syria were original Members of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. Following a
plebiscite on 21 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was established by a union of Egypt and Syria
and continued as a single Member. On 13 October 1961, Syria, having resumed its status as an independent
State, resumed its separate membership in the United Nations. On 2 September 1971, the United Arab
Republic changed its name to the Arab Republic of Egypt.”)
304
Id. (“On 5 March 1981, Iran informed the Secretary-General that it had changed its name to Iran
(Islamic Republic of).”)
305
Id. (“In 1947, the Philippine Republic changed its name to Philippines.”)
300
301

86

Arabia, Syria,306 Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,307 Union of South
Africa,308 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,309 United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia310 all became the first fifty one (51) Member States
of the UN.311
The set of State Parties to the UN has expanded since 1945. Growth of UN
Membership continued in 1946 with the addition of Afghanistan, Iceland, Siam,312 and
Sweden bringing the total to fifty-five (55) State Parties.313

Id. (“Egypt and Syria were original Members of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. Following a
plebiscite on 21 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was established by a union of Egypt and Syria
and continued as a single Member. On 13 October 1961, Syria, having resumed its status as an independent
State, resumed its separate membership in the United Nations. On 2 September 1971, the United Arab
Republic changed its name to the Arab Republic of Egypt.”)
307
Id. (“On 24 August 1991, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic changed its name to Ukraine.”)
308
Id. (“In 1961, the Union of South Africa changed its name to South Africa.”)
309
Id. (“The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was an original Member of the United Nations from 24
October 1945. In a letter dated 24 December 1991, Boris Yeltsin, the President of the Russian Federation,
informed the Secretary-General that the membership of the Soviet Union in the Security Council and all
other United Nations organs was being continued by the Russian Federation with the support of the 11
member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.)
310
Id. (“The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an original Member of the United Nations, the
Charter having been signed on its behalf on 26 June 1945 and ratified 19 October 1945, until its dissolution
following the establishment and subsequent admission as new Members of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted as a Member of
the United Nations by General Assembly resolution A/RES/46/237 of 22 May 1992. The Republic of
Croatia was admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General Assembly resolution A/RES/46/238 of
22 May 1992. The Republic of Slovenia was admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General
Assembly resolution A/RES/46/236 of 22 May 1992. By resolution A/RES/47/225 of 8 April 1993, the
General Assembly decided to admit as a Member of the United Nations the State being provisionally
referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
pending settlement of the difference that had arisen over its name. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was
admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/12 of 1 November
2000. On 4 February 2003, following the adoption and promulgation of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia
and Montenegro by the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the official name of “Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia” was changed to Serbia and Montenegro. In a letter dated 3 June 2006, the
President of the Republic of Serbia informed the Secretary-General that the membership of Serbia and
Montenegro was being continued by the Republic of Serbia, following Montenegro's declaration of
independence. Montenegro held a 21 May 2006 referendum and declared itself independent from Serbia on
3 June. On 28 June 2006 it was accepted as a United Nations Member State by General Assembly
resolution A/RES/60/264.”)
311
Id.
312
Id. (“On 11 May 1949, Siam informed the Secretary-General that it had changed its name to Thailand.”)
313
Id.
306
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In 1947, Pakistan and Yemen314 joined bringing the total of UN membership to
fifty-seven (57).315
In 1948, Burma316 joined the UN bringing membership to fifty-eight (58).317
In 1949, Israel became the fifty-ninth (59) State Party to the UN.318
In 1950, Indonesia319 joined the UN.320
UN membership stayed constant until 1955 when Albania, Austria, Bulgaria,
Cambodia, Ceylon,321 Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos,322 Libya,323 Nepal,
Portugal, Romania, and Spain all joined the UN raising membership to seventy-six (76)
States Parties.324
In 1956, Japan, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia joined the UN bringing the total
number of States Parties to eighty (80).325

Id. (“Yemen was admitted to membership in the United Nations on 30 September 1947 and Democratic
Yemen on 14 December 1967. On 22 May 1990, the two countries merged and have since been represented
as one Member with the name “Yemen”.”)
315
Id.
316
Id. (“On 18 June 1989, the Union of Burma informed the United Nations that it had changed its name to
the Union of Myanmar. On 30 March 2011, the Union of Myanmar changed its name to the Republic of the
Union of Myanamar [sic].”)
317
Id.
318
Id.
319
Id. (“By letter of 20 January 1965, Indonesia announced its decision to withdraw from the United
Nations “at this stage and under the present circumstances”. By telegram of 19 September 1966, it
announced its decision “to resume full cooperation with the United Nations and to resume participation in
its activities”. On 28 September 1966, the General Assembly took note of this decision and the President
invited representatives of Indonesia to take seats in the Assembly.”)
320
Id.
321
Id. (“On 19 September 1991, Ceylon informed the United Nations that it had changed its name to Sri
Lanka.”)
322
Id. (“On 2 December 1975, Laos changed its name to the Lao People's Democratic Republic.”)
323
Id. (“In 1969, the Kingdom of Libya informed the United Nations that it had changed its name to Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya. Following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 66/1, the Permanent
Mission of Libya to the United Nations formally notified the United Nations of a Declaration by the
National Transitional Council of 3 August changing the official name of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to
“Libya” and changing Libya's national flag.”)
324
Id.
325
Id.
314
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In 1957, Ghana and Federation of Malaya326 became the eighty-first (81) and
eighty-second (82) State Parties to the UN.327
In 1958, Guinea become the eighty-second (82) State Party to the UN after the
creation of a plebiscite established by a union of Egypt and Syria and continued as a
single Member on February, 21 1958 to form the United Arab Republic.328
In 1960, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville),329
Congo (Leopoldville),330 Cyprus, Dahomey,331 Gabon, Ivory Coast,332 Malagasy
Republic,333 Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, and Upper Volta334 joined the
UN raising member to one hundred members (100).335

Id. (“The Federation of Malaya joined the United Nations on 17 September 1957. On 16 September
1963, its name was changed to Malaysia, following the admission to the new Federation of Singapore,
Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak. Singapore became an independent State on 9 August 1965 and a
Member of the United Nations on 21 September 1965.”)
327
Id.
328
Id. (“Egypt and Syria were original Members of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. Following a
plebiscite on 21 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was established by a union of Egypt and Syria
and continued as a single Member. On 13 October 1961, Syria, having resumed its status as an independent
State, resumed its separate membership in the United Nations. On 2 September 1971, the United Arab
Republic changed its name to the Arab Republic of Egypt.”)
329
Id. (“In 1970, Congo (Brazzaville) changed its name to the People's Republic of Congo, and on 15
November 1971 — to Congo.”)
330
Id. (“Zaire joined the United Nations on 20 September 1960 when it was known as the Republic of the
Congo. On 17 May 1997, its name was changed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”)
331
Id. (“On Nov 30 1974, Dahomey informed the United Nations that it had changed its name to Republic
of Benin.”)
332
Id. (“In 1985, Ivory Coast informed the United Nations that it had changed its name to Côte d'Ivoire.”)
333
Id. (“In 1975, Malagasy Republic changed its name to Madagascar.”)
334
Id. (“In 1984, Upper Volta informed the United Nations that it had changed its name to Burkina Faso.”)
335
Id.
326
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With the acceptance of Mauritania, Mongolia, Sierra Leone, and Tanganyika336 in
1961, and the resumption of Syria as an independent State,337 membership in the UN
grew to one hundred and five (105).338
By 1962, the number of States Parties increased to one hundred and eleven (111)
with the acceptance of Algeria, Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, and
Uganda to the UN.339
In 1963, Kenya, Kuwait, and Zanzibar340 joined the UN bringing membership
totals to one hundred and fourteen (114).341
By 1964, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar continued as a single
member State, changing its name to the United Republic of Tanzania on 1 November
1964342 and Malawi, Malta, and Zambia joined bringing membership to one hundred and
sixteen (116).343

Id. (“Tanganyika was a Member of the United Nations from 14 December 1961 and Zanzibar was a
Member from 16 December 1963. Following the ratification on 26 April 1964 of Articles of Union between
Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar continued as a single Member,
changing its name to the United Republic of Tanzania on 1 November 1964.”)
337
Id. (“Egypt and Syria were original Members of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. Following a
plebiscite on 21 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was established by a union of Egypt and Syria
and continued as a single Member. On 13 October 1961, Syria, having resumed its status as an independent
State, resumed its separate membership in the United Nations. On 2 September 1971, the United Arab
Republic changed its name to the Arab Republic of Egypt.”)
338
Id.
339
Id.
340
Id. (“Tanganyika was a Member of the United Nations from 14 December 1961 and Zanzibar was a
Member from 16 December 1963. Following the ratification on 26 April 1964 of Articles of Union between
Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar continued as a single Member,
changing its name to the United Republic of Tanzania on 1 November 1964.”)
341
Id.
342
Id.
343
Id.
336
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In 1965, membership in the UN rose to one hundred and nineteen (119) after The
Gambia, Maldive Islands, and Singapore, as a newly formed independent State,344 joined
the UN.345
In 1966, Barbados, Botswana, Guyana, and Lesotho joined the UN raising
membership totals to one hundred and twenty-three (123).346
In 1967, the Democratic Yemen347 joined the UN as an independent State
bringing total membership to one hundred and twenty-four (124).348
In 1968, the UN grew to one hundred and twenty-seven (127) States when
Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, and Swaziland were accepted as member States.349
In 1970, Fiji became the one hundred and twenty-eighth (128) State to be
accepted into the UN.350
In 1971, Bahrain, Bhutan, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates all joined the
UN bringing membership to one hundred and thirty-three (133).351

344

Id.
Id.
346
Id.
347
Id. (“Yemen was admitted to membership in the United Nations on 30 September 1947 and Democratic
Yemen on 14 December 1967. On 22 May 1990, the two countries merged and have since been represented
as one Member with the name “Yemen”.”)
348
Id.
349
Id.
350
Id.
351
Id.
345
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In 1973, the UN accepted the Bahamas, the Federal Republic of Germany,352 and
the German Democratic Republic353 as member States raising membership to one
hundred and thirty-six (136).354
In 1974, Bangladesh, Grenada, and Guinea-Bissau joined the UN raising
membership to one and thirty-nine (139).355
By 1975, UN membership increased to one hundred and forty-five members (145)
when Cape Verde, Comoros, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe,
and Suriname joined.356
In 1976, Angola, Samoa, and Seychelles joined the UN increasing membership to
one hundred and forty-eight (148).357
In 1977, Djibouti and Viet Nam entered the UN as new States Parties bringing
membership to one hundred and fifty (150).358
In 1978, Dominica and Solomon Islands became UN member States raising
membership to one hundred and fifty-two (152).359
In 1979, Saint Lucia joined to become the one hundred and fifty third (153)
member of the UN.360

Id. (“The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were admitted to
membership in the United Nations on 18 September 1973. Through the accession of the German
Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany, effective from 3 October 1990, the two German
States united to form one sovereign State.”)
353
Id.
354
Id.
355
Id.
356
Id.
357
Id.
358
Id.
359
Id.
360
Id.
352
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In 1980, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Zimbabwe joined the UN bringing
membership to one hundred and fifty five (155).361
In 1980, with the inclusion of Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, and Vanuatu, UN
membership totaled one hundred and fifty-eight (158).362
In 1983, Saint Christopher and Nevis363 became the one hundred and fifty-ninth
(159) State to join the UN.364
In 1984, Brunei Darussalam joined the UN to become the one hundred and fiftyninth (159) State Party.365
In 1990, Liechtenstein and Namibia joined the UN, but with the unifications of
Yemen and Democratic Yemen in May to form one State Yemen and the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in October to form one State
the Federal Republic of Germany, this kept membership totals at one hundred and sixty
(160).366
By 1991, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Republic of Korea joined the UN
bringing membership totals to one hundred and sixty-seven (167).367

361

Id.
Id.
363
Id. (“On 16 December 1986, Saint Christopher and Nevis changed its name to Saint Kitts and Nevis.”)
364
Id.
365
Id.
366
Id.
367
Id.
362
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In 1992, in light of the breakup of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina368 and
Croatia369 formed new States; with the addition of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, Slovenia,370 Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan raised UN membership to one hundred and seventy-nine
(179).371
In 1993, in light of the breakup of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the acceptance
of Andorra, Czech Republic,372 Eritrea, Monaco, Slovakia,373 and The former Yugoslav

Id. (“The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an original Member of the United Nations, the
Charter having been signed on its behalf on 26 June 1945 and ratified 19 October 1945, until its dissolution
following the establishment and subsequent admission as new Members of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted as a Member of
the United Nations by General Assembly resolution A/RES/46/237 of 22 May 1992. The Republic of
Croatia was admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General Assembly resolution A/RES/46/238 of
22 May 1992. The Republic of Slovenia was admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General
Assembly resolution A/RES/46/236 of 22 May 1992. . . . The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was admitted
as a Member of the United Nations by General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/12 of 1 November 2000. On
4 February 2003, following the adoption and promulgation of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and
Montenegro by the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the official name of “Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia” was changed to Serbia and Montenegro. In a letter dated 3 June 2006, the
President of the Republic of Serbia informed the Secretary-General that the membership of Serbia and
Montenegro was being continued by the Republic of Serbia, following Montenegro's declaration of
independence. Montenegro held a 21 May 2006 referendum and declared itself independent from Serbia on
3 June. On 28 June 2006 it was accepted as a United Nations Member State by General Assembly
resolution A/RES/60/264.”)
369
Id.
370
Id.
371
Id.
372
Id. (“Czechoslovakia was an original Member of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. In a letter
dated 10 December 1992, its Permanent Representative informed the Secretary-General that the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic would cease to exist on 31 December 1992 and that the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic, as successor States, would apply for membership in the United Nations. Following the
receipt of their application, the Security Council, on 8 January 1993, recommended to the General
Assembly that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic be both admitted to United Nations
membership. Both the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic were thus admitted on 19 January of that
year as Member States.”)
373
Id.
368

94

Republic of Macedonia374 brought UN membership to one hundred and eighty-four
(184).375
In 1994, Palau joined the UN raising membership to one hundred and eighty-five
(185).376
In 1999, Kiribati, Nauru, and Tonga all joined the UN increasing membership to
one hundred and eighty-eight (188).377
In 2000, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia378 and Tuvalu joined the UN raising
membership to one hundred and eighty-nine (189).379
In 2002, Switzerland and Timor-Leste were accepted as States Parties to the UN
increasing membership to one hundred and ninety-one (191).380
In 2006, Montenegro381 joined the UN bringing membership to one hundred and
ninety-two (192).382

Id. (“By resolution A/RES/47/225 of 8 April 1993, the General Assembly decided to admit as a Member
of the United Nations the State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as
"The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" pending settlement of the difference that had arisen over its
name.”)
375
Id.
376
Id.
377
Id.
378
Id. (“The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General
Assembly resolution A/RES/55/12 of 1 November 2000. On 4 February 2003, following the adoption and
promulgation of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro by the Assembly of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, the official name of “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” was changed to Serbia and
Montenegro.”)
379
Id.
380
Id.
381
Id. (“In a letter dated 3 June 2006, the President of the Republic of Serbia informed the SecretaryGeneral that the membership of Serbia and Montenegro was being continued by the Republic of Serbia,
following Montenegro's declaration of independence. Montenegro held a 21 May 2006 referendum and
declared itself independent from Serbia on 3 June. On 28 June 2006 it was accepted as a United Nations
Member State by General Assembly resolution A/RES/60/264.”)
382
Id.
374
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In 2011, South Sudan383 joined the UN as the one hundred and ninety-third (193)
member States.384

1. United Nations Member States Raw Data Table

To construct the table of raw data composed of UN State Parties from October
1945 to October 2015, a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was constructed using three
columns.385 The first column listed each State Party to the UN. The second column listed
the date on which a State in the row became a Member of the UN. The date of ratification
used a month and year format. The third column consists of notes on if and when a State
in the row changed its international legal personality after some event, e.g., due to
revolution, coup d’état, de-colonialism, or some other form of political transition.386 This
column was necessary to ensure that the graph in the growth of UN Membership was
counted correctly over time.

2. United Nations Member States Pivot Table

To fit the raw data to the graph of the Growth of UN Membership over time, a
pivot table was designed in Microsoft Excel.387 The UN Membership pivot table was

Id. (“The Republic of South Sudan formally seceded from Sudan on 9 July 2011 as a result of an
internationally monitored referendum held in January 2011, and was admitted as a new Member State by
the United Nations General Assembly on 14 July 2011.”)
384
Id.
385
See Appendix for raw data.
386
See supra note 48.
387
See Appendix for raw data.
383
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constructed using signature and ratification dates for each Member State over time.388
The list of Member States was manually adjusted for the formation or break-up of States
based on UN Membership history.
The pivot table construction followed four general rules. First, if a State never had
political or territorial transitions between 1945 and 2015, no changes were made to how
that State was counted over time. For example, the US continues to have the same
political character despite adding internally to its territory since 1945. Thus no change
was made to how the US and other similarly situated States were counted over time.
Second, if a State had a political transition that produced only one new political
entity regardless of any loss in territory between 1945 and 2015, then no change was
made to the table. For example, as the Soviet Union broke-up, the Russian Federation
transitioned politically from the anchor State that formed the political Soviet Union. Thus
no change was made to how Russia was counted over time.
Third, if one State broke up into two or more States, a count of one was subtracted
from the total count for the loss of the original State and a count of N number of new
States into which the original State broke apart was added at the time break-up occurred.
For example, in 1992, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up into The
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Republic of
Slovenia. Here, a count of one (1) was subtracted with the dissolution of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in May 1992. Correspondingly, a count of three (N=3)
was added with the acceptance Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia for UN
membership.

388

Ratification counts include States that acceded or succeeded to the treaty. See supra note 48.
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Fourth, if N States combined into one State, a count of N was subtracted from the
total number of States at the time, and a count of one was added to account for the final
formation of the new State. For example, in May 1990, Yemen and Democratic Yemen
merged into one (1) State from two (N=2) States. The rule followed for this case required
subtracting a count of two (N=2) and adding a count of one (1) in May 1990.
Once the pivot table was constructed using the adjusted time data for UN
membership, a scatterplot was designed to graph the pivot table data in Microsoft Excel.
Graph 1 below shows the growth of UN membership over time where the number of
States admitted to the UN is listed on the y-axis and time, between October 1945 and
October 2015, is listed on the x-axis.

3. United Nations Member States Scatterplot

A scatterplot for the Growth of UN membership was graphed (see Graph 4) where
the number of States that signed or ratified the UN Charter is listed on the y-axis and
time, between October 1945 and October 2015, is listed on the x-axis.389 Because the
entire set of rules that comprise public international law is dependent on the number of
States putting their valued preferences into effect through State practice at any given
time, relative market share and rule consumption may be inferred from observations of
exchange.390 In other words, how, when, and how many States engage in the
development of rules among and between States is dependent on how many States are

389

Ratification counts include States that acceded or succeeded to the treaty. See supra note 48.
This is only a relative measure because it only seeks to capture how many possible market participants
there are in the international system at each point in time relative to the number of States who supply and
consume rules.
390
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actually using particular supranational markets of international relations at any given
time. Such changes represent perturbations in the supranational market itself due to
shifting preferences of States due to the effects of the entrance and exit of States from the
supranational market of international relations over time. Consequently, fewer or more
States engaged in the supranational market of international relations may lead to
measurable effects that would include, inter alia, power-disparities in bargaining between
States who engage in rule-making, market failure, lower or higher transaction costs,
potential externalities that may impose benefits or costs on some or all States in the
system at or for a certain period of time, or less or more variability in preference
satisfaction.391
Accordingly, determining the total number of States engaged in rule supply and
consumption through the various means provided by the supranational market of
international relations establishes the upper bound of market participation at any given
time. Moreover, changes in the international system of States provides a means by which
to measure when and why States may or may not change their valued preferences when
engaged in the supranational market of international relations. Over time, as States enter
and exit the supranational market of international relations, the reevaluation of valued
preferences and underlying facts about those preferences may lead to changes in the
social dynamics among and between States and cause fluctuations in the international
system. For example, in Graph 1, one can observe several dips and spikes in the number
of State parties to the UN. The two most prominent dips and spikes an observer can
notice are located around the mid-1950’s and the early 1990’s. The first dip corresponds

391

See supra note 4.
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generally to de-colonialism, while the second dip corresponds to the breakup of the
USSR and Yugoslavia.392
Moreover, treaty success and the preference to be bound by or intended to be
bound by the obligations and duties of a particular treaty can be quantified in terms of a
relative percentage measure between the total number of UN member State Parties and
the number of States Parties and/or signatories to a target treaty at any given time because
the ratio establishes how many States seek to supply and/or consume rules over time.393
When the curve for the Growth of UN Membership over time is compared with a curve
representing observed supply or consumption of rules for space objects, the difference
between the two curves provides an inferential general measure of the objective
preference values of States. As any given rule supply or consumption curve approaches
the curve of the Growth in UN Membership, i.e., the smaller the distance between two
points between the baseline curve and test curve, that ratio provides a consistent measure
of the successfulness of rule supply or consumption at each point in time. In other words,
a measure of treaty success as a function of valued State preferences is based on how
many States exist at the time a treaty is concluded or ratified through as long as the treaty
remains in force. The larger the ratio, the greater the implied success of rule supply
and/or consumption, and vice-versa.

392

See supra note 48.
However, this thesis does not propose a way to rank these measured rations because the sample of rules
considered is small. Future analysis and the inclusion of other sets of rules supplied and/or consumed
would provide a means by which to more accurately
393
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4. United Nations Member States Data Limitations

While there exists one hundred and ninety-three State Parties to the UN, this does
not necessarily represent all entities that may be called States. At least three entities exist
that do not have a status of State Party to the UN. These are Kosovo, Taiwan (Republic
of China), and the Holy See. Of these three States, Taiwan and the Holy See have either
signed or ratified at least one of the four space treaties under study. Of these two, only the
Holy See has Permanent Observer status at the UN.394 However, for the sake of
congruency between data sets, Kosovo, the Holy See, and Taiwan (Republic of China)
are not counted in the data UN set.

394

United Nations, About Permanent Observers, What are Permanent Observers?, WWW.UN.ORG,
http://www.un.org/en/members/aboutpermobservers.shtml accessed Dec. 10, 2015.
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Graph 1: Cumulative Count of States Parties to the UN

B. Signatories to and Ratifying States of the Outer Space Treaty

The source of the Outer Space Treaty data set comes from the treaty lists kept in
Washington, DC, London, and Moscow.395 The data set starts in January 1967 and is
extrapolated out to October 2015, but ends in March 2013 when Lithuania became the
last State to ratify the Outer Space Treaty.396 As of October 2015, the Outer Space Treaty
has one hundred and four (104) States Parties and twenty five (25) signatories.397
The Outer Space Treaty is a multilateral treaty that is open and remains open to
all States to sign and/or ratify. As article XIV states:

1.

This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State

which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance
with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2.

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.

Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United

395

See United States Department of State, Status of Outer Space Treaty, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81123.pdf accessed Dec. 10, 2015; United Kingdom, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, Status of Outer Space Treaty, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-principles-governing-the-activities-of-states-in-theexploration-and-use-of-outer-space-including-the-moon-and-other-celestial-bodies-lond accessed Dec. 10,
2015; and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Status of Outer Space Treaty, available at
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space accessed Dec. 10, 2015.
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U.N. Comm. Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-Comm., Status of international agreements
relating to activities in outer space as at 1 January 2015, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2015/CRP.8 (Apr. 8,
2015), available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2015_CRP08E.pdf.
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States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary
Governments.
3.

This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments

of ratification by five Governments including the Governments designated
as Depositary Governments under this Treaty.
4.

For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are

deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter
into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or
accession.
5.

The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory

and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of
each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of
its entry into force and other notices.
6.

This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments

pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.398

Because the Outer Space Treaty was presented for signature and ratification in
triplicate, the three lists, each individually maintained by the US in Washington, DC, the
UK in London, and the Russian Federation in Moscow, were reviewed for completeness.
Each list is authentic as a matter of public international law;399 however, individually,
each list is not a complete list of signatory or ratifying States. Only the US and UK lists
are publically available online through 2015. Because the Russian Foreign Ministry does

398
399

Outer Space Treaty supra note 21, at art. XIV.
See supra note 105, at 262.
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not have an accessible list online, the list maintained by the United Nations Office of
Disarmament Affairs (Disarmament Affairs list) was used in its place because it includes
data from all three lists from which all lists could be crosschecked.400 Furthermore, the
complete list of signatory and ratifying States Parties were checked against the UN
COPUOS document with the title “Status of international agreements relating to activities
in outer space as at 1 January 2015” to ensure that the number of signatory and ratifying
State Parties matched.401

1. States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty Raw Data Table

The compilation of the data set for the Outer Space Treaty takes two forms. First,
a table of raw data was constructed using Microsoft Excel. The table consisted of four
columns. The first column listed each State that had either signed or taken steps to ratify,
accede, succeed, or withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty. The second column listed the
date of signature to the Outer Space Treaty for the State in that row. The third column
lists the date of ratification, accession, or succession to the Outer Space Treaty for the
State in that row. The fourth column contained notes about any changes to a State’s
signatory, ratification, accession, succession, or withdrawal from the Outer Space Treaty.

400

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Status of Outer Space Treaty, DISARMAMENT.UN.ORG,
available at http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space accessed Dec. 10, 2015.
401
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2. States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty Pivot Table

To fit the raw data to the graph of the Growth of State Parties to the Outer Space
Treaty over time, a pivot table was designed in Microsoft Excel.402 The Outer Space
Treaty pivot table was constructed using signature and ratification dates for each States
Party over time. The list of States Parties was manually adjusted for the formation or
break-up of States based on UN Membership history constructed into the UN
Membership pivot table. The Outer Space Treaty pivot table construction followed the
same rules of construction as the UN Membership pivot table.

3. States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty Scatterplot

Once the Outer Space Treaty pivot table was constructed using the adjusted time
data for UN membership, a scatterplot was designed to graph the pivot table data in
Microsoft Excel. Graph 2 below shows the Growth of States Parties to the Outer Space
Treaty over time where the number of States that signed or ratified the treaty is listed on
the y-axis and time, between January 1967 and October 2015, is listed on the x-axis.403
Where States have signed or ratified the Outer Space Treaty, those data provide
an indication of when and the degree to which a State has purchased those obligations
deriving from the treaty. The conclusion of any treaty indicates a supply of rules for
which a State may purchase the set of obligations inherent to the substance of the treaty.
The graph of the Growth of States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty provides a measure
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See Appendix for raw data.
Ratification counts include States that acceded or succeeded to the treaty. See supra note 48.
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of the rate of rule consumption over time. Furthermore, the number of States that
purchase the obligation of the rule in order to assert authority relative to other States
Parties also gives a sense of the demand for such rules because it demonstrates a State’s
willingness to pay a price for the benefit that the treaty is meant to provide.

4. States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty Data Limitations

No data limitations were discovered as each treaty list was checked against
multiple sources for completeness.
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Graph 2: Cumulative Count of Ratifying and Signatory States to the Outer Space treaty

C. Signatories to and Ratifying States of the Rescue and Return Agreement

The source of the data set comes from the treaty lists kept in Washington, DC,
London, and Moscow.404 The data set begins in April 1968 with fourteen (14) original
signatory States. The data is extrapolated out to October 2015, but ends in March 2013
when Lithuania became the last State to ratify the Rescue and Return Agreement.405 As
of October 2015, ninety six (96) States have ratified and twenty four (24) have signed the
treaty.406
The Rescue and Return Agreement is a multilateral treaty that is open and
remains open to all States to sign and/or ratify. As article 7 states,

1.

This Agreement shall be open to all States for signature. Any State

which does not sign this Agreement before its entry into force in
accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2.

This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.

Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United
States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary
Governments.

404

See United States Department of State, Status of Rescue and Return Agreement, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81125.pdf accessed Dec. 10, 2015, and United Kingdom,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Status of the Rescue and Return Agreement, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/agreement-on-the-rescue-of-astronauts-the-return-ofastronauts-and-the-return-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space-london-2241968 accessed Dec. 10, 2015.
405
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3.

This Agreement shall enter into force upon the deposit of

instruments of ratification by five Governments including the
Governments designated as Depositary Governments under this
Agreement.
4.

For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are

deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall
enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of
ratification or accession.
5.

The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory

and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of
each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Agreement, the date
of its entry into force and other notices.
6.

This Agreement shall be registered by the Depositary Governments

pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.407

Because States Parties to the Rescue and Return Agreement presented it for
signature and ratification in triplicate, there are three lists maintained by the US in
Washington, DC, the UK in London, and the Russian Federation in Moscow.408 Each list
is authentic as a matter of public international law;409 however, individually, each list is
not a complete list of signatory or ratifying States. Only the US and UK lists are

407

Rescue and Return Agreement supra note 21, art. 7.
However, the Moscow list could not be obtained.
409
See supra note 48.
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publically available online through 2015.410 Because the Russian Foreign Ministry does
not have an accessible list online and attempts to locate a list proved unsuccessful,
therefore the Russian list was not included in the count that makes up Table 5 in the
Appendix. Furthermore, the complete list of signatory and ratifying State Parties were
checked against the UNCOPUOS document “Status of international agreements relating
to activities in outer space as at 1 January 2015” to ensure that the number of signatory
and ratifying State Parties matched.411

1. States Parties to the Rescue and Return Agreement Raw Data Table

The construction of Table 5 consisted of a review of the US, UK, and Russian
lists. With the US list, each State and each date of signature and ratification are placed in
columns. As discussed above, changes in Statehood and corresponding treaty obligations
were accounted for to form a continuous list over time.
The compilation of the data set for the Rescue and Return Agreement takes two
forms. First, a table of raw data was constructed using Microsoft Excel. The table
consisted of four columns. The first column listed each State that had either signed or
taken steps to ratify, accede, succeed, or withdraw from the Rescue and Return
Agreement. The second column listed the date of signature to the Rescue and Return
Agreement for the State in that row. The third column lists the date of ratification,

410

See United States Department of State, Status of Rescue and Return Agreement, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81125.pdf accessed Dec. 10, 2015, and United Kingdom
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Status of the Rescue and Return Agreement, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/agreement-on-the-rescue-of-astronauts-the-return-ofastronauts-and-the-return-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space-london-2241968 accessed Dec. 10, 2015.
411
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accession, or succession to the Rescue and Return Agreement for the State in that row.
The fourth column contained notes about any changes to a State’s signatory, ratification,
accession, succession, or withdrawal from the Rescue and Return Agreement.

2. States Parties to the Rescue and Return Agreement Pivot Table

To fit the raw data to the graph of the Growth of State Parties to the Rescue and
Return Agreement over time, a pivot table was designed in Microsoft Excel. The Rescue
and Return Agreement pivot table was constructed using signature and ratification dates
for each States Party over time. The list of States Parties was manually adjusted for the
formation or break-up of States based on UN Membership history constructed into the
UN Membership pivot table. The Rescue and Return Agreement pivot table construction
followed the same rules of construction as the UN Membership pivot table.

3. States Parties to the Rescue and Return Agreement Scatterplot

Once the Rescue and Return Agreement pivot table was constructed using the
adjusted time data for UN membership, a scatterplot was designed to graph the pivot
table data in Microsoft Excel. Graph 3 below shows the Growth of States Parties to the
Rescue and Return Agreement over time where the number of States that signed or
ratified the treaty is listed on the y-axis and time, between April 1968 and October 2015,
is listed on the x-axis.412

412

Ratification counts include States that acceded or succeeded to the treaty. See supra note 48.
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Where States have signed or ratified the Outer Space Treaty, those data provide
an indication of when and the degree to which a State has purchased those obligations
deriving from the treaty. The conclusion of any treaty indicates a supply of rules for
which a State may purchase the set of obligations inherent to the substance of the treaty.
The graph of the Growth of States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty provides a measure
of the rate of rule consumption over time. Furthermore, the number of States that
purchase the obligation of the rule in order to assert authority relative to other States
Parties also gives a sense of the demand for such rules because it demonstrates a State’s
willingness to pay a price for the benefit that the treaty is meant to provide.

4. States Parties to the Rescue and Return Agreement Data Limitations

All efforts to track down an official Russian list was futile. No Russian list exists
online or elsewhere that is publically available and up to date.
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Graph 3: Cumulative Count of Ratifying and Signatory States to the Rescue and Return Agreement

D. Signatories to and Ratifying States of the Liability Convention

The source of the Liability Convention data set comes from the treaty lists kept in
Washington, DC, London, and Moscow.413 The data set begins in March 1972 with
fourteen (14) original signatory States. The data are extrapolated out to 2015, but end in
July 2014 when Columbia became the last State to ratify the Liability Convention.414 As
of October 2015, ninety five (95) States have ratified and twenty one (21) States have
signed the treaty.415
The Liability Convention is a multilateral treaty that is open and remains open to
all States to sign and/or ratify. As article XXIV states:

1.

This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State

which does not sign this Convention before its entry into force in
accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2.

This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.

Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United
States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary
Governments.

413

See United States Department of State, Status of the Liability Convention, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81127.pdf accessed Dec. 10, 2015, and United Kingdom,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Status of the Liability Convention, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/convention-on-international-liability-for-damage-caused-byspace-objects-london-2931972 accessed Dec. 10, 2015.
414
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3.

This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of the fifth

instrument of ratification.
4.

For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are

deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall
enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of
ratification or accession.
5.

The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory

and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of
each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Convention, the
date of its entry into force and other notices.
6.

This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary

Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations.416

1. States Parties to the Liability Convention Raw Data Table

The compilation of the data set for the Liability Convention takes two forms.
First, a table of raw data was constructed using Microsoft Excel. The table consisted of
four columns. The first column listed each State that had either signed or taken steps to
ratify, accede, succeed, or withdraw from the Liability Convention. The second column
listed the date of signature to the Liability Convention for the State in that row. The third
column lists the date of ratification, accession, or succession to the Liability Convention

416

See Liability Convention supra note 21, at art. XXIV.
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for the State in that row. The fourth column contained notes about any changes to a
State’s signatory, ratification, accession, succession, or withdrawal from the Liability
Convention.

2. States Parties to the Liability Convention Pivot Table

To fit the raw data to the graph of the Growth of State Parties to the Liability
Convention over time, a pivot table was designed in Microsoft Excel. The Liability
Convention pivot table was constructed using signature and ratification dates for each
States Party over time. The list of States Parties was manually adjusted for the formation
or break-up of States based on UN Membership history constructed into the UN
Membership pivot table. The Liability Convention pivot table construction followed the
same rules of construction as the UN Membership pivot table.

3. States Parties to the Liability Convention Scatterplot

Once the Liability Convention pivot table was constructed using the adjusted time
data for UN membership, a scatterplot was designed to graph the pivot table data in
Microsoft Excel. Graph 4 below shows the Growth of States Parties to the Liability
Convention over time where the number of States that signed or ratified the treaty is
listed on the y-axis and time, between March 1972 and October 2015, is listed on the xaxis.417

417

Ratification counts include States that acceded or succeeded to the treaty. See supra note 48.
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Where States have signed or ratified the Outer Space Treaty, those data provide
an indication of when and the degree to which a State has purchased those obligations
deriving from the treaty. The conclusion of any treaty indicates a supply of rules for
which a State may purchase the set of obligations inherent to the substance of the treaty.
The graph of the Growth of States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty provides a measure
of the rate of rule consumption over time. Furthermore, the number of States that
purchase the obligation of the rule in order to assert authority relative to other States
Parties also gives a sense of the demand for such rules because it demonstrates a State’s
willingness to pay a price for the benefit that the treaty is meant to provide.

4. States Parties to the Liability Convention Data Limitations

All efforts to track down an official Russian list were futile. No Russian list exists
online or elsewhere that is publically available and up to date. This created a problem in
discovering the correct ratification date for Lebanon. The British list has Lebanon signing
the Rescue and Return Agreement.418 However, the official UN list published by OOSA
shows that Lebanon is a ratifying State.419 To reconcile these two facts, Lebanon’s date of
signature was chosen as the date of ratification.

418

Compare Russian Federation, The list of multilateral international treaties (the Russian Federation is
the depositary), available at http://archive.mid.ru/spm_md.nsf accessed Dec. 10, 2015, with U.N. Comm.
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-Comm., Status of international agreements relating to activities
in outer space as at 1 January 2015, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2015/CRP.8 (Apr. 8, 2015), available at
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2015_CRP08E.pdf.
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Graph 4: Cumulative Count of Ratifying and Signatory States of the Liability Convention

E. Signatories to and Ratifying States of the Registration Convention

Unlike the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue and Return Agreement and the
Liability Convention, the Registration Convention has only one list of signatory and
ratifying States. The data set begins in May 1975 with two (2) original signatory
States.420 The data are extrapolated out to 2015, but end in April 2014 when Kuwait
became the last State to ratify the Registration Convention.421 As of October 2015, sixty
five (65) States have ratified and four (4) States have signed the treaty.422
The Registration Convention is a multilateral treaty that is open and remains open
to all States to sign and/or ratify through the UN. As article VIII states:

1.

This Convention shall be open for signature by all States at United

Nations Headquarters in New York. Any State which does not sign this
Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of
this article may accede to it at any time.
2.

This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.

Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

420

See United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the Registration Convention, available at
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIV1&chapter=24&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en accessed Dec. 10, 2015.
421
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422
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3.

This Convention shall enter into force among the States which

have depo- sited instruments of ratification on the deposit of the fifth such
instrument with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
4.

For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are

deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall
enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of
ratification or accession.
5.

The Secretary-General shall promptly inform all signatory and

acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each
instrument of ratification of and accession to this Convention, the date of
its entry into force and other notices.423

1. States Parties to the Registration Convention Raw Data Table

The compilation of the data set for the Registration Convention takes two forms.
First, a table of raw data was constructed using Microsoft Excel. The table consisted of
four columns. The first column listed each State that had either signed or taken steps to
ratify, accede, succeed, or withdraw from the Registration Convention. The second
column listed the date of signature to the Registration Convention for the State in that
row. The third column lists the date of ratification, accession, or succession to the
Registration Convention for the State in that row. The fourth column contained notes

423

Registration Convention supra note 21, at art.VIII.
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about any changes to a State’s signatory, ratification, accession, succession, or
withdrawal from the Registration Convention.

2. States Parties to the Registration Convention Pivot Table

To fit the raw data to the graph of the Growth of State Parties to the Registration
Convention over time, a pivot table was designed in Microsoft Excel. The Registration
Convention pivot table was constructed using signature and ratification dates for each
States Party over time. The list of States Parties was manually adjusted for the formation
or break-up of States based on UN Membership history constructed into the UN
Membership pivot table. The Registration Convention pivot table construction followed
the same rules of construction as the UN Membership pivot table.

3. States Parties to the Registration Convention Scatterplot

Once the Registration Convention pivot table was constructed using the adjusted
time data for UN membership, a scatterplot was designed to graph the pivot table data in
Microsoft Excel. Graph 5 below shows the Growth of States Parties to the Registration
Convention over time where the number of States that signed or ratified the treaty is
listed on the y-axis and time, between May 1975 and October 2015, is listed on the xaxis.424
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Where States have signed or ratified the Outer Space Treaty, those data provide
an indication of when and the degree to which a State has purchased those obligations
deriving from the treaty. The conclusion of any treaty indicates a supply of rules for
which a State may purchase the set of obligations inherent to the substance of the treaty.
The graph of the Growth of States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty provides a measure
of the rate of rule consumption over time. Furthermore, the number of States that
purchase the obligation of the rule in order to assert authority relative to other States
Parties also gives a sense of the demand for such rules because it demonstrates a State’s
willingness to pay a price for the benefit that the treaty is meant to provide.

4. States Parties to the Registration Convention Data Limitations

Since the signatory and ratification lists for the Registration Convention are
maintained by the UN, the list is complete.
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Graph 5: Cumulative Count of Ratifying and Signatory States of the RC

F. States that Have Implemented the Term Space Object into their National Laws

As described infra, the term “object” is extrapolated from the Outer Space Treaty
through the Rescue and Return Agreement, the Liability Convention, and the Registration
Convention. While an analysis of the evolution from the term “object” to “space object”
is discussed in Chapters III through V, it is important to briefly summarize the
importance of this approach.
The set of States that have implemented the term “space object” into their national
laws comprises States that have some space-faring experience, including being a member
State of a multilateral space agency, a partner to the International Space Station,
launching humans, animals, or other objects into outer space, or having had another State
launch objects into outer space for it. Each State counted has, at a minimum, either signed
or ratified the Outer Space Treaty or subsequent space treaties. Since the Outer Space
Treaty is an initial set of rules that comprise law for, and uses the term “object” in
reference to things launched or intended to be launched to, the outer space environment,
those specifically referenced articles represent the baseline for which States have
exchanged in the purchase of the treaty’s obligations that give effect to a State’s
extraterritorial application of its authority.425
Since all States in the full sample have, at least, signed or ratified the Outer Space
Treaty, obligations arising under treaty law may or may not have been given effect into
the national law with respect to space objects.426 Moreover, the obligations that arise
from any space treaty signed or ratified by the States sampled are with respect to the

425
426

See discussion supra in Chapter I.
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obligations purchased as a matter of treaty law. However, the obligations that arise from
treaty law generally have some legal effect in terms of rule supply within the national
law. When States give legal effect to a treaty’s obligation under national law, States may
publish or promulgate those obligations in the form of national law rules.427 In doing so,
States resupply rules to the international market of international relations in the form of
their national laws.428 When States resupply rules via the publication or promulgation of
their national laws, those rules common to States in content (i.e., a rule’s definition,
meaning, and scope) may signal to other States of the purchase of obligations relative to
their powers as sovereign States.429 This arises because States have generally complete
authority over their territories and thus the act or publishing or promulgation a rule
internal to the State expresses the preferred source of a rule’s obligation.430

1. National Law Data Set

Two samples of State national space laws were taken. The first sample consists of
thirty-nine (39) States. This set includes the following States: Algeria, Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, China, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea,
Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the

427

See JULIAN HERMIDA, LEGAL BASIS FOR A NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION (Kluwer 2004).
See discussion supra in Chapter I.
429
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creates a common source of rules for States that may be applied in disputes. See discussion infra in Chapter
V.
428

126

United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Venezuela. This sample consists of
States that have promulgated or published national laws with respect to the regulation of
space objects and those States that have, at least, signed or ratified the Outer Space
Treaty and several other space treaties.431 However, not every State sampled has signed
or ratified all other space treaties analyzed for this thesis.432
The second sample consists of twenty-nine (29) States from the sample of thirtynine States (39).433 This sample includes: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, China, France, Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States of
America, and Venezuela. The sample of twenty-nine (29) States was constructed because
there are, at a minimum, twenty-nine States that have published or promulgated rules for
space objects under their national law. This is a separate source of rules distinct from
international agreements and international custom.434 As such, they represent some bound
on the number of States that engage or participate in a State practice, in some form, of
launching into and using space objects in the outer space environment.
The compilation of the data set for National Space Laws is represented in Table 4
in the Appendix. A table of raw data was constructed using Microsoft Excel. The table
consists of seven columns. The first column listed each State counted in the sample. The
second through fifth columns listed the date of ratification for the four space treaties for
each sampled State. The sixth column lists the promulgation of rules regarding space
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objects. If a State had promulgated a national space law, then that date was used in the
table. However, if a sampled State never promulgated a national space law, then the date
of the last ratification of a definition of space object was chosen because the act of
ratification integrates a treaty’s obligation into a State’s national law. The seventh
column lists the dates on which States promulgated a national space law regarding space
objects and does not incorporate any State sampled that has not promulgated a national
space law in relation to other States sampled.

2. National Law Pivot Table

Due to the limited number of sampled States, the construction of a pivot table was
unnecessary.

3. National Law Scatterplot

A scatterplot was designed to graph the sample of national space laws data in
Microsoft Excel. Graph 6 below shows the growth of the number of States that have
promulgated national space laws regulating space objects and that have also incorporated
obligations from one or more space treaties. The number of States that have published or
promulgated a national (space) law is listed on the y-axis and time, between July 1958
and October 2015, is listed on the x-axis.435
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Ratification counts include States that acceded or succeeded to the treaty. See supra note 48.
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A curve was generated for each sample. The first curve relates to the sample of
thirty-nine (39) States and is designated as NL uncorrected (uncorr.). This means these
States have at least purchased the obligations of the Outer Space Treaty and/or gave
effect to the treaty’s obligations through the publishing or promulgation of a national
law.436 The second curve relates to the sample of twenty-nine (29) States that have only
published or promulgated national laws relating to the launching into or use of space
objects in the outer space environment. This curve is designated NL corrected (corr.) and
represents the supply of rules to the supranational market of international relations. Each
curve provides evidence of rule supply as a function of rules of general principles of law
and rule consumption as a function of rules from international agreements. Generation of
these curves enables comparison across the types of rules supplied and consumed across
various supranational markets of international relations.

4. National Law Data Limitations

Most national space laws surveyed are published in official or unofficial versions
in English. The English versions are the basis for the construction of the table of national
space laws. Each national space law was screened to ensure that each law or regulation
had some mention of space object. For national laws sampled that did not have an
English translation, Google Translator was utilized to distinguish whether the national
law reviewed had some mention of the regulation of space objects. The procedure used
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involved looking for words like “object,” “space object,” satellite, launch vehicle,
spacecraft, or payload.
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Graph 6: Cumulative Count of the Sample of National Space Laws (Space Object)

G. Member States of the COPUOS
1. COPUOS Data Set

The compilation of the data set for the Growth of Membership in COPUOS is
represented in Table 6 in the Appendix. First, a table of raw data was constructed using
Microsoft Excel. The table consisted of three columns. The first column listed each State
that had become a member of COPUOS. The second column lists the date on which the
listed State became a member of COPUOS. The third column lists the cumulative count
of membership in COPUOS over time.

2. COPUOS Pivot Table

No pivot table was designed for COPUOS membership because no State member
has transitioned off due to significant changes in its political composition over time.

3. COPUOS Scatterplot

A scatterplot was designed to graph the pivot table data in Microsoft Excel. Graph
7 below shows the growth in COPUOS membership over time where the cumulative
number of member States is listed on the y-axis and time, between December 1958 and
October 2015, is listed on the x-axis.
The curve COPUOS generated represents market participation within the
specialized UN committee regarding the outer space environment. COPUOS is its own
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supranational market of international relations because each Member State of COPUOS
has the ability to engage in preference revelation with other committee members as well
as supply possible rules for States.437 Changes in membership to COPUOS indicate how
States use the committee and therefore offer a measure of market participation. All of the
space treaties analyzed were developed within COPUOS and COPUOS continues to
facilitate exchanging ideas and rules for various types of space activities between and
among States.

4. COPUOS Data Limitations

No limitations on COPUOS data were discovered. All member States are
accounted for.
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Since COPUOS members cannot put into force international agreements, the best the Committee can do
is supply rules to the international community of States via processes internal to United Nations
administration. Nonetheless, the supply of rules emanating from COPUOS may become consumed rules if
the international agreement reaches beyond the Committee, i.e., to the General Assembly or open to all
States to purchase the obligation.
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Graph 7: Growth of COPUOS Membership

d. Quantification of Supranational Market Participation

A Herfindahl Index is a general measure of the relative market power of an
individual participant in relation to the total number of participants in an industry as an
indicator of the level of competition within a particular market.438 A Herfindahl index is
usually used in relation to competition among firms in an industry. In particular, the US
Department of Justice uses a Herfindahl Index to determine whether the merger of two
firms would produce market shares for the new firm in excess of the number permitted by
law.439 This is done by looking at the relative market share of each firm and squaring the
value of the market share to determine how much competition exists in a particular
industry.440
Competition for rules can be a basic measure of determining preference
revelation. As discussed in subsequent chapters, market participation across different
supranational markets of international relations can vary. Consequently, these changes
can give rise to different ways in which rules of jurisdiction are supplied to the
supranational market. Moreover, market participation also is indicative of what States
value in particular supranational markets, those rules supplied, and rules consumed in any
given supranational market because different States will seek to satisfy their valued
preferences in different ways, which may not include the consumption of most or many
rules already supplied or consumed by other States based on the source of the rule(s) in
question. Hence, a Herfindahl index can be a useful tool to analyze to what extent States
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compete for the supply and consumption of rules within any given supranational markets
of international relations.
The use of a Herfindahl index is adapted here where States take the form of the
traditional firm and pool of market participants by which competition among them is
measured. To date, the total population of the international System of States that are
members of the UN is N=193 States. As a function of sovereign equality, each State has
the same market share of the supranational market of international relations
In relation to rules supplied as a matter of international custom, market shares in
the supranational market may be calculated by looking at the ratio of each individual UN
member State in relation to the total number of States in the UN. Today, for example, a
State has a market share of

1

1

∗ 100 = 193 ∗ 100 = 0.52%.441 An individual value
𝑁

below 25% market share is considered a competitive market.442 Therefore, the
supranational market of international relations is a highly competitive market because
any given State has a market share quantified to 0.52% relative to other States, which
enables States to supply any rules to the supranational market as a function of State
practice.
In relation to rules supplied as a matter of international agreements, market shares
in the supranational market may be calculated by looking at the ratio of members States
of COPUOS in relation to the number of States that have consumed the space treaties
analyzed at any given time. This measure provides a sense to which States may seek
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participation in a particular supranational market and the extent to which States clearly
have an interest in rule development for activities in the outer space environment.
Furthermore, market shares may be analyzed in relation to the number of member
States of COPUOS and all members of the United Nations. Where generally States have
an equal market share in the supranational market of international relations for rules of
international custom, the measure of the share of market concentration within COPUOS
will vary over time. Today, for example, within COPUOS a member State has a market
share of

1
𝑁

∗ 100 =

1
83

∗ 100 = 1.25%.443 COPUOS market shares are significantly

greater than the general share of market concentration that States have with respect to
rules of international custom. Thus, COPUOS member States have greater market power
relative to non-member States – a factor of almost two and half times greater.444
In relation to rules supplied as a matter of national law, market shares in the
supranational market of international relations may be calculated by looking at the
number of States that have published or promulgated a national (space) law. This
provides a measure of how States supply rules to the supranational market and provides
an indication of their valued preferences. For example, today, in terms of rule supply, of
the twenty-nine (29) States sampled, each State has an individual market share in the
supply of rules relative to all other States. Thus, each State in the sample has a market
1

1

share of 𝑁 ∗ 100 = 39 ∗ 100 = 2.56%. Furthermore, this measure provides a sense of
individual market participation for rule supply that may be compared to participation in
other supranational markets of international relations.
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Graph 8 below represents the supranational markets of international relations with
respect to each source of rules of public international law studied in this thesis. Each
market provides different risks, benefits, and costs to States and therefore give a sense of
how States seek to be involved in supranational markets for rule development, rule
supply, and rule consumption. As the graph seems to show, while the number of States in
the international system continues to grow, market participation has only recently begun
to increase, in the last fifteen to twenty years, where market participation was previously
relatively flat. This seems to indicate that States have started to value the need to enter
the supranational market of international relations for the outer space environment.
Whether a State consume rules supplied once it enters a supranational market is a
separate question generally addressed in the following chapters of this thesis.
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Graph 8: Growth in Supranational Market Participation

CHAPTER III
THE EXISTENCE OF RULES FOR THE OUTER SPACE ENVIRONMENT
a. Introduction

Chapter III analyzes the initial rule formation for the outer space environment,
which arose from the State practice of launching objects over the territories of other
States. This chapter begins with a brief historical analysis of the supranational market of
international relations for launching of objects into outer space that establishes the
variables of study for the game theory approach to initial rule formation for the outer
space environment. Game theory is applied as a means to assess the potential outcomes
for initial rule formation that could have arisen from the Sputnik and Explorer launches
and those solutions sets are analyzed against the observed historical outcomes.
As a product of the Cold War, the programs to develop launch vehicle technology
in the Soviet Union and the US had different meanings to each State.445 While the
proliferation of dual-use launch vehicle technology spread among States throughout the
1950’s, generally in the form of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, only two States had
the capabilities, capacity, and resources to develop programs that could develop
technology that would enable the launching of objects beyond the Earth’s atmosphere.446
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Consequently, the legal aspects of these motivations did not go unnoticed and there was
some doubt initially as to the legal validity of launching objects over the territories of
other States.447
Irrespective of the possible legal concerns of the time, States were aware that this
new technological capability would likely require interested States to enter the
supranational market of international relations to ensure that the preference of continued
use of launching objects into outer space environment remained a viable preference.448
To this end, States were and are willing to trade in State sovereignty in the form of rules
of prescriptive jurisdiction over activities involving the launch of objects over the
territories of States into the outer space environment. Consequently, various
supranational markets of international relations arose for rules relating to the outer space
environment as a function of State practice.
However, the source of these rules may be observed in the valued preferences
materialized as State practice, which equates to both the supply and pricing of rules. The
consumption of rules over time can lead to a variety of outcomes whether or not a State
supplies, sells, or buys rules of prescriptive jurisdiction. In particular, as a function of the
evolution of individual or collective valued preferences of a State(s), the potential
outcomes of rule supply can take several forms, e.g., proposed rules may never be
consumed (i.e., no buyers), supplied rules may converge into rules of law (i.e. market
transition from the consumption of rules), markets may cease to produce rules (i.e.,

447

See supra note 163. See also supra note 141.
See ASIF A. SIDDIQI, RECONSIDERING SPUTNIK: FORTY YEARS SINCE THE SOVIET SATELLITE 43 (John M.
Logsdon & Robert W. Smith ed., Harwood Academic Publ’rs 2000) [hereinafter SIDDIQI], available at
http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/siddiqi.html. See also supra note 141.
448

141

possible market failure), or rules and rules of law may converge as a function of rule
consumption across supranational markets (i.e., possible obligatory convergence).
In each case, initial rules that may converge into rules of law are the product of
State practice. State practice is the basic measure of how rules arise, develop, and evolve
over time. Therefore, with respect to initial rule formation, the genesis of all rules studied
in this thesis started with the State practice of launching objects into the outer space
environment over the territories of other States with the launching of the Sputnik and
Explorer objects.

b. From Proto-Market Signaling to Market Creation: Initial Development of
Supranational Markets for the Outer Space Environment

The preference to launch objects over the territories of States into and through the
outer space environment arose at a time when two clear hegemonic States competed in
the domain of international politics.449 Thus, the supranational market of international
relations over initial activities in the outer space environment consisted of two States,
which may be termed a duopoly, i.e., a market consisting of only two suppliers of rules.
Each State had a market share equal to its capabilities starting at a particular time. For
example, when Sputnik I launched on October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union had a monopoly
on the supply of rules for the outer space environment because it had the capabilities to
define such rules.450 As the Soviet Union was the only State with the necessary
capabilities of spaceflight at the time, it controlled the market in terms of supply of
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rules.451 Consequently, the price and supply of rules of prescriptive jurisdiction over these
types of activities was initially set by the Soviet Union. All other States in the
international system would remain buyers of rules of jurisdiction until such time as they
developed the same preferences and capabilities to compete in the supranational market
of international relations.452
On January 31, 1958, the United States entered the supranational market of
international relations when it launched Explorer I into the outer space environment.453
Starting at this time, the United States had an equal share in the development of rules
(e.g., through initial supply of rules and technological capabilities) for the outer space
environment. Because the United States had an equal share of the supply of rules of
jurisdiction with the Soviet Union, each State had to compete with each other and use
diplomacy and other means to attract buyers of rules of jurisdiction for activities that
could occur in the outer space environment. Without other buyers in the market, the
market would turn into a duopsony, i.e., a market which consists of only two buyers.
Since rules of jurisdiction are considered purely substitute goods in the supranational
market of international relations, the United States and Soviet Union were initially left to
figure out who supplies and buys which rules of jurisdiction over what types of
activities.454 However, the fact that a competition for rules of jurisdiction arose from the
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“space race” and this competition resulted from the hierarchical alignments between the
hegemons necessarily increased the value of such rules rather quickly.455
Generally, where no international forum exists, State practice represents the
supply of rules to the supranational market of international relations. State practice is the
physical manifestation of a State’s valued preferences. As such, when States conduct
activities or preform actions outside their territories, they are subject to a variety of risks
and costs to their authority. In order to manage these risks in relation to the activities of
other States, States may seek to sell rules of prescriptive jurisdiction in the form of their
State practice. While not every State practice may constitute a supply of possible rules,
e.g., when States give notice that their respective practice is not conducted or followed
out of a legal obligation,456 State practice nevertheless does supply rules. The question is
how does an observer measure the formation and development of such rules?
The next section describes the historical events that helped catalyze the launching
of the Sputnik and Explorer objects.
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c. The Historical Bases for the Valued Preferences of the United States and the
Soviet Union that Catalyzed Initial Rule Development for the Outer Space
Environment457

Scholars of space history have termed the date October 4, 1957, as the date on
which the “space race” between the United States and the Soviet Union began.458
However, the date also signifies another major moment, i.e., the initial State practice of
launching and orbiting a space object over the sovereign territories of other States.459 In
other words, the creation of the first rule regarding the activities and conduct of States in
outer space. The establishment of this initial rule laid the foundation for subsequent rules
regarding the outer space environment. But what were the specific catalyzing events that
precipitated the development and formation of the initial rules for the outer space
environment? From where did the valued preferences to launch objects derive and how
did it manifest into State practice?
This section summarizes the historical and necessary variables that helped
catalyze the initial launching of objects into the outer space environment. Three critical
variables are identified that represent catalysts for the launch of the Sputnik and Explorer
objects. The first variable is the necessary technological development and utilization of
rockets and payloads. This variable is implicit to the following analysis because it is
common to both the US and the Soviet Union, but nonetheless a necessary element to
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enter the supranational market for international relations relating to outer space activities.
The second variable is the supply of a set of rules of jurisdiction for an Open Skies Treaty
on the supranational market of international relations.460 This variable influenced the
development of a preference to launch objects into outer space over the territories of
States because the US and the Soviet Union could not converge on a price for negotiating
rules for an Open Skies Treaty. In other words, the supranational market never produced
a rule either State would be willing to buy. The third variable relates to the acceptance of
the informal obligations arising from the goal of the International Geophysical Year of
1957-58 (IGY).461 This variable represents the valued preference of seeking to purchase
the authority to launch and orbit objects over the territories of States into the outer space
environment pursuant to an international scientific project. Thus, the Open Skies Treaty
and the IGY are linked because the valued preferences manifested simultaneously in time
and form the basis of the stratagems and their constraints to the valued preferences of the
US and Soviet Union.

i. Origins of the Structure of the Supranational Market of International Relations
Relating to Outer Space Activities

Before the surrender of the Axis powers during World War II, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt began advocating for and sought the drafting of two major new multilateral
treaties. The first new multi-lateral treaty would establish the framework and legal
structures for a post-War international civil aviation authority.462 Although signed onto in
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1944 by fifty-two States, the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation did not
go into force until 1947.463 The second multilateral treaty would replace the League of
Nations464 with an international organization built to minimize international conflict and
increase dialogue between States in order to prevent another World War.465 Even before
the Empire of Japan had formally surrendered to Allied Forces, the victors of World War
II finalized and signed the Charter of the United Nations.466 This new Charter
significantly changed many fundamental relationships at the international level including,
inter alia, the institution of new legal rules and governing structures.467 These two new
multilateral treaties would reshape international relations and legal relationships and
provide a backdrop to the birth of rules for the outer space environment.
The Chicago Convention is considered a major accomplishment of post-War
international governance.468 As the basis for the regulation of international civil air travel,
the Chicago Convention imported several well regarded rules of public international law.
In particular, article I of the Convention states that “[t]he contracting States recognize
that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its
territory.”469 (Emphasis added). Moreover, despite several attempts to reach the upper
atmosphere and the edge of outer space before October 1957, States still generally
accepted that their sovereignty over their airspace was exclusive.470 However, the issue of
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the delimitation of the airspace environment from the outer space environment did arise
in discourse prior to October 1957 and continues to this day.471
The delimitation issue illustrates the effects of rule-making based on shifting
valued preferences with respect to State practice, including the evolution of rules of
public international law in relation to the boundary between the airspace and outer space
environments. The fact that States have not consumed many rules of airspace delimitation
implies that the price of these rules so far supplied do not satisfy the valued preferences
of many States. Interestingly, despite the lack of supply or consumption of delimitation
rules, this trend has not stopped the proliferation of outer space activities and the
attendant rules generated by such activities. As the discussion in the following section
presents, valued preferences are subject to change and change can manifest over a
nominally long period of time.

ii. The Formation of Valued Preferences to Launch into and Orbit Objects in the Outer
Space Environment Over the Territories of States472
One form of a valued preference manifests through a State’s foreign policy.
Generally, a State’s foreign policy tends to be complicated, varied, and subject to change.
Changes in and to the international system of States may force a State to revalue, replace,
and/or innovate its valued preferences as a function of their foreign policies. For
example, in the US, the doctrine of using science and technology as a means to achieve
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foreign policy goals began in the Truman Administration.473 Two principle proponents of
this doctrine were Lloyd Berkner and James Webb.
In April 1950, Berkner wrote a report for the State Department titled “Science and
Foreign Relations.”474 In the report, Berkner “describe[ed] the nature and significance of
basic problems in international relations raised by scientific and technical
developments.”475 In a secret supplement to the report, Allan Needell notes that “Berkner
… emphasized the usefulness for intelligence gathering from increased international
contacts by American scientists.”476 Berkner believed that “[s]cience and national interest
were both powerful motivations… [a]nd since they reinforced each other, it [was]
difficult to rank them.”477 Webb was instrumental in trying to implement Berkner’s
recommendations due to Webb’s seniority at the State Department.478
On April 5, 1950, the same month in which Berkner finished his “Science and
Foreign Relations” report, Berkner was invited to a dinner party at the home of James van
Allen in Silver Spring, Maryland.479 Several historians have noted that during dinner
Berkner reportedly proposed that the “world's scientists organize a third international
polar year to take place during the period of maximum solar activity expected during
1957 and 1958.”480 The outcome of the van Allen dinner ultimately resulted in the
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creation of the International Geophysical Year (IGY), which in seven years would result
in the launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik I.481
For two years, Berkner worked on organizing an IGY with the help of Sydney
Chapman, another van Allen dinner guest. In October 1952, the International Council of
Scientific Unions (ICSU) approved the idea and created the Comité Spécial de l'Année
Geophysique Internationale (CSAGI) to plan the IGY.482 Chapman was elected president
and Berkner vice-president by members of the CSAGI. Chapman and Berkner then
lobbied Detlev Bronk, President of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and the
National Research Council for help in organizing US participation in the IGY. On
February 10, 1953, the United States National Committee for the IGY (USNC-IGY) was
created and Joseph Kaplan was appointed as its Chair.483 A year later, “members of
CSAGI recognized the possibility of using … ballistic missiles to place satellites in
orbit.”484 On October 4, 1954, CSAGI sent letters to President Eisenhower and Soviet
Premier Bulganin asking them to participate in the IGY by “plac[ing] small scientific
spacecraft in orbit [with their ballistic missiles] to measure solar radiation and its effect
on the upper atmosphere.”485 On July 29, 1955, the United States agreed to the CSAGI

481

See DONALD T. ROTUNDA, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ACT OF 1958 21-22 (NASA HHN-125 Sept. 1972) [hereinafter ROTUNDA]. Donald Rotunda and other
historians claim that the IGY idea was conceived by Lloyd Berkner, while John Naugle claims that the IGY
idea originated from Berkner’s wife Abbie. Compare supra note 473, at 299, with supra note 477, at
Chapter I, and ROTUNDA, at 4. No matter who suggested it first, it “set off,” as Naugle notes, “a chain of
events that helped to create NASA.” Supra note 477, at Chapter I.
482
See supra note 477, at Chapter I.
483
Id.
484
Id.
485
Id.

150

request to place a small scientific satellite into orbit with an American missile for the
IGY.486
However, the Soviet Union’s participation in the IGY was far from clear at the
time. Although Soviet representatives served on the CSAGI, their contributions to the
proceedings were insignificant.487 As Siddiqi notes “the May 1954 deadline for
submissions for participation in the IGY passed without any word from Soviet
authorities.”488 Moreover, on October 4, 1954, Soviet representatives watched silently as
the CSAGI adopted the US’s plan for the IGY.489 However, US agenda setting at the
CSAGI surprised the Soviets and they subsequently moved to organize an internal
Commission that would determine the plan for contributing to the IGY.490
Although the CSAGI was successful in securing government support of satellite
launches, the idea of using satellites for science did not originate with the CSAGI. Naugle
notes that “even before the formation of CSAGI, the members of the Upper Atmosphere
Rocket Research Panel [UARRP] had recognized that sounding rockets could play an
important role in the IGY.”491 Moreover, the UARRP members were well aware of an
earlier report on the subject of Earth satellites, first brought up in 1945 by the Navy’s
Bureau of Aeronautics.492 The Bureau created a Committee for Evaluating the Feasibility
of Space Rocketry (CEFSR). The CEFSR published their study in 1946 recommending
that the Joint Research and Development Board should attempt to place a small satellite
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in Earth orbit. The proposal was later rejected by the DOD for having an “insufficient
military requirement.”493 Later, in April 1947, the Air Force’s Project RAND published a
study on the feasibility of launching satellites with sounding rockets. The RAND study
served as the basis for the military services’ development of their own rocket programs,
which eventually led to the formation of the UARRP in 1946. Richard Hirsch and Joseph
Trento note that James van Allen “proposed an Earth satellite experiment at the 1948
meeting of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics.”494 However, van
Allen’s early call for science satellites went nowhere due to the conservative mindedness
of academe in the US at the time.
By early 1950, scientists in government could not find support within the military
for launching satellites. Scientists outside of government did not have the funding or
facilities to build rockets nor did they have access to the rockets being developed by the
US military in an effort to deter the Soviets from attacking the US. A shift in science
policy occurred in 1954 when Eisenhower issued an Executive Order “declar[ing] … that
the NSF should … be responsible for all federally funded basic research, while other
agencies [must] stick to applied research related to their missions.”495 As a consequence,
the “executive order … reduc[ed] D[O]D and AEC support for pure science, while the
NSF lacked the funds to take up the slack[.]”496 In response, NSF Director “Alan
Waterman protested, styling his appeal to the White House as a program for
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“Maintenance of Technological Superiority.””497 Waterman’s protest was ignored at the
fiscally conservative White House.
The funding issue came to a head in July 1957 when scientist I.I. Rabi and the
Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) Science Committee reported to the White House
that

the welfare of the U.S., incomparably more than at any other time in its
history[,] [was] dependent on new scientific knowledge for the welfare of
its people, for the advancement of its economy, and for its military
strength…Research is a requisite for survival.498

I.I. Rabi pleaded with the Eisenhower Administration, arguing that “government could
encourage private investment in R & D, perhaps through tax policy, but [acknowledged
that] the time had passed when national needs could be met from private sources.”499
McDougall notes that this was a sudden change and that “[a]fter 1945, scientists advised
Truman that even military related research ought to be directed and funded by a civilian
agency . . .and [by] 1957, scientists advised Eisenhower that even civilian basic research
ought to be sponsored by the military[.]”500 By the mid-1950’s, obstacles to increased
science funding were already reaching critical mass. Coincidently, satellites were seen as
feasible means of conducting science in space, and the US military services were
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developing ballistic missiles with sufficient thrust to place a satellite into orbit around the
Earth.
When Eisenhower was elected President, he brought with him not only a fiscally
conservative attitude toward government, but also a real fear of Soviet aggression.
President Eisenhower was very concerned about a surprise attack from the Soviets and
wanted better surveillance of Soviet movements and installations.501 On July 26, 1954,
the President ordered the creation of a panel of scientists to advise him on the state of US
technology and offer recommendations for national defense. James Doolittle, James
Killian, and several other prominent scientists formed the Technological Capabilities
Committee (TCP). In February 1955, the TCP “recommended accelerating procurement
of intercontinental ballistic missiles … [and] a program to develop a small scientific
satellite that would operate at extreme altitudes above national airspace.”502 The satellite
recommendation was based upon a RAND follow-up study from 1954 on the technical
feasibility of satellites for military observations.503 The first RAND study in 1947 was
initially dismissed by the military before it was widely understood that a satellite could
provide intelligence on the Soviet Union. However, as Hall notes, “James Killian, who
chaired the TCP, viewed RAND’s … propos[al] [for a] military observation satellite as a
“peripheral project” and … refus[ed] to support it until the Soviets launched Sputnik I
nearly three years later.”504 Even without Killian's support, what later came to be known
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as Operation Feed Back marked the beginning of the covert US satellite reconnaissance
program, which represented first US military satellite program..505
It is not entirely clear who among the USNC-IGY knew of Operation Feed Back
or, if they did know, when they knew it. Historians have not thoroughly explored this
issue. Needell notes that there is no evidence of Berkner’s involvement in the 1954
RAND study or the TCP.506 Berkner’s previous clashes with the Air Force and RAND
would have made it unlikely that he was consulted. However, there is some evidence
Berkner was briefed on the RAND study prior to leaving for Europe for CSAGI
meetings.507 Needell claims that “[t]he case is much stronger, although still
circumstantial, that Berkner would have been familiar with the deliberations of the
TCP.”508 Needell writes that at the January 7, 1955, USNC Executive Committee
meeting, Berkner suggested that the recently enlarged USNC Panel on Rocketry meet in
closed session to “study [the] proposal of launching [an] artificial satellite during or near
the IGY.”509 Moreover, Needell points out that the committee members were willing to
act secretly to make the satellite launch happen even if the answer was no from the
Eisenhower Administration.510
Following the closed meeting, the USNC-IGY Executive Committee met on
January 22, 1955, to form a special group to report on technical feasibility of satellites.
The Executive Committee named it the Long Playing Rocket (LPR) Committee, chaired
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by Fred Whipple. During the LPR meeting, “[Athelstan] Spilhaus recommended that the
USNC accept the task of building a completely unclassified instrument “head” section,
which could be turned over to the military for launch on a rocket.”511 Needell notes that
Merle Tuve objected to the idea. Needell writes that “[g]iven the origins of the project
and the degree of collateral interest, [Tuve] thought the entire project should be
undertaken by the military.”512 In response, Whipple “asserted, without elaboration, that
the IGY association was necessary to “ease permission to go over other countries.””513
With the satellite proposal finally adopted by the CSAGI in early 1955, USNCIGY members started to solicit the Eisenhower Administration for support. NSF Director
Alan Waterman approached Secretaries Donald Quarles and Allen Dulles, of the Defense
and State Departments, respectively, as well as Richard Bissell of the CIA regarding how
to go about selling the IGY satellite proposal. Quarles, Dulles, and Bissell suggested
obtaining high-level endorsements, which Waterman did. At this time, the DOD was
reviewing Killian’s TCP report and Dulles agreed to bring the matter to the NSC’s
Operations Coordinating Board.514
While Waterman was soliciting support, so too was Berkner. Berkner was asked
to a meeting on March 22, 1955, with Detlev Bronk and Robert Murphy at the State
Department to discuss the satellite proposal. In late April, Murphy wrote a letter to
Berkner giving him the go ahead from the State Department to proceed. Murphy’s letter
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noted that “if successful, it would, as a matter of fact, undoubtedly add to the scientific
prestige of the United States, and it would have a considerable propaganda value in the
cold war.”515
As the Eisenhower Administration figured out how to implement the TCP
recommendations, the IGY Executive Committee presented its own proposal for the US
government to launch a scientific satellite in support of the IGY’s goals. The proposal
was approved by the NAS, which would organize the effort, while the NSF would fund
the program. In tandem with the IGY proposal, the TCP panel’s recommendation, and the
need for better intelligence of the Soviet Union, the National Security Council drafted
NSC 5520, “which stated that the United States should develop small scientific satellite
weighing 5 to 10 pounds.”516 The report also urged the development of large
reconnaissance satellites, but only after a scientific satellite launch had established the
principle of “freedom of space.”517
Eisenhower and his national security advisors had been looking for ways to
penetrate the Soviet Union. At first, US intelligence agencies attempted to float high
altitude balloons across the Soviet Union, but this was not very reliable since the balloons
could not be controlled remotely.518 It was ultimately decided that satellites would be the
best means to keep constant surveillance on the Soviet Union, but the earliest a
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reconnaissance satellite would be available would be 1958.519 Moreover, it was quickly
realized that a covert satellite program could potentially violate international law.520 As a
way of dealing with a potential violation of international law, Eisenhower’s national
security strategy required that the principle of “freedom of space” be considered instant
customary international law.521 Hence, the Eisenhower Administration deemed it critical
that the US start a civilian operation to launch the first successful scientific satellite into
outer space so as to be able to later argue that it is permissible to launch covert satellites
into orbit.522
On May 27, 1955, Eisenhower approved NSC 5520, authorizing the US to launch
a scientific satellite, but stressed that the satellite proposals would only go forward as
long as they did not interfere with the development of ballistic missiles.523 Deputy
Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles then instructed the Committee on Special
Capabilities to review the satellite proposals of the Navy, Army, and Air Force.524 On
July 29, 1955, the U.S. formally announced to the world that it would launch a small
scientific satellite as part of the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58.525 Later, in
November 1956, Quarles made it known to the other branches that in no way would a
military satellite precede a scientific one.526
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On July 21, 1955, over a week before the US announced its participation in the
IGY, President Eisenhower approached the Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin with the
idea of an “Open Skies Treaty” at a summer conference in Geneva, Switzerland.527 At the
time, the treaty would have called for the United States and the Soviet Union to exchange
maps denoting military installations in their respective States and then authorize
overflights of each State by the other States’ personnel.528 Immediately, Soviet Secretary
General Nikita Khrushchev instructed Bulganin to reject the Open Skies Treaty because
of Cold War concerns driven largely by the fact that the Soviet Union lagged behind in
military capabilities and wanted to hide that fact from the United States.529 Ironically, the
repeated overtures to Premier Bulganin to negotiate an Open Skies Treaty ended in
failure precisely because the Soviet Union did not value overflights of its sovereign
territory without permission. The launch of Sputnik I undercut the Soviet position and
Eisenhower was free to move forward with developing a foreign policy that would
include both military and civilian components.530
The announcement by the US that it would seek to launch “small Earth-circling
satellites” for the IGY set the Soviet Union into action.531 The first clear indication of
Soviet IGY participation occurred following a US announcement regarding the IGY on
August 2, 1955, in which Leonid I. Sedov told journalists “In my opinion, it will be
possible to launch an artificial Earth satellite within the next two years,” and adding
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“[t]he realization of the Soviet project can be expected in the near future.”532
Coincidently, on July 16, 1955, Soviet Chief Designer Sergei P. Korolev finished his coauthored study on arguments for the design of an object to launch on the R-7 launch
vehicle.533 Korolev’s most provocative argument was that “the creation of [a satellite]
would have enormous political significance as evidence of the high development level of
our country’s technology.”534 Oddly enough, Soviet officials were initially tepid to the
idea of launching a satellite on the R-7 launch vehicle as well as the political benefit
argument.535 However, on August 30, 1955, Korolev won over Sputnik Committee
Chairman Vasily Ryabikov, who approved the use of the R-7 for a modest satellite
program.536
Several reasons have been put forth as for why the Soviets decided to participate
in the IGY. For one, it is speculated that the deliberations may have turned on the
possibility of using satellites for military purposes.537 However, what is clear is that once
the Soviet leadership approved Korolev’s plans for the IGY, Korolev, spurned by the US
announcement in July 1955, moved to finish the satellite and set the launch date before
the official start of the IGY in order to achieve the political victory of demonstrating
Soviet technological superiority before the US could launch.538
On October 4, 1957, less than three months after the official start of the IGY,
Korolev’s team successfully launched “object-D” (later named Sputnik I) into orbit.539
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Months later, in January 1958, the US successfully launched its Explorer I object under
project Vanguard.540 These two launches set in motion the “space race” where the US and
the Soviet Union battled for “space firsts” in a bid to demonstrate technological and
scientific superiority. Although the Soviets met their foreign policy objectives with the
launch of Sputnik I and II, the Soviets also engaged in the first clear State practice of
launching objects over the territories of sovereign States. Without objection from other
States, the State practice of launching objects over the territories of sovereign States
slowly proliferated among the international system of States, but States generally
supported the State practice. As discussed in Chapter IV, support for this State practice
quickly spread as States began to value space activities as part of their valued
preferences.
In the next section, game theory is applied to the two main events that necessarily
facilitated the development of the initial rule formation for the outer space environment.
In particular, the rejection of rules with respect to mutually consented overflights of the
US and Soviet Union and participation in the launching of objects into the outer space
environment for the international scientific program the IGY. These two events helped
define the valued preferences of the US and Soviet Union as well as defined the possible
strategic outcome for developing a rule of State practice that permits States to launch
objects over the territories of sovereign States. These events are modelled as iterative
games to demonstrate how rules based on State practice arise from the strategic positions
of the United States and Soviet Union.
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d. Game Theory Model of Initial Rule Development

As previously mentioned, preference revelation may be measured by looking at
the strategic choices of the players in a game. Initial rule formation is the product of
progenitor events that manifest in the form of State practice. State practice can take the
form of cooperation or defection from rule formation and supply. The strategic outcomes
of State practice may be modeled from history and relative payoffs constructed based on
the relationship between outcomes for each potential action a State might take.
As Table 1541 above shows, the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (SU)
have payoffs for each strategic choice for each game. With respect to the first game, if the
US chooses to cooperate with the SU on the Open Skies Treaty (O), the US will earn a
payoff of +1 because it has sought to maximize its valued preference of negotiating for
overflight rules. If the US chooses to defect and not pursue the Open Skies Treaty (NO),
then the US will earn a payoff of zero (0) because no change in circumstances occurred
as a result of the strategic choice. Conversely, if the SU chooses to cooperate with the US
on the Open Skies Treaty (O), then the SU will earn a payoff of -1 because the strategic
choice would expose the military gaps between the two players and would cause
significant strategic risks and costs. If the SU chooses to defect and not pursue an Open
Skies Treaty (NO), then the SU will earn a payoff of 0 because no change in
circumstances occurred as a result of the strategic choice.
With respect to the second game, if the US chooses to cooperate as a participant
of the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (I), the US will earn a payoff of +1
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because it has sought to maximize its valued preference of launching an object over the
territories of other States for surveillance purposes. If the US chooses to defect and not
pursue participation in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (NI), then the US
will earn a payoff of -1 because it would create a detriment in the form of political and
technological outcomes that do not satisfy its valued preference to launch an object over
the territories of other States. Conversely, if the SU chooses to cooperate as a participant
of the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (I), then the SU will earn a payoff of +1
because it has sought to maximize its valued preference of launching an object over the
territories of other States for surveillance purposes. If the SU chooses to defect and not
pursue participation in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (NI), then the SU
will earn a payoff of -1 because it would create a detriment in the form of political and
technological outcomes that do not satisfy its valued preference to launch an object over
the territories of other States.
From these strategies and payoff schema, there were only three paths to the initial
rule formation of launching objects into the outer space environment. In this game, the
historical record sets the values for the strategic outcomes, i.e., payoffs. As Figure 3542
above illustrates, the US and SU played a sequential game, the payoffs of which have
sixteen (16) possible outcomes. Of these sixteen (16) possible outcomes, two payoff
strategies dominate for the game and three equilibria arise from three subgames. Table
2543 above illustrates the total number of possible payoff outcomes. The two dominate
strategies arising from this game are highlighted in rows (e) and (m). Both are a
combination of three equilibria that represent the optimal payoffs for each player.
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Table 3544 above divides the entire game into subgames. Given the possible
choices, the US had two optimal strategies represented by (O, I) and (NO, I). The first
strategy consists of the US agreeing to negotiate rules for the Open Skies Treaty and
participating in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58. The second strategy
consists of the US foregoing cooperating with the Soviet Union on the Open Skies
Treaty, but agreeing to participate in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58. On
the other hand, the Soviet Union had only one optimal strategy. This strategy consists of
not cooperating in the negotiation for the Open Skies Treaty, while accepting to
participate in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58.
The model of the game represented by Figure 3545 not only shows the optimal
strategies, but also the suboptimal strategies. The suboptimal strategies did not arise
because the strategic constraints placed on both States by their valued preferences could
not have enabled those suboptimal outcomes. For example, if the US and the Soviet
Union agreed to conclude and ratify and Open Skies Treaty as well as publically accepted
the obligations of the goals of the IGY, this would have exposed the Soviet Union to
costs associated with the gaps resulting in the military positions between both States.
Thus, for each suboptimal strategy, there is a corresponding limitation built into their
valued preferences that would not have enabled deviation without incurring significance
risks and costs to both States.
Once the initial rules for launching objects into outer space was initiated from the
maximization of the valued preferences of the US and Soviet Union, various
supranational markets of international relations began to form. In particular, member
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States of the UN would create a special committee to deal with the outer space
environment and State interests in conducting activities in it. As discussed in the next
chapter, this new supranational market enabled exchanges in information, trades in
valued preferences, and development of rules of jurisdiction for the outer space
environment. This evolution of State practice laid the foundation for subsequent rule
development and evolution.

e. Conclusion

Sergei Korolev’s R-7 rocket launched a tiny sphere originally known as “object
D” designated Sputnik I into orbit around the Earth on October 4, 1957. The launch of
Sputnik I began an iterative game of rule formation and development in a newly created
supranational market of international relations for outer space activities. As a
consequence, the supranational market enabled the establishment of order without (space)
law through the supply of rules that States began to accept and consume. In other words,
the space race enabled spontaneous coordination for mutual benefit between the US and
the Soviet Union without imposition by a supra-State or other States. This coordination,
while self-serving, helped establish the rules by which the United States, the Soviet
Union, and all other participating States in outer space activities would play the “game”
for exchanges in the supranational market of international relations. Despite the lack of
certainty about what future activities could or will eventually occur throughout the outer
space environment, States nevertheless started a process by which rules could be
developed for the proliferation of such activities.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SUPPLY AND PROLIFERATION OF RULES FOR THE OUTER SPACE
ENVIRONMENT
a. Introduction

On October 8, 1957, four days after the Soviet Union gave notice to States that it
had launched an object into Earth orbit, Donald Quarles, US Deputy Secretary of Defense
in the Eisenhower Administration, is reported to have commented in a meeting that “the
Russians have . . . done us a good turn, unintentionally, in establishing the concept of
freedom of international space.”546 As NSC 5520 had originally laid out, the Eisenhower
Administration had the goal of getting greater surveillance of the Soviet Union and
getting the concept of “freedom of international space” accepted by States without
objection served that goal.547 To underscore this point, once Quarles made the comment,
“The President then looked ahead . . . and asked about a reconnaissance [satellite]
vehicle.”548 Whether or not States would accept the orbiting of objects over their territory
was affirmed and this affirmation changed how States reacted to the first rule for the
outer space environment.
Chapter IV seeks to analyze two issues. First, how did States organize to develop
and supply rules of jurisdiction for the outer space environment after initial rule
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formation? Second, how did the evolution in the supply of rules of jurisdiction lead to
changes in the definition, meaning, and scope of the term space object subsequent to
initial rule formation?

b. Market Participation, Rule Supply, and Market Transitions after October 1957

The international system is the product of State practice. Since the conclusion of
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the international system has undergone several
transitions in the way States promote their interests and protect those interests in relation
to the interests of other States.549 As noted previously, the most significant change to the
international system arose from the Allied Powers preference to replace the League of
Nations with a United Nations Charter. The relative stability of the UN governance
structure has further changed how States interact with each other in a forum outside the
usual embassy system.550
As stated previously, the supranational market of international relations can take
many forms. These forms must be a function of State sovereignty so that States have at
least one commodity in which to trade on the supranational market of international
relations. Therefore, any forum where rules of jurisdiction over State activities can be
supplied and bought and sold is a supranational market of international relations. Where
State practice forms the basis of possible rules of jurisdiction as a function of
international custom, political institutions like the UN offer the ability to create
supranational markets for which States can trade in value preferences and rules. For
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example, while COPUOS is a UN committee, it is also a supranational market of
international relations. While COPUOS does not promulgate rules of law like a
legislature, it does provide a market mechanism by which to order the flow of
information regarding valued preferences of States and for rules over outer space
activities. Hence, growth in COPUOS membership provides a measure of market
participation and concentration.
Shortly after the launch of Sputnik I, several States called for the UN to
investigate State activities in the outer space environment.551 Consequently, the UN
General Assembly approved the creation of an ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS).552 The UN General Assembly, itself a supranational market of
international relations for valued preferences and rules regarding outer space activities,
created the ad hoc Committee on December 13, 1958, with eighteen (18) initial State
members.553 By December 12, 1959, COPUOS grew to twenty-four (24) in membership
and also became a permanent UN committee.554 Since 1959, membership in COPUOS
has grown 71.1% to 83 State members.555 Graph 7 shows how the growth of membership
in COPUOS has increased over time.556 The growth of so many member States in the
committee clearly demonstrates significant investment for discussing valued preferences
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and rules for the outer space environment in a supranational market that has a barrier to
entry the payment of which requires the votes of UN Member States.557
An interesting consequence of the COPUOS market is that as the acceptance of
States onto the committee increases, the risk of a committee veto from a member State
also increases because of the consensus voting rules: more State members equals more
chances for a veto.558 Thus the cost of coordinating consensus on any discussion of
valued preferences and rules regarding the outer space environment also increases. The
question thus is what is the likely upper bound of marginal benefit beyond which States
no longer participate in the COPUOS market because the cost exceeds the benefit?
A likely but probably coincidental bound may be gleaned from the curve
OSTRATF in Graph 9 below. First, as the graph below shows, the COPUOS curve is
higher and outpaces the RCRATF and NL (corr) curves. Thus, the growth in COPUOS
membership outpaces the development of national space law and the last set of treaty
based rules regarding space objects that has the lowest ratification rate of any other space
treaty in the sample.559 Second, the COPUOS curve has a positive slope and is trending
toward the OSTRATF curve. Since the Outer Space Treaty has the highest ratification
rate of all the space treaties, the total number of States Parties (in relation to the total
number of UN Member States) indicates the greatest number of States that have accepted

557

See supra note 551. See, e.g., Jonathan Wachtel, Israel clinches place on key UN space coalition, FOX
NEWS.COM, Oct. 30, 2015, available at http://www.foxnews.com/science/2015/10/30/israel-clinches-placeon-key-un-spacecoalition.html?utm_content=buffer876cb&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campai
gn=buffer accessed Dec. 10, 2015.
558
See supra note 551.
559
Except for the Moon Agreement.

169

170

Graph 9: Scope of Exchanges in the Supranational Market of International Relations for Space Activities

rules of jurisdiction regarding activities in outer space at each time interval. While it
remains to be seen, predictably, as the total number of States to COPUOS increases and
approaches the total number of States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty, the benefits of
discussing valued preferences and rules regarding the outer space environment may
marginally increase until the costs of achieving the goals of the COPUOS exceed the
marginal benefits. At which point State members likely would turn to other means and
forms of rule development to maximize their valued preferences regarding outer space
activities.560
The rate at which States entered the supranational market of international
relations for the outer space environment rapidly increased over the first two ten year
intervals after the launch of Sputnik I. As observed in the data relating to rule
development, a movement toward the development of rules arose under national law,
treaty law, and international custom within the span of the first ten years from the launch
of Sputnik I.561 However, the overall growth in the pool of potential buyers (i.e., States)
significantly outpaced the growth of buyers for rules of jurisdiction over activities in the
outer space environment.
Graph 9 above shows where changes took place in the period from October 1957
to October 1977. First, in October 1957 there were eighty-two (82) States in the
international system. By October 1967, the international system had increased to one
hundred and twenty-two (122) States. That is a 32.8% increase in the number of States in
the international system. Between October 1957 and October 1967, twenty-eight (28)
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States had signed and twenty (20) States had ratified the Outer Space Treaty, one State
had promulgated a national space law, and most likely at least one rule of international
custom arose. Hence, relative to the total number of States in the international system, by
October 1967, 23% of States intended to be bound by treaty rules, 16.4% of States
consented to be bound by treaty rules, and 0.82% of States invested in a national space
law; but 1.64% of States had engaged in sufficient State practice to be considered a rule
under international custom to launch and orbit an object over the territories of other
States for peaceful purposes.562
Second, by October 1977 there were one hundred and forty nine (149) States in
the international system. This represents an increase of 18.1% in the pool of potential
supranational market participants. Corresponding along the same interval of time,
seventy-six (76) States had ratified and twenty-eight (28) States had signed the Outer
Space Treaty. That is an increase of 73% of ratifying and, no change in the number of
signatory, States. Thus, the second ten (10) year interval measured the greatest growth of
States consenting to be bound to a set of rules relating to the outer space environment.563
Comparing the growth of the international system of States to the development of
rules for the outer space environment, within the period of time where the activity in
spaceflight was dominated by the space programs of US and Soviet Union, gives an
indication of the market concentration. In particular, interested States aligned with the
US and the Soviet Union sought to consolidate interest in the supranational market
through the UN General Assembly and bilaterally.564 Moreover, the UNGA created first
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an ad hoc and then a permanent COPUOS. From Sputnik to the Outer Space Treaty’s
entry into force as a set of rules of public international law, membership in COPUOS
grew 35.7%. By December 1977, COPUOS membership increased 40.4%. Thus,
following twenty years after the launch of Sputnik I, membership in COPUOS grew
61.7%.
As these data indicate, in over twenty years membership in the UN grew 45%,
COPUOS membership grew 61.7%, and ratifying and signatory States Parties of the
Outer Space Treaty grew 100%. Furthermore, because the growth in UN membership
lagged behind the growth of COPUOS membership and States Parties to the Outer Space
Treaty, in the twenty years since the launch of Sputnik the greatest supranational market
concentration was observed.

c. Evolution of the Term Space Object in Rules of Jurisdiction for Activities in the Outer
Space Environment

To date, the definition, meaning, and scope of the term “space object” has
undergone various transitions over time. When the Soviet Union launched their Sputnik
(meaning “fellow-traveler”)565 objects and the United States subsequently followed suit
with the launch of their Explorer objects, the nomenclature of the time termed these
objects “artificial Earth satellites.”566 Today, objects launched into outer space have a
variety of names depending on the context, but the most common term of art used is a
shortened version of the old term, namely “satellite”. No matter the term of art used to
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describe these objects, i.e., things without international legal personality,567 the focus of
this thesis is on how any term used to describe a thing launched or intended to be
launched by a State into outer space has evolved as a primary element of rules for the
outer space environment. Over time, the content (i.e., the definition, meaning, and scope)
of the term “space object” and its relation to rules became a legal definition with legal
meaning and scope forming the foundation of much of the laws that govern the outer
space environment.

i. Scope of the Issues Investigated

The theme of this thesis revolves around the term space object as it is used as a
necessary element of rules and rules of law that apply to State activities within the outer
space environment. The goal here is to define how the term “space object” and its
associated terms of art have evolved over time into rules of law as well as how the term
space object subsequently evolves in definition, meaning, and scope.
The term “space object” and its associated terms of art are found today in rules of
national law and the corpus of public international space law. As discussed in Chapter V,
States have defined the term “space object” in their national laws in different ways. In
order to understand the meaning and scope of the definition of the term “space object”
under public international law, two issues must be addressed. The first issue is whether
the way States have used and defined the term “space object” in their State municipal
laws in conformity with the treaty definition demonstrates evolution in rule adoption into
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national space laws. If States have implemented only the treaty definition into their
national law, then States are subject to that specific definition. If States have not
implemented the treaty definition but instead have redefined the meaning of space object,
then a question arises as to how this difference might affect the scope and meaning of the
treaty definition and the duties and obligations of States under general public
international law. In other words, to what extent can we say that the use of the term
“space object” in State municipal law expresses a general principle of law and thus
provides a mechanism to address international space issues not already subject to treaty
provisions?
The second issue is whether States that use the term “space object” to form rules
for the outer space environment that represent a general and consistent State practice and
are performed with a sense of legal obligation, thereby extending the evolution of the
term space object underlying such rules, potentially transcend the rule’s original use and
application by States. If a rule composed of the term “space object” represents an
international custom, then that rule’s content and obligation would supersede the content
and obligation of a treaty rule because international custom would bind all States that
have purchased the rule via State practice while the obligation of a treaty only binds those
States Party to it.568 Moreover, if a rule depends on a specific meaning of the term “space
object” and that term does not categorically represent a set of specific rules carved out by
a particular source of rules, then its utility as an element of a rule may be inapplicable as
a source of specific obligations because they are distinct obligations. As will be discussed
in Chapter V, the way States have constructed the term “space object,” and have made
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the term a necessary element of rules and rules of law for the outer space environment,
arises relative to a particular source of rules. Thus, objects made in, used in, and launched
or intended to be launched into outer space may be outside the scope of the terms original
meaning and intent thereby necessitating further rule evolution. Thus, a resolution of both
issues will determine the meaning and scope of the definition of space object and provide
an objective standard with which to understand the meaning of the term “space object”
under general public international law and thus demonstrates the point of rule evolution
this thesis seeks to show.
Finally, while important, the study developed in Chapter V does not determine
when the use of the term space object applies or what principles apply in what types of
circumstances involving space objects. This study means only to clarify the meaning of
space object in international law through a review of treaty acceptance, State practice,
and national law definitions of space object as a function of rule evolution.

ii. The Importance of this Study to the Development and Evolution of Space Law

This section lays the foundation of the study conducted in Chapter V. This is
important because it analyzes the extent to which States have complied with duties and
obligations under each treaty that defines legal rules for space objects. Since the term
space object arises in different treaties in different ways, a particular treaty limits the
applicability of the term space object. This is important because not all States that have
signed or ratified the Outer Space Treaty have also signed or ratified all the other space
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treaties; however, some have signed one or more of the other space treaties and not the
Outer Space Treaty.569
To illustrate this point, let us consider some of the important rules that form some
important duties and responsibilities of States Parties to the first four space treaties that
relate specifically to the use of space objects. Under the Outer Space Treaty, space object
implicates, inter alia, international liability and responsibility, jurisdiction and control,
registration, and the prohibition on the placement of weapons of mass destruction into
outer space.570 Under the Rescue and Return Agreement, inter alia, the treaty defines
whether a State can request or send back a space object found in its territory, as well as
the extent to which a State may be compensated for the effort. 571 Under the Liability
Convention, inter alia, space object defines the extent to which a State can apply a theory
of liability and specific proceedings in seeking compensation or restitution for damage
caused by a space object to other objects in outer space, on the surface of the Earth, or
aircraft in flight as a matter of treaty law.572 Finally, under the Registration Convention,
inter alia, a State party must register its space objects in order to give notice to other
States of its existence and provides a mechanism by which a State can assign nationality
to a space object.573
Thus, as a matter of public international law, the various treaty definitions and
meanings of space object show specific application of rules under different treaties.
Therefore, it becomes important to discover whether a broader meaning exists under
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public international law, including under international custom and general principles of
law. Changes over time to the application and characteristics of the term space object
demonstrate rule evolution because the definition, meaning, and scope of the term space
object represents a necessary element to particular rules that apply to various types of
activities that the space treaties seek to regulate. Whether such rules are or become legal
rules is a matter of how a State may purchase the obligation of the rule.
“Space object” has a variety of meanings depending on its application in a
particular context. Given the increase in the number of States operating in outer space,
whether individually or multilaterally, what exactly constitutes a space object continues
to evolve beyond what States contemplated beginning in the late 1950’s. Because the
term “space object” represents a treaty term, only a State Party has purchased the
obligation to follow provisions to which it is subject under a particular treaty. 574
Moreover, the term space object forms the keystone of the Outer Space Treaty, the
Rescue and Return Agreement, the Liability Convention, and the Registration
Convention because the term itself activates obligations, affects rights, as well as
establishing duties under each specific space treaty and generally under public
international law. Therefore, the evolution of much of space law is centered on the
definition, meaning, and scope of the term space object over time.
Additionally, this study is important because not every State Party to the Outer
Space Treaty is a party to either the Liability or Registration Conventions – treaties that
actually define space object in the exact same way. 575 Most States have ratified the Outer
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Space Treaty; however, some States that have ratified the Outer Space Treaty have not
ratified either or both the Liability and Registration Conventions.576 Since only these two
treaties specifically define space object, this study therefore seeks to find those common
elements that give meaning to the term space object under general public international
law and to eventually show how States have evolved the codification of the term in their
national laws.577
A discussion of the types of objects that could constitute a space object in
scholarly writings abound. A review of literature written by international legal scholars
shows that under the space treaties the term of “space object” can mean almost anything
that a State can, at least, attempt to launch into outer space. This invites representative
and tautological problems. The first problem, which may be termed the “ham sandwich
problem,” indicates that anything launched into outer space, even a ham sandwich could
be considered a space object. As stated, this example probably elicits an absurd reaction
in the reader, yet when scholars speak of rocket fuel exhaust as representing an example
of a space object, as such, strains the history of the meaning of the term space object.578
Fortunately, State practice does not seem to have borne out these absurdities because
States tends to constrain how the term is defined and used under their national (space)
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laws. Therefore, the study presented in Chapter V seeks to parse out those elements of the
term space object that could represent a rule of international custom or a general principle
of law within national legal systems demonstrating rule evolution.
The second problem involves the “tautological problem.” This problem has two
sides. On one hand, when exactly does a space object become a space object? On the
other hand, when does a space object cease to be a space object? This problem arises
partly because no legal definition has been accepted that delimits the sovereign airspace
of States in public international law.579 While scholarly writings have cut one way or
another, very few States have yet to indicate through practice or law where they divide
airspace and outer space, i.e., the legal altitude where a State ends its sovereignty in the
airspace above its territory.580 Does an object become a space object when it enters outer
space?581 Where does outer space begin?582 Delegates to the Liability Convention
negotiations seemed to have sidestepped these questions and instead discussed an intent
element of launching an object into outer space as part of the definition of space object.583
Consequently, for example, this has had a major impact on the development of space
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debris mitigation guidelines and has led to ways in which proponents of debris removal
seek to redefine the meaning of space object in order to justify removal.584 Hence, if the
term space object could mean specific types of objects, then the definition could be
limited to certain types of objects and not others.

iii. Definition, Meaning, and Scope of the Term Space Object

When Sputnik I became the first object launched into Earth orbit on October 4,
1957, no definitive legal classification existed for such an object.585 Considered State
property, objects launched by the United States and the Soviet Union into orbit
represented the height of technological capability at the time.586 By 1975, two
international treaties legally classified objects launched or intended to be launched into
space as “space objects.” Article I of both the Liability and Registration Conventions
define a space object as including the space object itself and “component parts of [the]
space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.”587 Because international
negotiation for a definitive term proved difficult to devise, States settled on a definition
of space object that would not require definitive classifications.588 As discussed infra, the
debate continues to persist as to the scope of the meaning of the term space object.
The term space object has had a curious evolution. The term object in reference to
outer space was first used in 1961 in UNGA Resolution 1721 (XVI) titled International
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co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, which issued an invitation to record any
object launched by States into outer space with the UNCOPUOS through the UN
Secretary General.589 In context, object meant such things that could assist in the
exploration and understanding of outer space such as scientific instruments, satellites, and
launch vehicles.590 In 1967, the term object became a binding treaty term for the first time
when the term found its way into the Outer Space Treaty.591 However, a definition for the
term did not arise until the 1972 Liability Convention came into force.592
Generally, space object includes terms of art used in the commercial, civil, and
military space sectors. As noted in statutes, codes, and regulations as well as by scholars
and commentators, Earth manufactured technologies colloquially termed “space vehicle”,
“spacecraft”, “spaceship”, “satellite”, and “space station” represent the types of objects
launched into outer space.593 Cheng has noted that members of the COPUOS during
negotiations over the space treaties treated spacecraft and space vehicles as synonymous
terms.594 This point is illustrated by the fact that article V of the Outer Space Treaty uses
the term “space vehicle;” articles I(1), II, III, and IV of the Rescue and Return Agreement
use the term “spacecraft;” and article XII of the Outer Space Treaty “distinguishes ‘space
vehicles’ on celestial bodies from ‘stations, installations, [and] equipment’, to which the
See G.A. Res. 1721 B (XVI), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/4987 (Dec. 20, 1961) (“Calls upon States launching
objects into orbit or beyond to furnish information promptly to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, through the Secretary-General, for the registration of launchings” (emphasis added)),
available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_16_1721E.pdf accessed November 30, 2015. But see
G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), U.N. Doc. A/4351 (Dec. 12, 1959) (“Noting with satisfaction the successes of great
significance to mankind that have been attained in the exploration of outer space in the form of the recent
launching of artificial earth satellites and space rockets, . . .” (emphasis added)), available at
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_14_1472E.pdf accessed Dec. 10, 2015.
590
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Moon Treaty”595 uses the term facilities (articles VIII, X, XI, XII & XV) and spacecraft
(articles III & X).596
During the Liability Convention negotiations, delegates debated two definitions
for the term space object. The first definition was a narrow definition that “included the
object itself and its component parts, as well as the means of delivery and its component
parts.”597 A second definition consisted of a broader meaning for the term space object in
that it “would have included articles on board the space object and articles detached,
thrown or launched from the space object.”598 Delegates chose the former definition to
classify a space object.599
In addition, the delegates debated the scope of the term “space object.”600 A
proposal submitted by Argentina, Belgium, and France, which was not adopted, included
a definition of space object without mention of outer space.601 The proposal suggested
that a space object mean: “any object made and intended for space activities” and that
“For the purpose of [the] Convention, the term ‘space object’ also includes a launch
vehicle and parts thereof, as well as all component parts on board, detached or torn from
the space object.”602 The reason for the proposal was to move away from a discussion of
where airspace ended and outer space began.603 The United States, in particular, neither
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wanted to get into the technical aspects of delimitation of outer space in order to preserve
the greatest latitude for technological development of launch vehicles and space systems
nor wanted to agree to any limitations on State sovereign airspace.
Under the Liability and Registration Conventions, a space object includes
component parts to the launch, but neither the treaty’s travaux preparatoires nor scholars
agree which component parts remain space objects after launch. Gorove has concluded
that “the component parts of a space object would include all elements normally regarded
as making up the space object, including fuel tanks and perhaps even the fuel itself. Thus
any object without which the spacecraft would be regarded incomplete, may be taken to
be a component part.”604 Cheng has suggested that a space object covers “any object
launched by humans into outer space, as well as any component part thereof, together
with its launch vehicle and parts thereof.”605 Thus, objects launched into orbit are ipso
facto space objects. Nevertheless, the definitions advanced by Gorove and Cheng
generally conform to what the delegates to the Liability Convention had contemplated,
however it is unclear how far the treaty negotiators wanted to extend the definition of
“objects” to things like fuel exhaust.606
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A. Space object: Spatialist vs. Functionalist Arguments

When does an object become a space object? The delimitation of airspace issue
centers on the spatialist and functionalist arguments.607 The spatialist argument advances
the point that where the atmosphere legally terminates, outer space legally begins. 608 Gal
raises the point of airspace demarcation, i.e., altitude in flight/orbit, which affects when
an object launched becomes a space object.609 Gal concludes, “only those objects can be
regarded as space objects which perform an orbiting movement round the earth or other
celestial bodies, or which have been launched with that purpose,” with the deciding
criterion of a space object dependent upon its orbital motion.610 If the space object does
not have sufficient velocity to achieve orbit, then it is not a space object.611
The functionalist argument rejects a technical or arbitrary delimitation of airspace
but delimits legal airspace from outer space by the character or nature of the activity
under regulation.612 Thus, an object becomes a space object by virtue of how the object is
placed into outer space, i.e., launched by a launching State.613 Kopal has suggested that
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“Space Objects should be considered any object launched by man for a mission into outer
space, be it into orbit around the Earth, or beyond into planetary space to and around the
Moon and other celestial bodies of the Solar system, or into deep space.”614 As noted
Chapter V, the functionalist paradigm reigns dominate within national space laws. Only a
few States have adopted the spatialist paradigm.

B. Problems with the Scope of the Space Object Definition under the Space
Treaties

Several additional problems arise with respect to the scope of the meaning of
space object under the Liability and Registration Conventions. First, some commentators
argue that the term space object is an incomplete term because it fails to address the issue
of functional vs. nonfunctional objects in outer space.615 While the intent to launch a
space object is the first threshold question, once launched, which element of the launch is
still a space object and how long does it legally remain a space object? Hurwitz notes that
ambiguity arises as to whether an object continues to have the legal status of a space
object under the Liability Convention when it is abandoned and uncontrolled, or
destroyed in outer space.616 Past scholarship seems to conclude that no limit exists in
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which an object ceases to be classified as a space object under the article I definition of
the Liability and Registration Conventions.617 However, a debate has arisen challenging
the current space object paradigm utilizing maritime law analogies and general
international law.618 However, States have yet been observed to adopt such changes to the
term space object in practice.
Second, a question arises as to whether the launch of a space object must originate
from Earth.619 This question presented itself in the policy debates surrounding the
development of an international space station.620 If a structure is built in outer space from
“materials not originating from the Earth and if, as a result, those materials are not
regarded as a “space object”, there may be no State required to register the object” and a
State may not be liable for damage caused by its object under the Outer Space Treaty or
Liability Convention.621 Resolution of these issues could be found in analyzing
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international responsibility under public international law, generally, and the Outer Space
Treaty, specifically, which would limit this issue to jurisdiction and control over State
property or responsibility over the activities and conduct of non-governmental entities.622
However, the application of rules different than those expressed under a particular treaty
or more generally the use of a definition of the term space object different from its
meaning and scope under treaty law requires the interpolation of the term space object to
other sources of law. This too demonstrates rule evolution from its previous in time usage
and rule applicability.
Third, a space object’s presence in outer space does not affect its ownership or
nationality.623 Ownership extends beyond the operation of the space object, including
when it ceases to function at end-of-life, malfunctions, or fails to reach intended orbit
because of a failed launch.624 Moreover, States have the responsibility to ensure that the
rights of entities subject to its jurisdiction follow accepted rules and practices in outer
space.625 Hence, national law plays an important role in defining the scope of the rights,
duties, and obligations of States and their non-governmental entities who conduct
activities or have traceable interests in outer space. Thus, national legal obligations
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undertaken by States help reinforce the basis of principles, duties, and obligations of the
space treaties and public international law in general.
Finally, given the possibilities of interpretation, space object could have no upper
limit in meaning under the space treaties. However, because the term space object
implicates different treaties, national regulations, and terms of art, it becomes important
to figure out what space object means in a variety of contexts to determine which
obligations States purchase with respect to the source of rules. Chapter V thus studies
how State municipal law and State practice affects and has affected the definition of
space object and provides possible answers to the issues presented in this thesis.

d. Conclusion

The proliferation of market participants and rule supply led to the creation of
several supranational markets of international relations regarding the outer space
environment. Within a year of the launch of Sputnik I, interested States cooperated to
create COPUOS as a forum to discuss the international issues associated with the outer
space environment. Moreover, COPUOS enables trading in valued preferences and the
development of rules of jurisdiction among and between States. Between October 1958
and October 1975, COPUOS grew from eighteen members to thirty seven members.
Although market participation grew 50%, relative to the entire pool of potential market
participant States, COPUOS membership reflected the views of a minority of States who
had in interest in developing such rules.
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Coincidently, while the number of COPUOS member States has almost tripled
since October 1975, the rate of rule supply to the international system remains steady, but
consumption of rules generated out of COPUOS has significantly declined. The process
by which COPUOS supplies rules of jurisdiction to States through supranational market
mechanisms is consent based. However, this defining aspect of COPUOS also limits
member States’ abilities to supply rules where there is no consensus, but may have value
to other States. This characteristic of COPUOS illustrates that rule supply in one
supranational market does not produce the same effects in other markets.
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CHAPTER V
THE EVOLUTION OF RULES FOR THE OUTER SPACE ENVIRONMENT
a. Introduction

In July1958, the United States enacted the National Aeronautics and Space Act of
1958 that established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.626
Consequently, the United States became the first State to enact a national space law.
Since then at least twenty nine States have promulgated national space laws the content
of which governs the launch into and operation of space objects in the outer space
environment.
Space object is arguably the most important term in all of the corpus of space law
because the entire legal regime for space is centered on what is launched into and used in
outer space. Since the term space object has been defined rather broadly in the outer
space treaties, the definition, meaning, and scope of the term as a function of rules of
jurisdiction takes on important meaning as State practice evolves. Moreover, since the
definition, meaning, and scope of terms that define a State’s legal obligation in relation to
the international community of States must have some common basis, the supply of rules
over time may provide further clarity to the extent to which a State has authority over
persons, objects, and events in the outer space environment. Therefore, this Chapter
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analyzes how States have supplied rules of jurisdiction in the form of rules of national
and the extent to which States have defined the content of the the term “space object.”

b. Evolution toward Convergence of Rules into Rules of Law for the Outer Space
Environment

This case study comprises a comparative study of the definition of the term
“space object” in national space laws. This chapter analyzes those States that have or
have not implemented the term “space object” and its definition into their national legal
systems and the legal effect it has under international law. This study surveys the supply
of rules to the supranational market from a sample of States.627 The first sample consists
of thirty-nine States, all of which have purchased rules with respect to the regulation or
use of space objects. Each State has some space-faring experience, including being a
member State of a multilateral space agency, a partner to the International Space Station,
launching humans, animals, or other objects into outer space, or having had another State
launch objects into outer space for it.628 The second subsample consists of those States
that have internally promulgated or published rules with respect to the regulation or use
of space objects as a matter of rule supply. Moreover, the survey also includes a review
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Members, available at http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/COPUOS/members.html accessed Dec. 10, 2015.
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of which States in the sample are party to the first four space treaties and analyzes
whether States have implemented the treaties into their national law.629

i. Space Object Defined Under National Space Laws

This section discusses how the thirty-nine (39) States sampled define space
object. Not all States have defined space object using the definition expressed in the
Liability and Registration Conventions. Several States have redefined space object in
their national law using terms of art generally through national licensing and registration
regimes. Moreover, national licensing and registration regimes seem to form the basis for
which States either use the treaty definition of space object or redefine the term to include
a specific list of objects that States consent to launch into outer space. These national
legal requirements seem to limit generally the scope of the type of object a space object
can be via State practice.
Generally, States segment the scope of their national space laws between civil and
military space activities, while some States also permit commercial/private space
activities.630 States regulate civil, military, and commercial activities through a variety of
national law mechanisms. Depending upon the structure of government, some States have
created regulatory agencies or have created regimes that require government
authorization for entities under their jurisdiction to seek approval for launching objects
into outer space, while some States allow other States to launch objects into outer space
for them. Hence, those types of “objects” States generally launch into the outer space
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See supra note 21.
See, e.g., SPACE POLITICS AND POLICY 33-39 (Eligar Sadeh ed., Kluwer 2002).
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environment represent State practice necessary by which to judge what may or may not
be a “space object.” The measure the evolution of the term depends on how a State
manifests its valued preferences for the classification of the term “space object.”

A. Thirty-Nine States Sampled
1. States with “Space Object” Defined in National Law

For States that have defined space object in their national law, this analysis
reveals two types of definitions utilized. The first category of States define space object
utilizing a specific national law definition of space object. The second category of States
define space object in national law utilizing the article I definition from the Liability and
Registration Conventions. Each category is listed below.

(a). Category I States: Specific Definitions

Australia defines space object under Section 8 of the Space Activities Act of 1998.
631

Under Section 8,

‘space object’ means a thing consisting of: (a) a launch vehicle; and (b) a
payload (if any) that the launch vehicle is to carry into or back from an
area beyond the distance of 100 km above mean sea level; or any part of
such a thing, even if: (c) the part is to go only some of the way towards or
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See NATIONAL REGULATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES 37-59 (Ram S. Jakhu ed., Springer 2010) (Australia
has promulgated a national space law that includes a licensing and registration regime).
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back from an area beyond the distance of 100 km above mean sea level; or
(d) the part results from the separation of a payload or payloads from a
launch vehicle after launch.632

Russian Federation law currently defines space object in a variety of ways.
Russian law defines space object as “an immovable property that is subject to
registration;”633 “an object designed for exploration and use of outer space, the Moon and
other celestial bodies for civil purposes;”634 and “a space mechanical device, which is
designed to conduct specific tasks and is capable of independent long-term functioning in
outer space.”635
Several States use the term “any object” to define a space object. These States
qualify the term “any object” with an intent element. States that define “any object”
include Netherlands – space object “is any object launched or destined to be launched
into outer space;”636 Norway – space object is “any object” launched with permission of
government;”637 and Republic of Korea – ““space objects” are objects designed and
manufactured for use in outer space including space launch vehicles, artificial satellites,
and spaceships and their components.”638 Furthermore, Iran’s Statute of the Iranian Space
Agency defines the scope of its regulatory powers in article (3)(IV), which states

632

Space Activities Act 1998, No. 123, Section 8 (Austl.), available at
http://corrigan.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/saa1998167/s8.html accessed Dec. 10, 2015.
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Supra note 631, at 315-34.
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Supra note 631, at 225-46. See Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Establishment of a Registry
of Space Objects (Space Activities Act), BILL (13.06.06), 1.1.c (2006) (Neth.).
637
Act on launching objects from Norwegian territory etc. into outer space. (13 June. 1969) (Nor.).
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Space Development Promotion Act, Art. 2(3) (2005) (S. Korea).
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“Agency’s tasks and authorizations are as follows: . . . Doing research, designing,
manufacturing and launch of the commercial, scientific and research satellites, and
designing and establishing control center and launch of national satellites in cooperation
with related institutions.”639 Nigeria’s National Space and Development Space Agency is
“charged with the responsibility for building and launching satellites.”640 Thus, any
object intended to be launched into the outer space environment is a space object.

(b). Category II States: Article I Definitions

Austria, Belgium, China, Spain, and the United Kingdom utilize the article I
definition of space object. The Austrian Federal Law on the Authorisation of Space
Activities and the Establishment of a National Space Registry defines space object as “an
object launched or intended to be launched into outer space, including its components.”641
Belgium’s Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Operation or Guidance of Space
Objects defines space object as “any object launched or intended to be launched into
outer space, including the material elements composing that object.”642 Under the Outer
Space Ordinance, China defines space object as the space object itself “includ[ing] the
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An Act to establish the National Space Research and Development Agency; and for related matters, §
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Austrian Federal Law on the Authorisation of Space Activities and the Establishment of a National
Registry [Austrian Outer Space Act], Oct. 11, 2011, § 2(2) (Austria), available at
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/spacelaw/national/austria/austrian-outer-space-actE.pdf (English
translation provided by the Government of Austria) accessed Dec. 10, 2015. The Austrian government must
authorize all space activities, which requires approval from the Minister for Transport, Innovation, and
Technology.
642
Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Operations or Guidance of Space Objects, Art. III(1) (Belg.).
Interestingly, the Law does note that component parts of a space object includes material elements. Thus,
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component parts of a space object, its launch vehicle and the component parts of such
launch vehicle.”643 Spain has defined the term space object “to include both component
parts thereof and the launch vehicle and parts thereof,”644 while the United Kingdom has
defined space object to “include[] the component parts of a space object, its launch
vehicle and the component parts of that.”645

2. States That Do Not Have “Space Object” Defined in Their National Space Law, But
Have a Licensing or Registration Regime as Part of Their National Law

Some States have established a licensing or registration regime in which to govern
space activities. In most cases, either regime will use the term space object without
definition, define a synonymous term to represent a space object, or will only mention
specific types of objects, e.g., satellites. Those States that have developed a law,
regulation, or decree to establish a licensing or registration regime demonstrate some
compliance with certain outer space treaty obligations. A list of those States that have
developed a licensing or registration regime follows.
Argentina has no licensing regime or procedures to regulate the authorization of
launch services.646 However, under Executive Decree 125/1995, “all acts related to a
space object launched or promoted by the national State or launched from its territory or
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facility, whether by the State itself or private entities, are to be recorded in the National
Registry.”647 At a minimum, the National Registry provides a list of objects that could be
considered a space object, if registered.
Brazil has a licensing and authorization regime that focuses on launch
activities.648 Under its License Regulation, Brazil defines launch activities as “the
operation to place or attempt to place a launching vehicle and its payload into suborbital
trajectory, in Earth orbit or otherwise in outer space.”649 Hence, by the plain reading of
the language, the License Regulation provides a list of objects that can represent a space
object. Furthermore, Brazil uses several terms in its national space laws to denote the
types of things that require license, registration, promotion, and protection under national
law, including launch or space activities, space systems, space products and services,
satellite, and launch vehicle.650
Under the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (as amended), the United
States defines “space vehicles [as] . . . satellites, and other space vehicles, manned and
unmanned, together with related equipment, devices, components, and parts.”651 While
the United States Code and the Code of Federal Regulations do not explicitly define
space object, each does however define synonymous terms. 51 U.S.C. § 50902(10)
defines payload as “an object that a person undertakes to place in outer space by means of
a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, including components of the vehicle specifically
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designed or adapted for that object.”652 Further, the United States Code defines launch
vehicle as “(A) a vehicle built to operate in, or place a payload or human beings in, outer
space; and (B) a suborbital rocket.”653 Finally, 14 C.F.R. § 417.19 mentions the term
space object as part of the implementing regulation for the Registration Convention as it
pertains to commercial launch vehicles, but also does not define the term
independently.654
Lastly, Canada, France, India, South Africa, Sweden, and Ukraine all have
licensing regimes incorporated into their national laws.655 However, none of these States
have defined space object in their national law. A review of the States with licensing
regimes reveals no evidence of terms or phrases to indicate the types of object that may
be considered a space object, except for the specific terms object, satellite, and launch
vehicle.656

3. States That Neither Have “Space Object” Nor Have a Licensing or Registration
Regime as Part of Their National Law

A review of the national laws of the Chile, Columbia, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Kazakhstan, Mexico,
Romania, and Switzerland found that none of these States have promulgated a national
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space law or defined space object in national law. Of these fifteen States, all States have
ratified, acceded, or succeeded to the Liability Convention and only the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Greece, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, and Switzerland have ratified, acceded, or
succeeded to the Registration Convention. Furthermore, of these sixteen States, all have
ratified or succeeded to the Outer Space Treaty and only Luxembourg has not ratified or
succeeded to the Rescue and Return Agreement. Thus, these States have at least
incorporated the Liability Convention’s article I definition of space object into their
national laws.

B. Analysis of the Thirty-Nine Sampled States

Because every State has its own internal processes for internalizing its
international obligations, the treaty provisions of the first four space treaties do not oblige
a State to pass national space laws to implement the duties and obligations of each treaty
only that it finds some way to do so.657 Recently, however, many States have
promulgated implementing legislation to authorize and supervise the space activities of
governmental and nongovernmental entities. Licensing and registration regulations and
decrees provide sources of rules that describe how States define the content of the term
“space object.”
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See HERMIDA supra note 627, at 244.
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1. Observations on the Way in Which States Have Sought to Define Space Object in
Their National Law

Some States have attempted to define space object in a specific way, while most
States promulgate the term space object in close conformity to the article I definition of
the Liability and Registration Conventions. Of the thirty-nine (39) States surveyed,
nineteen have licensing regimes for civil and commercial space objects, five have an
authorization regime, and fifteen do not have a licensing regime for the launching of
space objects. Of these thirty-nine States, thirty eight are party to the Liability
Convention and thirty three are party to the Registration Convention.
These data reveal several observations worth noting. First, Australia, Netherlands,
Norway, Republic of Korea, and Russia have defined space object in a particular way
under their national laws. Australia is the only State surveyed that used a spatialist
paradigm to delimit airspace. In addition, while Australia’s Space Activities Act does not
define payload, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), an
independent statutory authority required to manage the radio spectrum for the Australian
government, does have the authority to determine what types of objects are or are not
space objects for the purposes of the Radiocommunications Act of 1992 (RA92).658 RA92
uses the terms satellite, satellite system, and space system to describe the types of space
objects under ACMA authority that may be licensed and regulated in the context of space
telecommunications.659
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Supra note 631, at 57-59.
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Second, no Argentine national law specifically defines a space object, but several
decrees mention the term satellite and Argentine Decree 532/2005 mentions space
vehicles.660 Since Argentina has ratified the first four outer space treaties, the treaty
definition of space object has binding legal effect as a matter of national law.661
Third, Brazil’s License Regulation seems to incorporate a hybrid spatialist and
functionalist definition of space object. A launch vehicle and payload must achieve at
least suborbital velocity without specifying the type of trajectory a suborbital trajectory
would represent. Again, intent language appears with respect to launch, but the License
Regulation does not specify the type of payloads that could be launched.662
Fourth, a common theme among States that have codified the term space object in
their respective national laws is that those States have utilized the article I definition
rather than devise a more sophisticated definition. Further, Netherlands, Norway, and the
Republic of Korea do not place limits on the types of objects that require authorization
for launch. Hence, any object launched with the approval of the State is a space object.
Fifth, ten of the States surveyed (Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece,
India, Ireland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Romania, and Switzerland) have not promulgated a
national law space law. Each State has accepted as a matter of treaty law the term space
object.
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2. Common Elements of a Space Object in National Space Laws

A review of the sampled national space laws has yielded seven common
definition elements: (1) object, (2) intent to launch, (3) launched, (4) launch vehicle, (5)
payload, (6) component parts and parts thereof, and (7) satellite. First, the meaning of the
term object has a narrow meaning in some States under domestic registration and
licensing regimes. In addition, object tends to be defined with respect to the functional
paradigm. Second, almost all States sampled with a definition of space object, whether
specifically or by synonym, utilize an intent element relative to the action of launch.
Thus, a space object is not a space object unless launched. Third, an object has been
qualified in many national space laws by terms of art that include satellite, rocket,
payload, spacecraft, space system, and launch vehicle. For each term, the definition of
space object includes, from almost every State sampled, those component parts of each
constitute a space object. This would suggest that the physical component parts of these
types of objects would be considered a space object, but not necessarily rocket fuel or
humans. Finally, the term satellite has tended to have a specific meaning under the
national laws of States sampled. In most cases, the term “satellite”, while considered a
space object is limited by two types of objects: telecommunications and remote sensing
satellites. Because of the importance of these types of objects, States tend to clearly
regulate their uses. As such, this indicates that States seek to constrain or provide a clear
label or definition of the meaning of satellite and thus the meaning of space object in their
national laws.
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c. Conclusion

The term space object is arguably the most important legal term in all of space
law. Without a definition of space object, the rights, duties, and obligations of States
engaged in activities in the outer space environment would have no meaning. As a treaty
term, space object only has legal effect with respect to States that have ratified the outer
space treaties. Moreover, the scope of the legal effect the term has on States is limited by
the provisions that give the term legal effect and the number of State parties to the treaty
that utilize the term space object. In order to understand the scope of the legal effect of
the term space object outside of any of the space treaties, an inquiry must be made in
which to discern whether the space object has risen to the status of consisting as a rule of
customary international law or a general principle of law.
The use of the term “space object” has most likely reached a level of practice
beyond the space treaties. All States surveyed have purchased the obligation relating to
the term space object as a matter of treaty and national law. Consistent use of the term as
a purchased obligation has most likely given the term a status under customary
international law. Moreover, the article I definition of the term has most likely reached
the level of a rule of customary international law because the launching of objects is
fundamental to all other types of rules and their associated obligations across all
supranational markets. At a minimum, the national laws that define those objects
registered or licensed as a space object, whether termed a launch vehicle, payload or
satellite as well as its component parts, provide the operative source of the type of objects
that can be a space object. As such, space object includes at least the following elements:
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(1) an object, (2) intended to be launched, or (3) launched, that includes a (4) launch
vehicle, (5) payload, or (6) satellite – which also includes remote sensing, scientific,
telecommunication satellites, as well as (7) including the component parts and parts
thereof of a launch vehicle, payload, or satellite. In addition, almost all of the States
surveyed utilized the legal meaning of the term space object under a functionalist
paradigm. Moreover, only two States sought to define space object by when an object
reaches outer space.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
a. Conclusions

States are the primary units of analysis in the international system. As such, they
are endowed with sovereignty. Moreover, the rule of sovereign equality with other States
can manifest in a variety of ways. However, States are not necessarily commensurate,
inter alia, in resources, capabilities, or State practice.
As individual actors in the international system, States seek to maximize their
valued preferences within and outside their territory. In particular, State’s seek to extend
their authority beyond their territory in relation to certain types of activities. In order to
manage the risk and minimize the costs of extending State authority extraterritorially,
States may seek to trade in components of power to ensure their authority extends beyond
their territorial borders with respect to the need to satisfy valued preferences. To
accomplish this extension of authority extraterritorially, States may engage in State
practice the act of which supplies rules of jurisdiction to the supranational market of
international relations.
By seeking to maximize State preferences, States tend to design their State
practice in accordance with rules supplied and/or consumed by States as a function of
their sovereignty. Not every State practice connotes a bargained for legal obligation the
product of which manifests from the consumption of rules through State practice.
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Nevertheless, because the international system is based on the consent of States, the rules
that govern international relations can take the form of choice of law rules
(cooperative)or rules of prescriptive jurisdiction (non-cooperative).
Since States supply rules of jurisdiction to the supranational market of
international relations, other States may bargain for such rules in a variety of international
fora. The act of bargaining can take many forms. In particular, international fora for
bargaining may be open and multilateral or closed to States without a need or reason to
enter the supranational market. As such, by measuring market participation in rule
supply, negotiation, and consumption, an observer may draw inferences from which and
how many States engage in the supranational market of international relations. In the case
of rules for the outer space environment, the data show variation, but some growth, in
market participation and rule supply. However, rule consumption has remained relatively
flat since about 1980 in terms of choice of law rules, but there has been substantial
growth in rule supply and consumption among States that enact national space laws. This
is a curious trend because since October 1957, only thirteen (13) States have developed
their own launch capabilities. Furthermore, as of October 2015, approximately fifty-eight
(58) States have space objects of some variety in orbit around the Earth or beyond cislunar space. Yet one hundred and four (104) Sates have ratified the Outer Space Treaty.
So what do these facts mean in light of rule formation and evolution?
One possible explanation is that given the importance of rules for outer space
activities, States initially benefited from international negotiations within the UN system.
The supply of rules through COPUOS to the UNGA and consequently to all States
provided a means to more efficiently bargain for rules because only a few States self-
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selected into the COPUOS supranational market. Subsequently, States that did not
participate in rule-making were supplied rules and thus the rules developed from the first
four space treaties were easy to consume. Furthermore, political alignments among and
between States affected how States valued these rules in relation to the hegemons (US
and Soviet Union) whose initial State practice set the foundation for subsequent rules.
Therefore, collectively, the initial rule development arose because the market participants
reacted to the signals provided by States that initially engaged in the practice of launching
objects into the outer space environment.
A second possible explanation is that the majority of States on Earth find value in
basic rules of jurisdiction. However, rules that do not align with a State’s valued
preferences will tend not to be consumed by the State. States that have no capabilities or
resources to enter the outer space environment may use other States capabilities and
resources to do so. Moreover, those States will bargain only for rules that are
commensurate with the valued preferences of States despite not possessing the
technology to launch objects into the outer space environment. Conversely, if the value of
the rules supplied diminishes over time, the probability of rule consumption will tend to
decline. Thus, changes in how States value rules will also evolve where the measurable
effect on rule supply and consumption may shift across the different types of
supranational markets of international relations.
Finally, as rules get more detailed and sophisticated to handle changes in the
valued preferences of States, State practice will supply additional rules for potential
consumption. Consequently, changes in State practice will also led to changes in the
content of rules. Because a re-supply of rules must necessarily include rules not
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specifically on the supranational market, new rules will always seek to augment the old
rules. The consequence of this process is that rules may have shifting meaning to States.
When States try to shift the meaning of consumed rules of jurisdiction, they engage in a
redistribution of the intent of the State Parties to the original rule. Depending on the
valued preferences of other States in the supranational market, new rules supplied to the
supranational market may or may not be valued or consumed by States. However, State
cooperative behavior tends to assist in the supply, negotiation, and consumption of rules
of jurisdiction over time. This process closes the loop on rule evolution enabling the
process to reinitiate over time.
Graph 10 below illustrates the complexity and interconnectedness of the
supranational market of international relations for the outer space environment. Each
source or rules is analyzed against how many States engage in a practice to launch
objects over the territories of other States into the outer space environment, or engage in
rule supply, rule consumption, and preference revelation. Moreover, the entire
international legal system is bounded by the number of States in existence at any given
time. Therefore, when States begin to supply or consume rules, you can measure how
many States engage in a practice against how many States there are in the international
system at any observable time.
Consumption of rules is also indicated in Graph 10. With respect to the space
treaties, each State that signs or ratifies one or more of the space treaties has consumed
the obligation of the rule in return for a trade in extraterritorial authority relative to other
States Parties. Relative to non-States Parties to the space treaties, the OSTRATF curve
provides an upper bound on the consumption of rules of law relating to the launching of
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space objects. The variability in the consumption of rules across all supranational markets
indicates a level of supply and demand through supranational market participation
because of the price paid in the consumption of rules, i.e., the consensual exchange of an
obligation for a right among the group of interested States.
However, States also supply rules relative to their State practice in a
nonconsensual manner. If a State manifests a valued preference to launch objects over the
territories of States into the outer space environment, then it may supply rules by some
internal manifestation of its valued preferences or it may engage in a State practice and
give notice of the acceptance of the rule’s obligation. If a State promulgates a national
law that regulates the launching and use of space objects, it has engaged in preference
revelation and rule supply. If a State gives notice to the international community without
clearly and consistently objecting to the obligation of a rule, it has supplied rules to the
supranational market of international relations as an international custom. However, the
State practice must be consistent and persist for some period of time in order to give the
international system sufficient time to observe the State practice. Since States continued
to engage, without objection, in the State practice of launching objects over the territories
of States into the outer space environment for at least ten years from the launch of
Sputnik I, such a State practice has certainly been purchased by mutual consent among
the international community of States who engage in such a State practice. Therefore, to
what degree has the particular uses or activities of space objects been supplied, priced, or
consumed on the supranational market and thereby enabling the measure of the rate of
consumption? This is left for future study.
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Graph 10: Growth in Market Participation, Rule Supply, and Rule Consumption in the Supranational Market of International Relations for the Outer Space
Environment

i. Case Study I

As a result of the launches of the Sputnik and Explorer objects, the initial supply
of rules of prescriptive jurisdiction provided a framework by which States could negotiate
future rules regarding the outer space environment. The origin of the supranational
market for outer space activities is the consequence of the development of the first rule of
State practice relating to the launching of an object into the outer space environment over
the territories of States. The supranational market for space activities arose in October
1957 as a monopoly until January 1958 when it became a duopoly. For ten years, both the
United States and the Soviet Union dominated State practice in space activities.
Moreover, the competition in terms of State practice in the outer space environment can
be traced back to a series of events that produced the catalysts for the launch of Sputnik I.
Thus, the launch of Sputnik I necessitated the creation of a supranational market for the
trading in valued preferences to produce rules and rules of law for outer space activities
because a few States chose to engage in the State practice of launching objects over the
territories of States into the outer space environment.

ii. Case Study II

The proliferation of market participation and rule supply led to the creation of
several supranational markets of international relations regarding the outer space
environment. Within a year of the launch of Sputnik I, interested States cooperated to
create COPUOS as a forum to discuss the international issues associated with the outer
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space environment. Moreover, COPUOS enables trading in valued preferences and the
development of rules of jurisdiction among and between States. Between October 1958
and October 1975, COPUOS grew from eighteen members to thirty-seven members.
Although market participation grew 50%, relative to the entire pool of potential market
participant States, COPUOS membership reflected the views of a minority of States who
had in interest in developing such rules. Coincidently, while the number of COPUOS
member States has almost tripled since October 1975, the rate of rule supply to the
international system remains steady, but consumption of rules generated out of COPUOS
has significantly declined. The process by which COPUOS supplies rules of jurisdiction
to States through supranational market mechanisms is consent based. However, this
defining aspect of COPUOS also limits member States’ abilities to supply rules where
there is no consensus, but may have value to other States. This characteristic of COPUOS
illustrates that rule supply in one supranational market does not produce the same effects
in other markets.
A rule of customary international law must include general and consistent State
practice performed out of a sense of legal obligation.663 A rule of international custom
can be confined to a region, among States who use the term in the course of a specific
State practice, or broadened to all States who use the term in practice out of a sense of
legal obligation. The term space object could also extend as a rule of international custom
to those States that do not engage in outer space activities depending on if and how the
obligation of the rule is purchased, i.e., that supranational market from where the rule
could be purchased.664 This analysis of State practice indicates that out of the thirty-nine

663
664

See supra BROWNLIE note 4.
Id.
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space-faring States surveyed, all States have incorporated the term “space object” into
their national laws in some form. Thus, all States sampled generally use the term “space
object” out of a sense of legal obligation, i.e., all States surveyed in some form have at
least purchased the obligation of the term and have launched or attempted to launch space
objects for State purposes. On the other hand, the definition of space object has evolved
over time with the innovation in the types of technologies that can be launched into outer
space. States have sought to generalize how they define such objects or kept the
terminology open-ended.
To a large degree, treaties govern the national activities of States in outer space.
One hundred and four States have ratified the Outer Space Treaty; ninety-six States have
ratified, acceded, or succeeded to the Rescue and Return; ninety-five States have ratified,
acceded, or succeeded to the Liability Convention; and sixty-five States have ratified,
acceded, or succeeded to the Registration Convention. On one hand, a large number of
States, i.e., one hundred and four, have purchased the obligation of the rule relating to the
term space object by ratification of any of the first four outer space treaties. On the other
hand, a significant number of States, i.e., ninety-five States, have purchased the article I
definition of space object.
By utilizing articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, an understanding of the intention of
the term arises. However, the definition of space object, as expressed in article I of the
Liability and Registration Conventions, provides only a basis by which to understand the
content of the term’s legal effect under public international law. Thus, through State
practice, a State could specifically define the types of objects launched into outer space.
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A review of national law indicates, moreover, that States have regarded the use of
the term generally within a functionalist paradigm. In addition, given the history of the
Liability Convention negotiations, the term space object has generally meant those
objects such as a launch vehicle, spacecraft, or satellite. Subsequent treaties have
narrowed the meaning of the term by leaving off humans, i.e., astronauts, as space
objects. In the same way, national law has begun to narrow the meaning of space object
through the promulgation of national space laws. Because an open-ended treaty definition
leaves open possibilities for States to cap the meaning of the term space object, those
terms used to describe space object can take legal effect parallel to the treaty term and
definition.

iii. Case Study III

States will seek the most efficient means by which to develop and supply rules
that maximize the utility of their valued preferences, but efficiency in the supply of rules
does not translate into the efficient consumption of rules. States define and use their
technologies to launch into and orbit objects in the outer space environment in ways that
maximize the utility of their valued preferences. However, seeking to maximize the
utility of their valued preferences can arise through any supranational market to which
States have access. In particular, the most efficient way States develop rules is through
promulgating national laws. While supplying rules through State practice does not
necessarily lead to rule consumption, when States agree on rules that are traceable across
States with the same or similar practice in outer space activities they create general
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principles among and between those interested States. These general principles manifest
from the national law and collectively represent the consensus among States regarding
the content (i.e., the definition, meaning, and scope) of rules that apply to all States that
engage in the same or similar types of State practice. Finding a common basis for the
rules promulgated by States, without objection and put into effect through their
international relations, establishes the foundation of the consent required to consume
rules of jurisdiction from the promulgation of their national laws.
General principles of law are those legal principles that are common to a large
number of systems of municipal law. At least ninety-five States have incorporated the
specific definition of space object from the Liability Convention into national law
through domestic ratification processes. All States sampled have incorporated the term
space object into their respective national laws. In addition, every State sampled has
incorporated the article I space object definition, of the Liability or Registration
Convention, into their national laws. Nevertheless, thirteen States (Australia, Russian
Federation, United States, Canada, France, Iran, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Republic
of Korea, South Africa, Sweden, and Ukraine) have promulgated into national law a
specific definition using synonymous terms. Each State has generally restricted objects
intended to be launched into outer space to objects termed payload, satellite, launch
vehicle, and the component parts of each. These terms could represent rules of general
principles of law limited by the State practice of those objects launched or registered
under national law.
A space object has legal effect as a general principle of law if the object launched
falls into two categories. The first category is any object intended to be launched into
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outer space by an authorizing government, as registered, or by way of a national activity.
This first category is the broadest. The second category includes those terms of art that
express a space object in national law that are intended to be launched into outer space by
an authorizing government, as registered, or by way of a national activity. Thus, while the
term most likely represents a general principle of law, the definition of space object is
subject to two constraints, i.e., (1) any object and (2) those objects specifically defined in
a State’s national law subject to licensing or registration regimes.

b. Observations for Future Research

Since the fall of 1957, rules for outer space have proliferated across national laws
and regulations, treaties, international declarations, arbitration rules, nonbinding
agreements, and other written media. All of these rules, however, can be traced back to
the events that precipitated the space race. Nonetheless, looking at how States have
evolved their State practice over time, new activities and proposed activities will
necessarily lead to the supply of rules of jurisdiction through State practice. When States
seek to cooperate in developing and supplying rules to supranational markets, it is
implicit that these rules are meant to manage risk and minimize costs relative to the
benefits of engaging in activities in the outer space environment. However, it is not
entirely clear that rules of jurisdiction to which States have agreed are sufficient to deal
with the proposed State practices currently being contemplated by a variety of States.
This trend toward the evolution of rules for the outer space environment based on State
practice will test the limits of the authority for which States have bargained. For example,
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what happens when the definition of a space object and the scope of the bargained for
rule no longer applies because the object launched or made in situ is not launched from
Earth? How will States develop, supply, and consume rules for activities in environments
significantly distant from their territory?
As States seek to develop and achieve new valued preferences for activities in the
outer space environment, the bargained for rules thus far will most likely be inadequate to
deal with the extension of authority over persons and things subject to their jurisdiction.
Is it possible to measure these transitions and provide results by which States seek to
manage their own risks or will the economics of rule formation strain the international
system of States as activities proliferate in the outer space environment? Further analysis
will be needed to determine whether the current system set up on Earth to develop and
supply rules relative to the number of States participating in such supranational markets
will evolve or break down as humans move beyond the confines of the Earth. If such
events transpire, this should lead to a new cycle of evolution in the formation and
development of rules of jurisdiction because such rules provide States the glue that binds
their authority over objects and subjects of such rules.
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APPENDIX
a. Glossary of Terms
Basis of State Authority – Jurisdiction (e.g., Territorial, Nationality, Passive Personality,
Protective, Universal).
Buying/Purchasing – Accepting the costs of the obligation and benefits of the extension
of authority from the rule(s) supplied.
Choice of Rules (of Law) – Generally, the bi- or multi-lateral supply of rules regarding
the consensual allocation of obligations and authority in a supranational market of
international relations.
Consumption – The act of giving notice to the acceptance of the obligation of a rule of
jurisdiction.
Environments – Any location outside the territory of a State where the State may engage
in a State practice.
International Legal System – System of rules based on the principle of consent that gives
rise to obligations and the extension of extraterritorial authority among and
between States.
Market Participation – State practice in the form of exchanges (occurrences or
transactions) in the supranational market of international relations.
Preference revelation – Measuring the valued preferences of a State.
Prescriptive Rules (of Law) – The unilateral assertion of authority extraterritorially.
Rule(s) – A rule is defined as one or more instruction(s) of a policy. Policy is defined as a
valued preference that guides a course of action from a subjectively legitimate
source of authority that directs a subject’s act or omission to prevent a breach of
the rule(s).
Rule Development – The processes by which States seek to design rules that are supplied
to the international legal system through the supranational markets of
international relations.
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Rule Formation – The observable processes of States engaged in the supranational market
of international relations to supply to and consume rules from supranational
markets of international relations.
Rule(s) of Law – The product of exchanges in the supranational market of international
relations where the price paid takes the form of a legal obligation; the extent to
which a State’s authority may apply extraterritorially.
Rule(s) of Jurisdiction – A component of State power as the basis for a State’s authority
as a function of State sovereignty within the international system.
State – An entity that has a territory, a population, a government, and the ability to
conduct foreign relations.
State Practice – Observable acts or omissions of a State in the course of conducting its
international relations.
Sovereignty (Westphalian) – Territoriality and Exclusion of External Actors from
Domestic Authority (Presumption Against Nonconsensual Rulemaking).
Sources of Rules – These include State practice, scholarship, opinions of tribunals, public
international law (i.e., International Custom, International Agreements, General
Principles of Law).
Selling – Rules supplied for consumption by States via some State practice.
Valued Preferences – Economic and national security, foreign policy concerns of a State.
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b. Raw Data Sets
i. National Law Data Set
Table 4: National Law Data Set
State

OST
RATF

RRA
RATF

LC
RATF

RC
RATF

NL
(uncorr)

NL
(corr)

United States

Oct-67

Dec-68

Oct-73

Sep-76

Jul-58

Jul-58

Japan

Oct-67

Jun-83

Jun-83

Jun-83

Jun-69

Jun-69

Norway

Jul-69

Apr-70

Apr-95

Jun-95

Jun-69

Jun-69

Ireland

Jul-68

Aug-68

Jun-72

Switzerland

Dec-69

Dec-69

Jan-74

Mexico

Jan-68

Mar-69

Apr-74

Finland

Jul-67

Sep-70

Feb-77

Denmark

Oct-67

May-69

Apr-77

Greece

Jan-71

Jul-75

Apr-77

Romania

Apr-68

Jun-71

Mar-80

Sweden

Oct-67

Jul-69

Jun-76

May-72

Mar-78

Feb-83

Italy

-

Feb-78

Jan-74

-

Mar-77

Apr-74

-

Feb-77

-

Apr-77

Apr-77

-

Mar-03

Apr-77

-

Mar-80

-

Jun-76

Nov-82

Nov-82

Dec-05

Jan-83

Jan-83

-

-

Jan-06

United Kingdom

Oct-67

Dec-68

Oct-73

Mar-78

Jul-86

Jul-86

Canada

Oct-67

Feb-75

Feb-75

Aug-76

May-90

May-90

Czech Republic

Jan-93

Jan-93

Jan-93

Feb-93

Jan-93

-

South Africa

Sep-68

Sep-69

Dec-11

Jan-12

Jun-93

Jun-93

Russian Federation

Oct-67

Dec-68

Oct-73

Jan-78

Aug-93

Aug-93

Brazil

Mar-69

Feb-73

Mar-73

Mar-06

Feb-94

Feb-94

Spain

Nov-68

Feb-01

Jan-80

Dec-78

Feb-95

Feb-95

Argentina

Mar-69

Mar-69

Nov-86

May-93

Jul-95

Jul-95

Ukraine

Oct-67

Jan-69

Oct-73

Sep-77

Nov-96

Nov-96

India

Jan-82

Jul-79

Jul-79

Jan-82

Jun-97

-

Australia

Oct-67

Mar-86

Jan-75

Mar-86

Dec-98

Dec-98

Belarus

Oct-67

Dec-68

Jan-78

Dec-98

Dec-98

People's Republic of China

Dec-83

Dec-88

Dec-88

Dec-88

Feb-01

Feb-01

Chile

Oct-81

Oct-81

Dec-76

Sep-81

Jul-01

Jul-01

Dec-70

Feb-74

Jun-05

Jun-05

Signatory

Oct-83

Jun-72

Luxembourg

Iran

Signatory

-

Signatory

-

Signatory

Oct-83

-

Belgium

Mar-73

Apr-77

Aug-76

Feb-77

Sep-05

Sep-05

Republic of Korea

Oct-67

Apr-69

Jan-80

Oct-81

Dec-05

Dec-05

Algeria

Jan-92

Signatory

Oct-06

Mar-07

Jun-06

Jun-06

Signatory

Jul-14

Jan-14

Jul-06

Jul-06

Feb-81

Jan-81

Jan-07

Jan-07

Colombia
Netherlands

Signatory
Oct-69

Feb-81
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Venezuela

Mar-70

Signatory

Oct-07

Oct-07

Germany

Feb-71

Feb-72

Aug-72

Oct-79

Nov-07

Nov-07

France

Aug-70

Dec-75

Dec-75

Dec-75

Jun-08

Jun-08

Nigeria

Nov-67

Mar-73

Dec-05

Jul-09

Aug-10

Aug-10

Austria

Feb-68

Feb-70

Jan-80

Mar-80

Dec-11

Dec-11

Kazakhstan

Jun-98

Jun-98

Jun-98

Jan-01

Jan-12

Jan-12
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Aug-78

-

ii. Comparative Analysis Data Set
Table 5: Comparative Analysis Data Set

Time

UN

223

Oct-45

32

Nov-45

45

Dec-45

51

Nov-46

54

Dec-46

55

Sep-47

57

Apr-48

58

May-49

59

Sep-50

60

Dec-55

76

Nov-56

79

Dec-56

80

Mar-57

81

Sep-57

82

OSTSIG

RRARATF

RRASIG

LCRATF

LCSIG

RCRATF

RCSIG

NL
(uncorr)

NL
(corr)

1

Jul-58
Dec-58

OSTRATF

82

COPUOS

1
18
24

Dec-59
Sep-60

99

Sep-61

100

Oct-61

102

Dec-61

104

28

Sep-62

108

Oct-62

110

May-63

111

Dec-63

113

Dec-64

115

Sep-65

117

Sep-66

118

Dec-66

122

Jan-67

20

Feb-67

24

224

Mar-67

1

Apr-67

2

25

May-67

3

26

Jun-67

4

27

Jul-67

6

28

Sep-67
Oct-67

20

Nov-67

21

Dec-67

123

22

Jan-68

24

Feb-68

26

Mar-68

28
31

14

May-68

32

16

Jun-68

34

19

Apr-68

124

Jul-68

36

2

23

Aug-68

37

3

25

Sep-68

125

41

Oct-68
Nov-68

40

126

4

44

Dec-68

45

10

Jan-69

46

14
19

Feb-69
Mar-69

50

23

Apr-69

51

28

May-69

31

Jun-69

33

225

52

Jul-69

35
36

Sep-69
Oct-69

53

Dec-69

54

39
41

Feb-70
56

Mar-70

42

Apr-70

44

May-70

45
57

Jul-70

46

Aug-70
60

Sep-70
Oct-70

47

127

Nov-70

48

Dec-70

50

3

3

Jan-71

61

Feb-71

62

51

Jun-71

63

52
53

Jul-71
Sep-71

130

Oct-71

131

Dec-71

132
54

Feb-72

1

Mar-72

15

Apr-72

226

May-72

64

Jun-72

65

55

Jul-72

67

56

2

17

4

19
20

Aug-72

6

Sep-72

8

Oct-72

10
68

Nov-72

57

Dec-72

11

Jan-73

12

Feb-73
69

Mar-73

58

14

59

16

Apr-73

19

May-73

21
70

Aug-73
Sep-73
Oct-73

14

60

22

61

26

135

21

4

37

Dec-73
Jan-74

28

Feb-74

29

Mar-74

30

Apr-74

31

Jun-74

32

Sep-74

6

138

Oct-74

33

Jan-75

34
62

Feb-75

35

Mar-75

36

Apr-75

37

227

22

May-75

2

63

Jul-75

38

Aug-75
Sep-75

141

39

Oct-75

142

40

Nov-75

143

Dec-75

144

3
64

41

1

42

Apr-76

2

May-76
Jun-76
Aug-76

72

65
66

Sep-76

145

73

Dec-76

147

74

Jan-77

5

43

3

44

4
5

46
47

6

4

75

Feb-77

48
67

Apr-77
76

Jun-77

50

9
10

149

11

Oct-77

12

Dec-77

13
77

Jan-78

68

53

15
16

Feb-78
69

Mar-78

17

228

Apr-78

18

Jul-78

19
54

Aug-78
150

20

Nov-78
Dec-78

151

21
78

Feb-79

70

Mar-79

22

79

Jun-79

71

Jul-79
Sep-79

9

51

Aug-77

Sep-78

7

8

Mar-77

Sep-77

7

55

152
23

Oct-79
Dec-79

56

Jan-80

59

Feb-80

61

47

62

Mar-80

24

10

Apr-80
80

Jun-80
Aug-80

153

Sep-80

154
81

Oct-80

72

63
53

Nov-80
25

Jan-81
73

Feb-81

64

May-81
Sep-81

156
82

Oct-81

229

Nov-81

26
74

27

157
83

Jan-82

28

Feb-82

65

Nov-82

66

Jan-83
Feb-83

67

Mar-83

68
75

Jun-83
Sep-83

70

Dec-83

84

Jan-84

85

Jun-84

4

12

5

29

158

Oct-83

Apr-84

69

11

76

13

Sep-84

159
30

Apr-85
86

Jan-86

31

Feb-86
77

Mar-86

32

87

Jun-86
Jul-86
Nov-86

88

Mar-88

89

Nov-88

90

Dec-88

230

Jan-89

91

Jun-89

92

Apr-90

6

15

7

71
78

72

79

73

34

160

May-90
Sep-90

14

159

May-91
Sep-91

166

Oct-91
93

Jan-92
Mar-92

175

May-92

178

Jul-92

179

Jan-93

180

74

81

75

16
35

Feb-93
Apr-93

93

80

181

May-93

183

37
17

8

Aug-93

18

9

Feb-94

19

10

Jun-93
Jul-93

184

May-94

82

76

Aug-94

83

77

Dec-94

185

61
78

20

11

21

12

Nov-96

22

13

Jun-97

23

Feb-95
Apr-95

38

Jun-95
Jul-95

231

94

May-96

79

Jun-96

39

Jul-97
95

Jun-98

84

80
25

Dec-98
Feb-99

40

Apr-99

41
96

May-99

81

86

Jun-99
Sep-99

188

Sep-00

189

Oct-00

85

97

82

15

Nov-00

189

42
43

Jan-01
87

Feb-01

26

16

27

17

44

Mar-01
Jul-01

64

Dec-01
98

Jun-02
Sep-02

191
83

Nov-02

65

Dec-02
45

Mar-03
Jun-04

232

67

Dec-04
Jun-05

28

18

Sep-05

29

19

30

20

31

21

32

22

33

23

Nov-05
84

Dec-05
99

Jan-06

47

Mar-06
Apr-06
Jun-06

192

89

85

48

86

49

87

Jul-06

50

Oct-06
Dec-06

90

Jan-07
Feb-07

46

88

51

Mar-07
Oct-07

34

24

Nov-07

35

25
69

Dec-07
Jun-08
100

Mar-09

36

26

37

27

52
53

Jul-09
91

Nov-09

89
54

Jan-10
101

Apr-10
Aug-10

55

Oct-10

233

70

Dec-10
Jul-11

193

Oct-11
90

Dec-11

56

Jan-12

38

28

39

29

71

Feb-12
Mar-12

102

92

57

Jul-12

58

Sep-12

59
74

Dec-12
Mar-13

103

93

91

60
76

Dec-13
Jan-14

61

62

Apr-14
92

Jul-14

77

Dec-14
Jun-15
Oct-15

104

83
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iii. COPUOS Membership
Table 6: COPUOS Membership

States

Date

Count

Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia

Dec-58

18

Dec-59

24

Dec-61

28

( now Czech Republic), France, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico,
Poland, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ( now
Russian Federation), the United Arab Republic ( now Egypt), the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland & the United
States of America
Albania , Argentina, Australia, Austria , Belgium,
Brazil, Bulgaria , Canada, Czechoslovakia ( now Czech Republic ),
France, Hungary , India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon , Mexico,
Poland, Romania , Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
( now Russian Federation ), the United Arab Republic ( now
Egypt ), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
& the United States of America
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Chad , Czechoslovakia ( now Czech Republic ), France,
Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon,
Mexico, Mongolia ,Morocco , Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone ,
Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ( now Russian
Federation ), the United Arab Republic ( now Egypt ), the United
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Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland & the United States
of America
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,

Dec-73

37

Dec-77

47

Canada, Chad, Chile , Czechoslovakia ( now Czech
Republic ), Federal Republic of Germany , Egypt,
France, German Democratic Republic , Hungary,
India, Indonesia , Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya , Lebanon, Mexico,
Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria , Pakistan , Poland, Romania, Sierra
Leone, Sudan , Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
( now Russian Federation ), the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, & Venezuela
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin , Brazil,
Bulgaria, Cameroon , Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia ,
Czechoslovakia ( now Czech Republic ), Ecuador , Egypt, Federal
Republic of Germany, France, German Democratic Republic,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq , Italy, Japan, Kenya,
Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands , Niger ,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines , Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone,
Sudan, Sweden, Turkey , the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
( now Russian Federation ), the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Venezuela
& Yugoslavia

236

Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Brazil,

Nov-80

53

Dec-94

61

Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Chile, China , Colombia, Czechoslovakia
( now Czech Republic ), Ecuador, Egypt, Federal Republic of
Germany, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece 1 ,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon,
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, Spain , Sudan,
Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic , Turkey , 1 the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics ( now Russian Federation ), the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United Republic
of Cameroon, the United States of America, Upper Volta ( now
Burkina Faso) , Uruguay , Venezuela, Viet Nam & Yugoslavia
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Cuba 2 , Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France,
Hungary, Germany, Greece 3 , India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy,
Japan, Kazakhstan , Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia 2 , Mexico,
Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua , Niger, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Peru 2 , Philippines, Poland, Portugal 3 , Republic of
Korea 2 , Romania, the Russian Federation, Senegal , Sierra
Leone, South Africa , Spain 3 , Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab
Republic, Turkey, 3 the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
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Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Ukraine 4 ,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam & Yugoslavia
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Brazil,

Dec-01

64

Dec-02

65

Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China,
Colombia, Cuba 5 , Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France,
Hungary, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia 5 , Mexico, Mongolia,
Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru 5 ,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea 5 , Romania, the
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia , Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Slovakia , South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab
Republic, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Ukraine, Uruguay,
Venezuela & Viet Nam
Albania, Algeria , Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile,
China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France,
Hungary, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia,
Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, the
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia,
South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey,
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the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the
United States of America, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela & Viet Nam
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin,

Dec-04

67

Dec-07

69

Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile,
China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France,
Hungary, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ( now
Libya) , Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain,
Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand , Turkey, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United
States of America, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela & Viet Nam
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Benin, Bolivia , Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada,
Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, France, Hungary, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya ( now Libya ), Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco,
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian
Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South
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Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland , Syrian Arab Republic,
Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the United States of America, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela
& Viet Nam
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin,

Dec-10

70

Dec-11

71

Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad,
Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
France, Hungary, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
( now Libya ), Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain,
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic,
Thailand, Tunisia , Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Ukraine,
Uruguay, Venezuela & Viet Nam
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan ,
Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, France, Hungary, Germany, Greece, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon,
Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands,
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Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain,
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand,
Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the United States of America, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela
& Viet Nam
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia , Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica ,
Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Hungary, Germany,
Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan ,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia,
Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, the
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia,
South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab
Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Ukraine,
Uruguay, Venezuela & Viet Nam
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Dec-12

74

Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,

Dec-13

76

Dec-14

77

Azerbaijan, Belgium, Belarus , Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France,
Hungary, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia,
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of
Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United
States of America, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela & Viet Nam
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,
Azerbaijan, Belgium, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France,
Hungary, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon,
Libya, Luxembourg , Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco,
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian
Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South
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Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Ukraine, Uruguay,
Venezuela & Viet Nam
UAE, Sri Lanka, Israel, Qatar, Oman, El Salvador
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